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| Buyer during pendency of suit |
دورانِ مقدمہ پلاٹ خریدنے والے خریدار کو فریق بنانے کا قانونی حق — لاہور ہائی کورٹ کا اہم فیصلہ
مقدمے کے دوران پلاٹ کی خریداری اور قبضے کا تنازع
لاہور ہائی کورٹ نے قرار دیا ہے کہ اگر کسی متنازعہ جائیداد کا خریدار مقدمہ زیرِ سماعت ہونے کے دوران جائیداد خرید کر اس پر قبضہ حاصل کر لے تو حالات کے مطابق اسے مقدمے میں فریق بنانا ضروری ہو سکتا ہے، تاکہ اس کے حقوق اور مؤقف کو بھی سنا جا سکے۔
مقدمے کے دوران پلاٹ خریدا گیا
مقدمے میں ایک شخص نے ہاؤسنگ سوسائٹی اور ڈویلپرز کے خلاف پلاٹ کے قبضے کے حصول کے لیے دعویٰ دائر کر رکھا تھا۔ دورانِ مقدمہ مذکورہ پلاٹ دوسرے افراد نے خرید لیا اور وہ اس کے قبضے میں بھی تھے۔
بعد ازاں ان خریداروں نے ضابطۂ دیوانی کے آرڈر I رول 10 کے تحت درخواست دائر کی کہ انہیں مقدمے میں فریق بنایا جائے۔ ٹرائل کورٹ نے ان کی درخواست منظور کر لی، لیکن ڈسٹرکٹ کورٹ نے اس حکم کو منسوخ کر دیا اور خریداروں اور ان کے فروخت کنندگان کے درمیان ملی بھگت کا شبہ ظاہر کیا۔
لاہور ہائی کورٹ نے کیا قرار دیا؟
لاہور ہائی کورٹ نے قرار دیا کہ کسی متنازعہ جائیداد کی خریداری دورانِ مقدمہ ہونے سے اصولِ لس پینڈنس لاگو ہوتا ہے، جس کے تحت ایسی منتقلی مقدمے کے حتمی فیصلے کے تابع ہوتی ہے۔ تاہم، اس اصول کا مطلب یہ نہیں کہ جائیداد کے موجودہ قابض خریداروں کو اپنا مؤقف پیش کرنے کا موقع ہی نہ دیا جائے۔
عدالت کے مطابق، اگر قابض خریداروں کو مقدمے میں فریق نہ بنایا جائے تو بعد میں وہ ضابطۂ دیوانی کی دفعہ 12(2) کے تحت یا عمل درآمد کی کارروائی میں اعتراضات کے ذریعے اپنے حقوق کا تحفظ حاصل کرنے کی کوشش کر سکتے ہیں۔ اس سے مزید مقدمہ بازی پیدا ہونے کا خدشہ ہے۔
ملی بھگت کا الزام لگانے سے پہلے سماعت ضروری ہے
ہائی کورٹ نے مزید قرار دیا کہ ڈسٹرکٹ کورٹ نے مقدمے کی سماعت مکمل ہونے سے پہلے ہی ملی بھگت کا شبہ ظاہر کرکے متنازعہ حقائق پر رائے قائم کی، حالانکہ متعلقہ خریداروں کو اپنا دفاع پیش کرنے کا موقع نہیں دیا گیا تھا۔
نظرثانی کی عدالت کا اختیار محدود ہوتا ہے۔ وہ محض اپنے اندازے کی بنیاد پر ٹرائل کورٹ کے فیصلے کو تبدیل کرکے ایسے حقائق کا تعین نہیں کر سکتی جن کا جائزہ شہادت کے بعد ٹرائل کورٹ نے لینا ہو۔
ہائی کورٹ کا حتمی فیصلہ
لاہور ہائی کورٹ نے ڈسٹرکٹ کورٹ کا فیصلہ کالعدم قرار دے دیا اور ٹرائل کورٹ کا وہ حکم بحال کر دیا جس کے تحت خریداروں کو مقدمے میں فریق بنانے کی اجازت دی گئی تھی۔ ٹرائل کورٹ کو ہدایت کی گئی کہ وہ مقدمے کی کارروائی قانون کے مطابق جاری رکھے اور ڈسٹرکٹ کورٹ کے ملی بھگت سے متعلق ریمارکس سے متاثر نہ ہو۔
قانونی اہمیت
اس فیصلے سے واضح ہوتا ہے کہ دورانِ مقدمہ جائیداد خریدنے والا شخص محض اصولِ Lis Pendens کی وجہ سے مقدمے میں فریق بننے کے حق سے خودبخود محروم نہیں ہوتا۔ اگر اس کا قبضہ یا قانونی مفاد براہِ راست متنازعہ ہو تو اسے فریق بنانے کی ضرورت کا جائزہ لیا جا سکتا ہے، تاکہ تمام متعلقہ فریقوں کو سن کر مؤثر اور حتمی فیصلہ کیا جا سکے۔
حوالہ مقدمہ: 2026 CLC 1490، لاہور ہائی کورٹ، رِٹ پٹیشن نمبر 13156/2025، فیصلہ مورخہ 26 جون 2025۔
Must read judgement.
2026 CLC 1490
[Lahore]
Before Anwaar Hussain, J
NADEEM ASLAM and others-Petitioners.
Versus
SHAHID MEHMOOD and 6 others ---Respondents
Writ Petition No. 13156 of 2025, heard on 26th June, 2025.
