Criminal cases are not maintainable through power of attorney | Lahore high court case law.

فوجداری مقدمات مختار نامہ کے ذریعے قابلِ سماعت نہیں ہوتے

مقدمے کا پس منظر

یہ مقدمہ ایک بیرونِ ملک مقیم پاکستانی خاتون کے گرد گھومتا ہے جن کی شادی کئی برس قبل ہوئی اور ازدواجی زندگی کے دوران وہ اپنے شوہر کے ساتھ بیرونِ ملک منتقل ہوئیں۔ اسی شادی سے ایک بچہ پیدا ہوا جو والدہ کی تحویل میں ہے۔ بعد ازاں شوہر پاکستان آیا اور پہلی بیوی کی اجازت کے بغیر دوسری شادی کر لی، جس پر خاتون نے قانونی چارہ جوئی کا فیصلہ کیا۔

شکایت کا اندراج اور فیملی کورٹ کا فیصلہ

درخواست گزار نے مسلم فیملی لاز آرڈیننس کے تحت بغیر اجازت دوسری شادی کے خلاف شکایت دائر کی، تاہم یہ شکایت ذاتی طور پر دائر کرنے کے بجائے مختار نامہ کے ذریعے فیملی کورٹ میں پیش کی گئی۔ فیملی کورٹ نے ابتدائی مرحلے پر ہی یہ قرار دیا کہ فوجداری نوعیت کی شکایت مختار نامہ کے ذریعے قابلِ سماعت نہیں، لہٰذا شکایت مسترد کر دی گئی۔

نظرِ ثانی کی درخواست کا انجام

فیملی کورٹ کے فیصلے کے خلاف نظرِ ثانی دائر کی گئی، مگر نظرِ ثانی عدالت نے بھی یہی مؤقف اختیار کیا کہ چونکہ اصل شکایت ہی قانون کے مطابق قابلِ سماعت نہیں تھی، اس لیے فیملی کورٹ کا فیصلہ درست ہے۔ یوں نظرِ ثانی کی درخواست بھی خارج کر دی گئی۔

آئینی درخواست اور لاہور ہائی کورٹ میں سوالِ قانون

اس کے بعد درخواست گزار نے لاہور ہائی کورٹ سے آئینی دائرہ اختیار کے تحت رجوع کیا۔ بنیادی قانونی سوال یہ تھا کہ آیا مسلم فیملی لاز آرڈیننس کے تحت فوجداری شکایت مختار نامہ کے ذریعے دائر اور چلائی جا سکتی ہے یا نہیں۔

فوجداری کارروائی کی ذاتی نوعیت

لاہور ہائی کورٹ نے واضح کیا کہ فوجداری کارروائی اپنی نوعیت میں ذاتی ہوتی ہے۔ قانون فوجداری میں شکایت کنندہ اور ملزم دونوں سے ذاتی حیثیت میں عدالت کے سامنے پیش ہونے کی توقع کی جاتی ہے۔ ایسا اس لیے ہے کہ فوجداری نظامِ انصاف میں وہی شخص شکایت کر سکتا ہے جو بذاتِ خود واقعہ سے متاثر ہو یا جسے اس کا براہِ راست علم ہو۔

مختار نامہ اور فوجداری قانون کا باہمی تعلق

عدالت نے قرار دیا کہ مختار نامہ بنیادی طور پر دیوانی معاملات میں نمائندگی کے لیے استعمال ہوتا ہے۔ فوجداری قانون میں نہ تو شکایت درج کروانے اور نہ ہی اس کی پیروی کے لیے مختار نامہ کا تصور تسلیم کیا گیا ہے۔ اسی طرح ملزم بھی فوجداری مقدمے میں اپنے دفاع کے لیے مختار نامہ کے ذریعے پیش نہیں ہو سکتا۔

فیملی کورٹ کا فوجداری اختیار

عدالت نے یہ بھی وضاحت کی کہ اگرچہ فیملی کورٹ کو بعض فوجداری جرائم سننے کا اختیار حاصل ہے، مگر اس اختیار کے استعمال میں بھی فوجداری ضابطہ کار کی پابندی لازم ہے۔ فوجداری ضابطہ کار کے تحت شکایت کنندہ کی ذاتی حاضری بنیادی تقاضا ہے، جسے نظرانداز نہیں کیا جا سکتا۔

