Nikah ke baad rukhsti na hu or orat khula le le tu wo haqmahar ki haqdar nahi hu gi?
 |
| Nikah ke baad rukhsti na hu or orat khula le le tu wo haqmahar ki haqdar nahi hu gi. |
1۔ نکاح کی تکمیل کے بغیر خلع — مہر کی عدم ادائیگی
(Writ Petition No. 826 of 2022، فیصلہ مؤرخہ 22.01.2024)
2۔ فریقین
درخواست گزار / شوہر: محمد شعیب
مدعا علیہ / بیوی: سیدہ بی بی
3۔ مقدمے کا پس منظر
(ا) فریقین کا نکاح 05.09.2015 کو ہوا۔
(ب) نکاح کے بعد رخصتی (نکاح کی تکمیل) نہیں ہوئی۔
(ج) سیدہ بی بی نے خلع کی بنیاد پر نکاح کی تنسیخ اور مہر کی وصولی کا دعویٰ دائر کیا۔
(د) دعویٰ میں درج مہر میں:
(ا) 5 مرلہ پلاٹ،
(ب) 5 لاکھ روپے مالیت کا مکان،
(ج) 2 مرلہ کمرشل پلاٹ شامل تھا۔
(ہ) فیملی کورٹ نے نصف مہر کا دعویٰ منظور کیا جسے اپیلیٹ کورٹ نے برقرار رکھا۔
4۔ درخواست گزار (شوہر) کا موقف
(ا) نکاح کی کبھی تکمیل نہیں ہوئی۔
(ب) مہر کے اندراج میں جعلسازی اور رد و بدل کیا گیا۔
(ج) خلع بیوی کے مطالبے پر ہوئی، شوہر نے طلاق نہیں دی۔
(د) اسلامی قانون کے مطابق ایسی صورت میں بیوی مہر کی حقدار نہیں۔
5۔ ہائی کورٹ کے سامنے قانونی سوال
(ا) کیا ایسی بیوی جو:
(ا) خلع خود حاصل کرے،
(ب) اور نکاح کی تکمیل یا صحیح خلوت نہ ہوئی ہو،
(ب) مہر یا نصف مہر کی حقدار ہو سکتی ہے؟
6۔ اسلامی قانون کا اصول (عدالتی تشریح)
(ا) مہر درج ذیل صورتوں میں واجب اور مؤکد ہوتا ہے:
(ا) نکاح کی تکمیل (consummation)،
(ب) خلوتِ صحیحہ،
(ج) میاں یا بیوی میں سے کسی کی وفات۔
(ب) اگر شوہر طلاق دے اور نکاح کی تکمیل نہ ہوئی ہو تو نصف مہر واجب ہوتا ہے
(سورۃ البقرہ، آیت 237)
(ج) لیکن اگر:
(ا) نکاح کی تکمیل نہ ہوئی ہو،
(ب) اور علیحدگی بیوی کے مطالبے پر خلع کے ذریعے ہوئی ہو،
(د) تو بیوی کسی بھی مہر کی حقدار نہیں۔
7۔ مستند فقہی حوالہ جات
(ا) Mulla’s Principles of Muhammadan Law (Para 289-F)
(ب) Anglo-Muhammadan Law (Para 78(4))
(ج) ڈاکٹر تنزیل الرحمٰن — قانونِ ازدواج
(د) تمام حوالہ جات کے مطابق:
خلع اگر بیوی کی خواہش پر اور قبل از تکمیل نکاح ہو تو مہر ساقط ہو جاتا ہے۔
8۔ ہائی کورٹ کا فیصلہ
(ا) دونوں نچلی عدالتوں نے:
(ا) اسلامی قانون کے اس بنیادی اصول کو نظرانداز کیا،
(ب) اور نصف مہر دینے کا حکم دے کر
دائرہ اختیار سے تجاوز کیا۔
(ب) یہ jurisdictional error تھا جس کی اصلاح ضروری تھی۔
9۔ حتمی حکم
(ا) آئینی درخواست منظور کی گئی۔
(ب) فیملی کورٹ اور اپیلیٹ کورٹ کے فیصلے:
نصف مہر کے حوالے سے کالعدم قرار دیے گئے۔
(ج) سیدہ بی بی کی مہر کی وصولی کی درخواست مسترد کر دی گئی۔
10۔ اصولِ قانون
(ا) خلع اگر بیوی کے مطالبے پر ہو،
(ب) اور نکاح کی تکمیل یا خلوتِ صحیحہ نہ ہوئی ہو،
(ج) تو بیوی مہر یا نصف مہر کی حقدار نہیں ہوتی۔
لاہور ہائی کورٹ، بہاولپور بنچ نے 22 جنوری 2024 کو محمد شعیب اور ایڈیشنل ڈسٹرکٹ جج، لودھراں کے کیس میں فیصلہ سنایا۔ اس کیس میں سیدہ بی بی نے محمد شعیب سے مہر کی ادائیگی اور نکاح کے خاتمے کے لیے مقدمہ دائر کیا تھا۔ فیملی کورٹ نے مہر کا نصف حصہ دینے کا حکم دیا، جو اپیل کورٹ نے بھی برقرار رکھا۔
محمد شعیب نے اس فیصلے کو چیلنج کیا، اور کہا کہ چونکہ کوئی رکھی (نکاح کی تکمیل) نہیں ہوئی اور نکاح خلع کے ذریعے ختم ہوا، اس لیے سیدہ بی بی کو کوئی مہر نہیں ملنا چاہیے۔ عدالت نے محمد شعیب کے موقف کو تسلیم کیا اور کہا کہ اسلامی قانون کے تحت مہر صرف اس صورت میں ادا کیا جاتا ہے جب نکاح کی تکمیل ہو یا صحیح خلع ہو۔ چونکہ خلع کی درخواست سیدہ بی بی نے دی تھی اور نکاح کی تکمیل نہیں ہوئی، اس لیے سیدہ بی بی کو مہر کا کوئی حق نہیں۔
