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| Review before division bench. |
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FORM No. HCJD/C-121
ORDER SHEET
IN THE LAHORE HIGH COURT,
MULTAN BENCH, MULTAN.
JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
Review Application No.07-C of 2026
Mst. Jameela Begum, etc.
versus
Sh. Fayyaz Ahmad, etc.
Sr. No. of order/
Proceedings
Date of order/
Proceeding
Order with signature of Judge, and that of
Parties’ counsel, where necessary
22.06.2026
M/s Muhammad Ali Siddiqui, Sammar Abbas, Miss
Fatima Safeer and Miss Memona Ashiq, Advocates
for the applicants.
Syed Muhammad Ali Gillani and Syed Tajammal
Hussain Bokhari, Advocates for the respondents.
Rana Ghulam Hussain, Assistant Attorney General
for Pakistan, Sarwar Ahmad Ghani, Sh. Faisal
Sikandar Iqbal, Muhammad Shahid Malik and
Samina Nighat Chughtai, Advocates.
Mr. Musleh-ud-Din Khan and Malik Muhammad
Bakhsh Khakhi Assistant Advocate Generals,
Punjab.
The petitioners/applicants, through this review
petition/application, have challenged interlocutory
order dated 27.02.2026 passed by the learned Single
Judge of this Court in FAO No.07/2026, directing the
applicants to deposit 30% arrears of rent and 20%
surety with the Deputy Registrar (Judl.) of this Court
within a period of one month.
It is claimed that the said order was not
justified as the petitioners are owners in possession
of the suit property on account of Judgment and
Decree dated 14.07.2011 passed by learned Civil
Judge Multan and as the relationship of landlord and
tenant did not exist between the parties, order for
deposit of rent and surety bond could not have been
passed as jurisdiction did not vest with the Court to
pass any such order, unless relationship of landlord
RA No.07-C of 2026
-:2:-
and tenant was established to exist in the instant
matter. It is claimed that it was for this reason that
this Court on 27.01.2026 unconditionally passed
order of status quo regarding the suit property but
later on despite the fact that the respondents had
requested for an adjournment to prepare the brief,
directed the petitioners to deposit the aforementioned
amount and surety, which is claimed not to be
justified in the given circumstances of the case. The
order dated 27.02.2026 is reproduced below for
clarity:
“Learned counsel seeks time to file
power of attorney on behalf of respondents
and to prepare his brief.
Appellants’ side is directed to deposit
30% of the arrears of rent and 20% of the
surety with the Deputy Registrar (Judl.) of this
Court within a period of one month and the
said amount shall be kept in a profitable
scheme.
Adjourned to 25.03.2026.”
On the other hand, an objection has been
raised by respondents that in view of the judgments
reported as Muzaffar Ali v. Muhammad Shafi (PLD
1981 Supreme Court 94) and Chairman, WAPDA v.
Habib Ahmad Hashmi (1986 MLD 978), this review
application is not maintainable as the applicable law
i.e. the Cantonments Rent Restriction Act, 1963 does
not provide remedy of review against orders passed
in rent matters, which is a substantive right and
unless substantive right of review is provided by the
statute, it cannot be exercised by the original
authority/forum or the Appellate Court while hearing
appeal against such orders for the reason that appeal
by operation of law is deemed to be continuation of
RA No.07-C of 2026
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the proceedings of the original Court/forum, where
the entire case reopens for adjudication.
In the case of Muzaffar Ali (Supra), the
question for determination before the Hon‟ble
Supreme Court of Pakistan was that whether an order
passed by the High Court in second appeal arising
out of a rent matter under the provisions of West
Pakistan Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 “the
Ordinance” was open to review. It has been held
that the Ordinance neither expressly nor by reference
bestowed any power of review and High Court had
no jurisdiction to review its orders passed in second
appeal under the Ordinance. Some extracts of the
operative portion of the judgment which constitute
reasoning for reaching the aforementioned
conclusion are reproduced below for ready reference
and clarity:-
“Right of review is a substantive right and is
always a creation of the relevant Statute on the
subject. The assumption that a review in
appeal is a continuation of the appeal, is not
correct, with the result that the further
corollary drawn therefrom in favour of
existence of a right of review on that score will
also consequently fall. Again the theory of
continuation of trial or proceeding is not
conclusive of the existence of a right to make a
previous judgment open for scrutiny whether
by a higher Court in the form of appeal or the
same Court in the form of a review. For
example, it will be appreciated that an appeal
is regarded as a continuation of trial, but it is
well settled that a jurisdiction or right of
appeal does not exist merely on this theory but
is to be created or granted by a Statute. If so
granted and if so invoked or exercised, the
proceedings in an appeal are considered as a
continuation of the trial, but the basic fact
remains that this jurisdiction is to be bestowed
by a Statute and Statute alone. If this is not
RA No.07-C of 2026
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done then the aforesaid theory by itself will not
create any right or jurisdiction of appeal.