سابق عدالتی نظائر کا حوالہ

لاہور ہائی کورٹ نے متعدد سابق فیصلوں کا حوالہ دیتے ہوئے اس اصول کو دہرایا کہ نہ تو فوجداری شکایت مختار نامہ کے ذریعے دائر کی جا سکتی ہے اور نہ ہی اس بنیاد پر کارروائی آگے بڑھائی جا سکتی ہے۔ فوجداری انصاف کا نظام ایسی نمائندگی کو قبول نہیں کرتا۔

آئینی دائرہ اختیار کے استعمال سے انکار

عدالت نے یہ بھی قرار دیا کہ جب نچلی عدالتیں قانون کے مطابق درست فیصلہ کر چکی ہوں اور کوئی قانونی سقم یا بدنیتی ثابت نہ ہو، تو آئینی دائرہ اختیار استعمال کرنے کی کوئی گنجائش باقی نہیں رہتی۔

حتمی عدالتی نتیجہ

تمام قانونی پہلوؤں کا تفصیلی جائزہ لینے کے بعد لاہور ہائی کورٹ نے فیصلہ دیا کہ فوجداری شکایت مختار نامہ کے ذریعے دائر کرنا قانوناً ممنوع ہے۔ چنانچہ فیملی کورٹ اور نظرِ ثانی عدالت کے فیصلے درست قرار دیتے ہوئے آئینی درخواست خارج کر دی گئی۔

مقدمہ سونیا شریف کے ارد گرد مرکوز ہے، جو بیرون ملک مقیم پاکستانی ہیں۔ سونیا کی شادی 21 فروری 2011 کو ایک شخص (جواب دہندہ) سے ہوئی تھی۔ شادی پاکستان اور ناروے دونوں میں مدعا علیہ کی نقل مکانی کے مقاصد کے لیے رجسٹر کی گئی تھی۔ میاں بیوی کے ویزے پر ناروے منتقل ہونے کے بعد، سونیا اور مدعا کا ایک بچہ تھا، راحیل شریف، جو سونیا کی تحویل میں ہے۔

جولائی 2022 میں، مدعا پاکستان واپس آیا اور 25 جولائی 2022 کو سونیا کی اجازت کے بغیر دوسری خاتون سے شادی کر لی۔ اس نے سونیا کو مسلم فیملی لاز آرڈیننس، 1961 (آرڈیننس، 1961) کے سیکشن 6 کے تحت اپنے خصوصی وکیل کے ذریعے سرائے عالمگیر کی فیملی کورٹ میں شکایت درج کرانے پر مجبور کیا۔ تاہم، فیملی کورٹ نے 22 اکتوبر 2022 کو شکایت کو قابل سماعت قرار دیتے ہوئے مسترد کر دیا۔

اس کے بعد سونیا نے برطرفی کو چیلنج کرتے ہوئے نظرثانی کی درخواست دائر کی جسے ایڈیشنل ڈسٹرکٹ جج سرائے عالمگیر نے بھی 16 نومبر 2023 کو خارج کر دیا۔ نتیجتاً، سونیا نے آئین کے آرٹیکل 199 کے تحت لاہور ہائی کورٹ سے رجوع کیا، جس میں نچلے درجے کے ججوں پر نظرثانی کی درخواست کی گئی۔ عدالتوں کے فیصلے

لاہور ہائی کورٹ میں بنیادی مسئلہ یہ تھا کہ کیا آرڈیننس 1961 کے سیکشن 6 کے تحت شکایت درج کرائی جا سکتی ہے اور وکیل کے ذریعے اس کی پیروی کی جا سکتی ہے۔ عدالت نے متعلقہ قانونی دفعات کا جائزہ لیا، بشمول فیملی کورٹس ایکٹ، 1964، اور کریمنل پروسیجر کوڈ، 1898۔ اس نے یہ نتیجہ اخذ کیا کہ مجرمانہ شکایات کو ذاتی طور پر متاثرہ فریق کے ذریعے درج کرانا چاہیے اور کسی وکیل کے ذریعے ان کی پیروی نہیں کی جا سکتی۔ اس طرح لاہور ہائی کورٹ نے فیملی کورٹ اور نظر ثانی عدالت کے فیصلوں کو برقرار رکھتے ہوئے سونیا کی درخواست خارج کردی۔