عدالت نے دونوں نچلی عدالتوں کے فیصلے کو کالعدم قرار دے دیا اور سیدہ بی بی کی مہر کی وصولی کی درخواست مسترد کر دی۔
Must read Judgement
Stereo H C J D A 38.
Judgment Sheet
IN THE LAHORE HIGH COURT
BAHAWALPUR BENCH, BAHAWALPUR
JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
Writ Petition No.826 of 2022
Muhammad Shoaib
Versus
ADJ, Lodhran, etc.
JUDGMENT
Date of hearing
22.01.2024
Petitioner by:
Mr. Akbar Fayyaz Arain, Advocate.
Respondent by:
Mr. Amjad Parvez, Advocate.
SHAKIL AHMAD, J.: This petition has been filed under
Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 (“the
Constitution”) by Muhammad Shoaib (petitioner herein) to assail
consolidated judgment & decree dated 28.10.2021 and judgment & decree
dated 12.01.2022, respectively passed by learned Senior Civil Judge (Family
Division), Lodhran and District Judge, Lodhran, whereby suit for recovery of
dower, etc. filed by Sadia Bibi (hereinafter referred to as the ‘respondent’)
was partially decreed, whereas appeal filed by petitioner against decree of trial
court was dismissed.
2.
Facts, in brief, giving rise to the filing of instant petition are that
the respondent instituted a suit against the petitioner on 16.05.2020 seeking
dissolution of marriage besides seeking recovery of dower consisting of
05-Marla plot, a constructed house valuing Rs.5,00,000/- and 02-Marla
commercial plot falling in Khewat No.1717, Khatooni Nos.91 to 217/218
valuing Rs.15,00,000/- as detailed in column No.16 of the Nikahnama,
precisely on the ground that her marriage was solemnized with petitioner on
05.09.2015, however, no rukhsati took place and that she had developed
strong aversion against the petitioner as he was a person of bad character
besides being a drunkard and she would rather prefer to die than joining the
2
Writ Petition No.826 of 2022
petitioner. Matter was contested by petitioner by way of filing written
statement raising therein some preliminary objections as well as allegation of
forgery and interpolation in the entries of Nikahnama qua dower consisting of
landed property. In the meanwhile, petitioner also preferred to file separate
suit seeking cancellation of entries as stipulated in column Nos.15 & 16 of the
Nikahnama on the ground that same were the result of forgery. Both the suits
were consolidated and after framing consolidated issues by the learned Judge
Family Court, both the parties produced their respective evidence. Learned
Judge Family Court after hearing learned counsel for the parties proceeded to
dismiss the suit filed by petitioner, whereas suit filed by respondent was
partially decreed vide consolidated judgment & decree dated 28.10.2021,
whereby respondent was held entitled to get half of the dower as mentioned
in the Nikahnama. Petitioner’s appeal filed before learned District Judge,
Lodhran, however, was dismissed vide judgment & decree dated 12.01.2022,
hence this petition.