Assuming without conceding, that a review is
also a continuation of the previous proceeding
even then before the proceedings are allowed
to further continue, in the form of a review, a
jurisdiction to do so in this case also must be
similarly conferred by a Statute just as it is to
be done in the case of grant of a right of
appeal, If there is no statutory conferment of
jurisdiction of review, like jurisdiction of
appeals, the theory of continuation of
proceeding will be of no avail.”
While relying on the above case law, a
Division Bench of the Sindh High Court at Karachi
in case of Habib Ahmad Hashmi (supra) held that
right of review being substantive right and always
creation of relevant statute, assumption that review in
appeal was continuation of appeal was not correct as
the Ordinance neither expressly nor by reference had
bestowed any powers of review and High Court had
no jurisdiction to review orders passed by it in
second appeal.
When confronted with the principles laid down
in the aforementioned judgments coupled with the
fact that same was the position with the Cantonments
Rent Restriction Act, 1963, the learned counsel for
the petitioners states that as the impugned order had
been passed without determining that whether there
existed relationship of landlord and tenant between
the parties, hence same was without jurisdiction,
which was an error apparent on the face of record,
therefore, this Court has jurisdiction to set the same
aside while exercising power of review. It is further
claimed that originally the review petition was
entertained by the learned Single Judge who was the
RA No.07-C of 2026
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author of the impugned order, which had been passed
without providing opportunity of hearing to the
parties as a request for adjournment had been made
by the respondents, hence despite the fact that the
matter has been placed before this Division Bench as
the learned Single Judge who passed the impugned
order is not available, this Court retains the
jurisdiction to entertain the same.
Although the learned counsel for the applicants
has defended the maintainability of instant review
application on the ground that the order was without
jurisdiction and has been passed without opportunity
of hearing and the same according to him was an
error apparent on the face of the record, which
needed to be rectified but he could not convince us
by relying upon any case law to show that the
principles laid down in the afore-referred judgments
are not applicable to the case in hand or how this
court has the jurisdiction to entertain petition for
review against the impugned order. It is pertinent to
mention here that where jurisdiction is not vested in a
forum, the same could not be conferred in the said
forum at the wish of a party, even if consent is given
by the other side. Reliance is placed on Faqir
Muhammad v. Khursheed Bibi and others (2024
SCMR 107), wherein it is laid down that parties
cannot, by mutual consent, take away jurisdiction
vested in any Court of law, nor can they confer
jurisdiction to any Court not vested in it by law.
Consequently, it is observed that this review
application is not maintainable at this juncture as
jurisdiction is not vested by law on this court to
entertain the same.
RA No.07-C of 2026
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However, despite what has been observed
above, as the claim of the petitioners is that prejudice
has been caused to their rights by the act of court,
which did not provide proper hearing to the parties
before passing the said order, which is stated to be in
conflict with previous orders of the said court and it
appears that prima facie, the impugned order is an
interlocutory discretionary order, whereby nothing
has been finally decided and only a direction to
deposit portion of rent and surety bond has been
passed whereas the matter in controversy between the
parties through the afore-referred First Appeal
against Order („FAO‟) is still pending with the
learned Single Judge, which court still retains
jurisdiction to modify its previous interlocutory
orders that had not attained finality, therefore, if the
petitioners/applicants want to approach the learned
Single Judge for redress of their grievance, they may
do the needful through an appropriate application.
Disposed of.
(RASAAL HASAN SYED)
JUDGE
(MUZAMIL AKHTAR SHABIR)
JUDGE
KMSubhani
APPROVED FOR REPORTING.