Summary

The case centers around Sonia Sharief, who is an overseas Pakistani. Sonia was married to a man (the respondent) on February 21, 2011. The marriage was registered in both Pakistan and Norway for the respondent's migration purposes. After relocating to Norway on a spouse visa, Sonia and the respondent had a child, Raheel Sharif, who is in Sonia's custody.

In July 2022, the respondent returned to Pakistan and married another woman on July 25, 2022, without Sonia's permission. This prompted Sonia to file a complaint under section 6 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 (Ordinance, 1961) through her special attorney before a Family Court in Sarai Alamgir. However, the Family Court dismissed the complaint as not maintainable on October 22, 2022.

Sonia then filed a revision petition challenging the dismissal, which was also dismissed by the Additional District Judge, Sarai Alamgir, on November 16, 2023. Consequently, Sonia approached the Lahore High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution, seeking a review of the lower courts' decisions.

The core issue in the Lahore High Court was whether a complaint under section 6 of the Ordinance, 1961 could be filed and pursued through an attorney. The Court reviewed relevant legal provisions, including the Family Courts Act, 1964, and the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898. It concluded that criminal complaints must be personally filed by the aggrieved party and cannot be pursued through an attorney. Thus, the Lahore High Court dismissed Sonia's petition, upholding the decisions of the Family Court and the revisional court.

Must read Judgement

Form No. HCJD/C-121

ORDER SHEET

LAHORE HIGH COURT,

RAWALPINDI BENCH, RAWALPINDI.

JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

W.P.No.97 of 2024

SONIA SHARIEF. Versus ADDL. DISTRICT & SESSION

JUDGE, ETC.

S.No.of order

Proceeding

Date of

Order/

Proceeding

Order with signature of Judge, and that of parties counsel,

where necessary

25.01.2024 Mr. Arshad Mahmood Virk, Advocate for the petitioner.

The petitioner is an overseas Pakistani and she

was married to respondent No.3 (hereinafter referred to as

“respondent”) on 21st February, 2011. The marriage was

registered in Pakistan as well as Norway for migration

purpose of the “respondent’. The “respondent’ then shifted

on spouse visa to Norway and during marital tie, both the

spouses were blessed with a child namely Raheel Sharif,

who is in custody of the petitioner. It is alleged by the

petitioner that the “respondent” came in Pakistan in July,

2022 and contracted second marriage on 25th July, 2022

without seeking formal permission from her. This prompted

the petitioner to file complaint under section 6 of the

Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961) (hereinafter

referred to as “Ordinance, 1961”) through her special

attorney before the Family Court. The complaint was

dismissed preliminary, being not maintainable vide order

dated 22nd October, 2022. The petitioner then filed a

revision petition before the learned Additional District

Judge, Sarai Alamgir, which too was dismissed by way of

order dated 16th November, 2023, hence this petition under

Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of

Pakistan, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as “Constitution”)

W.P.No.97 of 2024

Learned counsel for the petitioner contended

that complaint under section 6 of the “Ordinance, 1961”

shall be governed in the light of provisions contained in the

Family Courts Act, 1964. He added that section 18 of the

Act ibid recognizes appearance of a party through duly

authorized agent. Submitted that complaint under section 6

of the “Ordinance, 1961” through attorney was thus

proceedable but it has wrongly been dismissed. In order to

supplement his contentions, learned counsel has placed

reliance on MUZAFFAR NAWAZ v. ISHRAT RASOOL and

another (2022 YLR 1920).

Heard. Record perused.

The moot point for determination before this

Court is as to whether a complaint under section 6 of the

“Ordinance, 1961” can be filed and prosecuted through

attorney or not?