3.
Heard learned counsel for the parties. Record perused.
4.
In view of pleadings of the parties and evidence adduced at trial
facts that petitioner’s Nikah was solemnized with respondent on 05.09.2015
and no rukhsati took place till the dissolution of marriage vide decree dated
29.10.2020 passed in terms of section 10(4)(5) of the Family Courts Act, 1964
(“Act 1964”) have attained the status of admitted facts between the parties. In
the face of these admitted facts, question that whether respondent is entitled
to dower as decreed by learned Judge Family Court and maintained by learned
Appellate Court or not needs to be answered in the instant petition. A factual
controversy qua fixation of dower amount as hinted in the Nikahnama,
however, needs to be taken up in the first place prior to dilating upon and
answering above hinted query. The fact qua fixation of dower, as claimed by
the respondent in her plaint is disputed by the petitioner in his written
statement in addition to challenging the same through filing of separate suit.
As per stance taken by the respondent, 05-Marla plot, a constructed house
valuing Rs.5,00,000/- and 02-Marla commercial plot valuing Rs.15,00,000/-
was fixed as dower and this fact was duly incorporated in Nikah Nama
3
Writ Petition No.826 of 2022
whereas according to petitioner, at the time of Nikah, only Haq-ul-Maher to
the extent of 02-Marlas land was settled and same was incorporated in
Nikahnama but subsequently same was changed in the Nikah Nama as the
digit ‘4’ was superimposed on digit ‘2’ in the first Nikah Pert and in second
Nikah Pert entry qua 05-Marlas land was the result of forgery. Both the courts
below while resolving this controversy preferred to accept the stance of
respondent by rejecting the version of the petitioner by observing that
petitioner failed to prove any forgery and tempering in Nikahnama through
any positive and cogent evidence. The findings of facts recorded by both the
courts below having jurisdiction to decide the matter can hardly be revisited
while invoking the constitutional jurisdiction of this Court. In case “Shajar
Islam v. Muhammad Siddique” (PLD 2007 SC 45), the Supreme Court of
Pakistan observed that this Court should not interfere with the finding on
controversial questions of facts based on evidence even if those findings were
erroneous. While explaining the scope of judicial review under Article 199 of
the Constitution, it was further observed in the said esteemed judgment as
under: -
“…that the scope of judicial review under Article 199 of the
Constitution in such cases was limited to instances of misreading or
non-reading of evidence or when the finding was based on no
evidence, leading to miscarriage of justice and that the high court
should not disturb findings of fact through a reappraisal of evidence
in its constitutional jurisdiction or use this jurisdiction as a
substitute for a revision or appeal and that an interference with the
lower courts' findings of fact was beyond the scope of the high
court's jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution. …”
(Underlining is to supply emphasis).
Subsequently, in case “Mst. Tayyeba Ambareen and another v. Shafqat
Ali Kiyani and another” (2023 SCMR 246), it was further resolved by the
Supreme Court of Pakistan that the objective of exercising jurisdiction under
Article 199 of the Constitution is to foster justice, preserve rights and to
correct the wrong. It was further observed that appraisal of evidence is
primarily the function of the Trial Court. Learned counsel for petitioner
remained unable to point out any instance of misreading or
non-reading of evidence by the learned courts below, therefore, findings of
facts qua mentioning of dower in Nikahnama as claimed by the respondent
cannot be taken to any exception particularly when petitioner has not opted to
4
Writ Petition No.826 of 2022
impugn judgments of both the learned courts below whereby his suit for
cancellation of entries in Nikahnama was dismissed as in the instant petition
he has prayed only for dismissal of the suit filed by the respondent. Even
findings of both the learned courts below on this factual controversy have not
been seriously objected to by learned counsel for the petitioner who by placing
reliance on case “Ajmal Khan and another v. Mst. Falak Negar Bibi and 2
others” (PLD 2019 Peshawar 218) merely focused his arguments on the
point that since no Rukhsti had taken place and marriage stood dissolved at
the instance of the respondent, she would not be entitled to receive any dower.