(a) Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882)---
-S. 52-Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), S. 12--Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S. 12(2) & O.I, R. 10--Suit for possession against a Housing Society / Developers-Subsequent purchaser being a necessary party-Scope-Principle of lis pendens--Scope-Principles of natural justice-Application under O.1, R.10, C.P.C. moved by of the subsequent purchasers/ possessors to become party in the suit for possession instituted by purchaser against the Housing Society / Developers was allowed, however, the Revisional/District Court dismissed the same casting aspersions of collusion-Validity-Admittedly, the disputed plot, was in possession of the petitioners (applicant under O.1, R.10, C.P.C.) C.P.C.) and undisputedly, the property /plot was purchased during the pendency of the suit between the respondent and the Developers and others and principle of lis pendens was applicable---However, the scope of 8.52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 ("the Act") was required to be kept insight inasmuch as the said provision of law non-suits the transferee pendente lite (who purchases the property during pendency of the case) by making such transfer subject to the decree-Section 52 of the Act clearly envisages that any transfer of immovable property made by a party to a pending suit concerning the said property is subject to the outcome of that suit; in this manner, said provision safeguards the litigating parties (plaintiff / the respondent in present case) against transfers designed to frustrate or circumvent the Court's adjudication--However, where the actual possessor or transferee (the petitioners in present case), who acquired possession or title during the pendency of the suit, is excluded from the proceedings, such omission may constitute a fundamental procedural and substantive defect inasmuch as non-joinder of such a necessary party not only violates the principles of natural justice but it also exposes any decree passed in such suit to vulnerability---The decree, in the absence of such a party, cannot conclusively bind the transferee and remains open to challenge on grounds of fraud or collusion, particularly through recourse to S.12(2), C.P.C. or by way of objections in the execution proceedings---Said vulnerability is rooted in S.52 of the Act itself as enforcement of a decree against the actual possessor-who purchased the property during the suit's pendency-necessarily requires the plaintiff (the respondent in present case) to establish that the decree was not procured collusively or by fraudulent means---Without such proof, the third party in possession (the petitioners in present case) is under no obligation to yield possession, rendering the decree ineffectual against hím-Thus, the inclusion of the actual possessor as a party is indispensable for the proper and final adjudication of rights and to prevent multiplicity of litigation---Therefore, in the present case, apparently, the petitioners had been wrongfully excluded from the suit instituted by the respondent against Housing Society / Developers---If the petitioners are denied joinder at this stage, they still retain the statutory right to seek remedy under S.12(2), C.P.C. or by filing an objection in execution proceedings, on the ground that the decree (if eventually passed in favour of the respondent) was obtained through collusion or fraud between the plaintiff (the respondent) and the defendants (Housing Society / Developers and others)---In-fact, in such a situation, it will further linger on the matter to the detriment of the respondent, which fact has not been appreciated by the Revisional/DistrictCourt below, while passing impugned judgment, which clearly demonstrates that the impugned judgment passed by the Revisional Court below is legally untenable-In contrast, Trial Trial C Court's order permitting itting the joinder of the petitioners accords with the settled legal position and the requirements of justice and equity-High Court set aside the impugned judgment of the Revisional /District Court and order of the Trial Court was restored; the Trial Court would proceed with the suit of the respondent strictly in accordance with law without being influenced from the remarks of the Revisional/District Court--Constitutional petitions. were allowed accordingly.
(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)...
- 115--Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), (IV of 1882), S. 52--Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), S. 12-Trial, pender factual questions /evidence-Revisional District Court, powers of-Scope-Application under O.1, R.10 Trial, pendency of--Appraisal of of disputed subsequent purchasers/possessors to become party in the suit for possession instituted by purchaser against the Housing Society/10, C.P.C. moved by of the Developers was allowed, however, the Revisional District Court dismissed the same observing aspersion findings of the Trial evaluafing disputed facts and evid Court, overstepped the permissible limits jurisdiction by delving into the merits of the case and undertaking an appraisal of the evidence available on record while the trial dity--Pertinently, the Revisional/District Court, while upsetting the still pending by observing that there existed a possibility of connivance between the their vendors and House Society/Developers-Such a sweeping remark, made at the petitioners (subsequent purchaser/posse revisional stage, not only transgres jurisdictional constraints placed upon, on a Revisional Court under S.115, C.P.C. but also prejudiced the position of the petitioners Housing Society Developers, particularly when the latter was contesting the suit and petitioners were yet to be impleaded-It is settled law that the function of a Revisional Court is supervisory and not appellate in nature; it cannot substitute its own findings of fact in place of those rendered by the Trial Court, unless there is a manif ifest error of law or jurisdiction more particularly when the trial has not been concluded and the Trial Court has yet to appraise the evidence---Such remarks on part of the Revisional Court below amount to a premature determination of facts, which defeats the rights of the parties to fair trial--The Revisional/District Court failed to consider that the proper forum to assess such disputed factual questions, including the alleged role of the petitioners or their vendors, was the Trial Court, being the Court of first instance-The obse observations made by the Revisional District Court, casting aspersions of col by leading evidence, was violative of the principle of audi alteram partem, thereby rendering the said findings legally unsustainable.. collusion without affording the petitioners any opportu ortunity to defend themselves. High Court set aside the impugned judgment of the Revisional /District Court and order of the Trial Court was restored; the Trial Court would proceed with the suit of the respo spondent strictly in accordance with law without being influenced from the remarks of the Revisional/District Court---Constitutional petitions were allowed accordingly.
Mian Rafaqat Ali for Petitioners.
Muhammad Saim Siddiqui for Respondent No. 1.
Imran Muhammad Sarwar for Respondent No. 2.