Section 6 of the “Ordinance, 1961” places a

restriction on the second marriage of husband unless he

obtains prior permission in writing of the Arbitration

Council. Sub-section 5 of section 6 of the “Ordinance,

1961” provides consequences of contracting second

marriage by a man without permission of Arbitration

Council, one of which is that he has to face prosecution in

complaint and if it is proved that he contracted second

marriage without permission of the Arbitration Council, he

shall be liable to be convicted and punishable with the

simple imprisonment which may extend to one year and with

fine of five hundred thousand rupees.

The petitioner being wife of “respondent”

lodged a complaint under section 6 of the “Ordinance,

1961” before the Senior Civil Judge (Family Division),

Tehsil Sarai Alambir, District Gujrat through her special

W.P.No.97 of 2024

attorney Naveed Hanif s/o Muhammad Hanif, which was

dismissed being not proceedable through attorney.

“Ordinance, 1961” does not prescribe any

procedure for the trial of the complaint, however, the Rules

under the “Ordinance, 1961” (hereinafter referred to as

“Rules, 1961”) framed under section 11 pave way for the

trial of offences under the “Ordinance, 1961”. Needless to

mention here that Rule 21 of the “Rules, 1961” ordains that

no Court shall take cognizance of any offence under the

Ordinance or these rules save on a complaint in writing by

the Union Council, stating the fact constituting the offence.

It would not be out of context to mention here that Rule 21

was later on reconstituted by the orders of the Governor of

Punjab in exercise of powers conferred upon him by section

11 of the “Ordinance, 1961” through S.O X-1-15/75-Vol.II

published in Gazette of Punjab, Extraordinary, 14th

October, 1976 and words “aggrieved party” were inserted

in place of “Union Council” and it now reads as under: -

“21. No Court shall take cognizance of any

offence under the Ordinance or these rules save on a

complaint in writing by the aggrieved party, stating

the facts constituting the offence.”

In the year 1964, sensing a dire need for the

speedily and expeditious settlement and disposal of disputes

relating to marriage and family affairs and for matters

connected therewith, the Family Courts Act, 1964

(hereinafter referred to as “Act, 1964”) was promulgated.

In terms of section 3 of the “Act, 1964”, Family Courts

were established within the Province of Punjab. Section 5 of

the “Act, 1964” outlines the jurisdiction of the Family

Courts, which reads as under: -

S. 5. Jurisdiction. (1) Subject to the provisions of

the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, and the

Conciliation Courts Ordinance, 1961, the Family Courts shall

have exclusive jurisdiction to entertain, hear and adjudicate

upon matters specified in Part I of the Schedule.

W.P.No.97 of 2024

(2)

Notwithstanding anything contained in the

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Act V of 1898), the

Family Court shall have jurisdiction to try the offences

specified in Part II of the Schedule, where one of the spouses

is victim of an offence committed by the other.

(3)

The High Court may with approval of the

Government, amend the schedule so as to alter, delete or add

any entry thereto.

It is thus manifestly clear that jurisdiction of the Family

Court is exclusive to entertain, hear and adjudicate upon

matters specified in Part I of the Schedule and the offences

specified in Part II of the Schedule where one of the spouses

is victim of an offence committed by the other subject to the

limitations prescribed in the Code of Criminal Procedure,

1898 (Act V of 1898) (hereinafter referred to as “Cr.P.C”).

Section 18 of the “Act, 1964” though recognizes

appearance of a party through agent but it is restricted to

the appearance of a person required under the “Act, 1964”

before the Family Court, otherwise than as a witness and a

pardahnashin lady. Section 20 of the “Act, 1964” bestows

power upon a Family Court to exercise the powers of a

Judicial Magistrate of the first class under the “Cr.P.C”.

Before moving further, it would be apposite to mention here

that section 20 was initially articulated in the following

form: -

“S. 20. Family Court to exercise the powers of the

Judicial Magistrate.—A Family Court shall have and

exercise all the powers of a Judicial Magistrate of the First

Class under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Act V of

1898).”