5.
Reverting to the moot point so formulated in the opening lines of
preceding paragraph, it may be seen that according to learned counsel for the
petitioner, respondent was not entitled to any amount of dower in view of
admitted facts of this case. Learned counsel for the respondent controverted
the said plea and argued that where marriage between the parties was
dissolved prior to valid retirement (khalwat-e-sahiha), respondent would
become entitled to half of the dower and according to him both the courts
below rightly proceeded to award half of the dower through the impugned
judgments and decrees. It is by now settled proposition of Islamic law that if
marriage between the parties has either been consummated or there was a
valid retirement (khalwat-e-sahiha) before pronouncement of divorce by the
husband, the whole of the unpaid dower whether prompt or deferred, becomes
immediately payable by the husband to the wife and is
enforceable/recoverable like any other debt, however, if there was no
consummation of marriage or a valid retirement (khalwat-e-sahiha) before
pronouncement of divorce by the husband, the wife would be entitled to get
half of the dower so fixed in view of the command of Allah as ordained in
Ayat No.237 of Surah Al-Baqarah, English translation1 of which reads as
follows: -
“If ye divorce them before ye have touched them, and have already
settled a dower on them, ye shall pay them one-half of what ye have
settled.” (Surah Al-Baqarah Ayat 237).
1 HEDAYA or guide: a commentary on the MUSSULMAN LAWS by Charles Hamilton, Second Edition Vol.I
(page No.44)
5
Writ Petition No.826 of 2022
Undeniably, in the instant case, petitioner did not pronounce divorce upon the
respondent and respondent obtained the decree for the dissolution of marriage
in terms of section 10(4)(5) of the Act, 1964 before consummation of marriage
or valid retirement. In the instant case, it was the respondent who herself
approached the court seeking dissolution of marriage on the basis of Khula by
asserting that she would rather die than joining the petitioner as his wife. Since
in the instant matter, petitioner did not dissolve the marriage by pronouncing
divorce upon respondent prior to consummation of marriage or valid
retirement, respondent would not become entitled to receive even half of her
dower as decreed by the learned Judge Family Court and maintained by the
learned Appellate Court. In view of para No.289-F of the Principles of
Muhammadan Law by D.F. Mulla 2
, dower becomes confirmed by
consummation of marriage; or by valid retirement (khalwat-e-sahiha); or by
death of either husband or wife and in case husband pronounces divorce upon
his wife before consummation of marriage or valid retirement
(khalwat-e-sahiha), wife would become entitled to receive half of the dower.
In this case, however, it is not the case that the marriage between the parties
was dissolved by pronouncing divorce by the petitioner and it was respondent
who obtained decree for the dissolution of marriage in terms of section
10(4)(5) of the Act, 1964. Where marriage was not dissolved by way of
pronouncing talaq by the husband on a wife and marriage was not
consummated or there was no valid retirement, wife would not be entitled to
any amount of dower so fixed if dissolution of marriage had taken place at her
wish or instance. Reference in this regard may be made to Para No. 78(4) of
Anglo-Muhammadan Law3
and same is reproduced hereunder for the facility
of ready reference: -
“78. The consequences indicated in the first five sub-clauses of
this section follow from the completion of a valid (bain) divorce by
any of the above-mentioned methods.