It was, however, amended through the Family Courts

(Amendment) Ordinance 2002 (LV of 2002) and now it

reads as under: -

“S. 20. Family Court as Judicial Magistrate.— (1) A

Family Court shall be deemed as the Judicial Magistrate of

the first class under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (V

of 1898) for taking cognizance and trial of any offence under

this Act; the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 (VII of

1961), and the Child Marriage Restraint Act, 1929 (XIX of

1929).

W.P.No.97 of 2024

(2) A Family Court shall conduct the trial of an offence

under subsection (1) in accordance with the provisions of

Chapter XXII of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (V of

1898) relating to the summary trial.

(3) An offence other than contempt of a Family Court

shall be cognizable on the complaint of the Union Council,

Arbitration Council or the aggrieved party.”

(Underlining supplied for emphasis)

10.

It is, thus, clear that by virtue of above noted

amendment a Family Court was empowered to take

cognizance and try any offence under the “Ordinance,

1961” as well. This was the reason that this Court in the

case of MUZAFFAR NAWAZ supra heavily relied by the

learned counsel for the petitioner, held as under: -

“Before proceeding further relevant provisions i.e. Section

5 and Section 20 (as amended by Family Courts

(Amendment) Ordinance 2002) of the West Pakistan

Family Courts Act, 1964, are reproduced here under:--

S.5. Jurisdiction--- [(1)] Subject to the provisions of

the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, and the

Conciliation Courts Ordinance, 1961, the Family

Courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction to entertain,

hear and adjudicate upon matters specified in [Part I

of the Schedule."]

[(2)] Notwithstanding anything contained in the

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Act V of 1898),

the Family Court shall have jurisdiction to try the

offences specified in Part II of the Schedule, where

one of the spouses is victim of an offence committed

by the other.

(3) The High Court may with approval of the

Government, amend the schedule so as to alter,

delete or add any entry thereto."]

Section 20 (as amended by Family Courts (Amendment)

Ordinance 2002)

[Section 20. Family Court as Judicial Magistrate. -

(1) A Family Court shall be deemed as the Judicial

Magistrate of the first class under the Code of

Criminal Procedure, 1898 (V of 1898) for taking

cognizance and trial of any offence under this Act;

the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 (VII of

1961), and the Child Marriage Restraint Act, 1929

(XIX of 1929).

(2) A Family Court shall conduct the trial of an

offence under subsection (1) in accordance with the

provisions of Chapter XXII of the Code of Criminal

Procedure, 1898 (V of 1898) relating to the

summary trial.

W.P.No.97 of 2024

(3) An offence other than contempt of a Family

Court shall be cognizable on the complaint of the

Union Council, Arbitration Council or the aggrieved

party.]

The intention of legislature reflected from the amendment

introduced above is to fold all family affairs under an

umbrella so that sanctity of family affairs and dignity of

spouses could be saved from public exposure in ordinary

courts. The word "exclusive" used in section 5 makes it

vividly clear that no other court can assume jurisdiction in

respect of provisions of Muslim Family Laws Ordinance

except the court constituted under the West Pakistan Family

Courts Act, 1964; it is further clarified that only family

court can assume jurisdiction in some offences of P.P.C. as

mentioned in Part II of the Schedule, if committed against

the spouses. It was the reason that under section 20 Family

Court was authorized to act as Magistrate of Ist Class under

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. At this stage, the Court

would like to specifically refer sub-Article (2) of Article

270AA of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan,

1973, inserted by way of Eighteenth Amendment Act, X of

2010, which reads as under:--

"270AA (2). Except as provided in clause (1) and

subject to the provisions of the Constitution

(Eighteenth Amendment) Act, 2010, all other laws

including President's Order, Acts, Ordinances, Chief

Executive's Orders, regulations, enactments,

notifications, rules, orders or bye-laws made

between the twelfth day of October, one thousand

nine hundred and ninety-nine and the thirty-first day

of October, two thousand and three (both days

inclusive) and still in force shall, continue to be in

force until altered, repealed or amended by the

competent authority."

In the presence of above specific saving clause, this Court

has been informed that sections 5 and 20 (as amended by

Family Courts (Amendment) Ordinance, 2002 (LV of 2002)

has not been altered, repealed or amended by the competent

authority, as such, the same is in vogue and applicable with

all force. Furthermore, Article 175(2) of the Constitution of

Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 in clear terms provides

that:--

"No Court shall have any jurisdiction save as is or

may be conferred on it by the Constitution or by or

under any law."