(1) …
(2) …
(3) …
(4) If the marriage had been consummated before the
divorce, the whole of the unpaid dower, whether prompt
or deferred, becomes immediately payable by the
2 Pakistan Edition (Revised Edition 2015) published by PLD Publishers, Nabha Road, Lahore
3 By SIR ROLAND KNYVET WILSON (Fifth Edition). Published in 1921 by CALCUTTA AND SIMLA, THACKER,
SPINK & CO, LONDON: W.THACKER & CO., 2, CREED LANE, E
Writ Petition No.826 of 2022
husband to the wife, and is enforceable like any other
debt.
If the marriage had not been consummated, and the
amount of dower was specified in the contract, he is
liable for half that amount; if none was specified, he must
give the divorced wife a present (mut’at), consisting of
three articles of dress suitable to her rank, or their value.
But the wife has no right to anything if the divorce before
consummation took place by her wish, or in consequence
of any disqualification on her side-e.g. her apostasy.
(Underlining is to supply emphasis).
Same view has been taken by Dr. Tanzeel-ur-Rehman at para-72 of his
celebrated work titled “االسم وقانین ومجمہع”4
in the following terms:-
ولخت ہحیحص ےک ریغب الطق ای خسف اکنح یک وصرت ںیم رمد ےک ذہم فصن رہم وابج وہ اگ۔
وتحیض: )افل( ارگ وکیئ رہم رقمر ہن وہا وہ وت وعرت وک رصف ڑپکوں اکاکی وجڑا دای اجےئ اگ-
)ب( ارگ خسف اکنح یک ذہم دا ری وعرت رپ وہ وت وہ ھچک رہم اپےن یک قحتسم ہن وہ یگ-
Learned author further elaborated above referred point in the note given by
him at page No.290 of the said book that reads as under:-
رہم یمسم یک وصرت ںیم اکنح خسف وہےن رپ فصن رہم وابج وہاگ نکیل ارگولخت ہحیحص ےس لبق امنیب
زونیج رفتقی واعق وہ اجےئ سج یک ذہم دا ری وعرت رپ وہ وت وعرت ھچک رہم اپےن یک قحتسم ہن وہ یگ۔
(Underlining is to supply emphasis).
In the instant case, separation between the parties that undeniably happened
prior to either consummation of marriage or any valid retirement, was not by
way of pronouncing divorce by the petitioner rather the marriage was
dissolved on the basis of Khula in terms of section 10(4)(5) of the Act, 1964
vide decree dated 29.10.2020 passed by learned Judge Family Court as
respondent was not willing to join the petitioner in any manner and came up
with the assertion that she would rather die than joining the petitioner as his
wife. In such eventuality, respondent No.3 was not entitled to any amount of
dower, however, both the courts below have passed the impugned judgments
and decrees by remaining altogether oblivious to the above hinted legal aspect
of the matter. In view of admitted facts and circumstances of the instant case,
respondent was not at all entitled to receive any dower whatsoever. While
4
جلد اول، قانون ازدواج،ناشر "ادارہ تحقیقات اسالمی، الجامعہ االسالمیہ العالمیہ
7
Writ Petition No.826 of 2022
passing impugned judgments & decrees, both the courts below have
committed jurisdictional error and exceeded their jurisdiction. Instant case is
a fit case for interfering in impugned judgments & decrees in view of the
guidelines given in Mst. Tayyeba Ambareen’s 5
case by invoking the
provisions of Article 199 of the Constitution for the reason that objective of
Article 199 of the Constitution is to foster justice, protect rights and to correct
the wrong. In the instant case wrong committed by both the courts below
needs to be corrected by invoking the jurisdiction under the provisions of
Article 199 of the Constitution in order to foster justice and protect the rights
of petitioner. Findings of both the courts below to the extent of holding
respondent entitled to get half of the dower are not sustainable.
6.
The upshot of above discussion is that petition in hand is allowed,
impugned consolidated judgment & decree dated 28.10.2021 passed by
learned Senior Civil Judge (Family Division), Lodhran and judgment &
decree dated 12.01.2022 passed by learned Additional District Judge, Lodhran
to the extent of holding respondent entitled to get half of the dower are
set aside and in consequence whereof, suit for recovery of dower filed by
respondent No.3 stands dismissed.
(SHAKIL AHMAD)
JUDGE
Mohsin Raza*
Approved for reporting.
JUDG