Therefore, once it is settled that per force of section 20 (as

amended by Family Courts (Amendment) Ordinance 2002)

of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964, only the

family court had the jurisdiction to try a complaint under

section 6(5)(b) of The Muslim Family Laws Ordinance,

1961; trial conducted by the Magistrate was blatant

violation of Article 175(2) of the Constitution, as

reproduced above.”

W.P.No.97 of 2024

11.

Sub-section 2 of section 20 of the “Act, 1964”

commands that a Family Court shall conduct the trial of an

offence under subsection (1) in accordance with the

provisions of Chapter XXII of the “Cr.P.C” relating to the

summary trial. There, thus, remains no hint of doubt that the

trial in a complaint under section 6 of the “Ordinance,

1961” shall be conducted in the manner provided in

Chapter XXII of the “Cr.P.C”.

12.

Section 262 of “Cr.P.C” forming part of

Chapter XXII envisages that in trials under this Chapter, the

procedure prescribed in Chapter XX shall be followed

except as hereinafter mentioned. Chapter XX of “Cr.P.C”

provides the manner of trial of cases by Magistrate. While

examining the provisions of Chapter XX of “Cr.P.C”,

it becomes crystal clear that appearance of complainant

before the Magistrate is necessary and non-appearance

contemplates consequences in the shape of dismissal

of complaint and acquittal of respondent accused.

Reference to the above effect can be made to LIAQAT

ALI MIR v. ADDITIONAL SESSIONS JUDGE and others

(2017 P Cr. L J 1026).

13.

It is an oft repeated principle of law that in

criminal proceedings, neither a complaint can be proceeded

through attorney nor an accused can defend the charges

through his/her attorney. Guidance in this respect can be

sought from MUHAMMAD QASIM v. STATION HOUSE

OFFICER, POLICE STATION KHUDABAD, DISTRICT

DADU and 7 others (2016 MLD 1238). The relevant extract

from the same is reproduced below: -

“14. Now let’s examine whether an attorney can act

as a complainant or a witness in criminal matters or

otherwise? The term “attorney” legally, in most general sense

draws a picture of one who is not speaking for himself but for

his ‘principal’. As per Black’s Law Dictionary (fourth

addition) the term ‘attorney’ is defined as: --

W.P.No.97 of 2024

‘In the most general sense this term denotes an

agent or substitute or one who is appointed

and authorized to act in the place of or stead

another’

Per Marriam-Webster, it is defined as:

‘one who is legally appointed to transact

business on another’s behalf’

Since the ‘Criminal administration of justice’ recognizes only

those as a witness for complainant who either have seen;

heard or least perceived any fact towards the offence hence

an ‘attorney’, being not speaking of his own knowledge,

would not fall within meaning of ‘witness/complainant’. Thus,

an attorney cannot legally, under such status of attorney, file

the FIR or a criminal complaint.”

14.

The above conclusion is undoubtedly rested

upon the fact that agitating or defending the criminal

proceedings is always a personal act of the complainant or

accused. The criminal proceedings in the Court, thus,

cannot be initiated through attorney as the criminal

administration of justice recognizes only those as a witness

or complainant who either have seen, heard or least

perceived any fact towards the offence. An attorney being

not uttering of his/her own knowledge rather deposing the

voice of his/her master would not fall within the meaning of

witness/complainant. An attorney, thus, is precluded to get

There is no concept or even legal provision allowing

initiation of proceedings or recording of evidence through

attorney in the criminal law. The concept of representation

through attorney either by the complainant or the accused is

alien to the criminal jurisprudence so far. To this effect,

reference can also be made to KHALID MEHMOOD and 3

others v. SAFDAR IQBAL and another (2017 P Cr. L J

1104), USMAN SALEEM v. ADDITIONAL DISTRICT AND

SESSIONS JUDGE III, KARACHI EAST and 7 others (2021

P Cr. L J Note 66) and GHAZANFAR ALI v. M. ZAHID

HUSSAIN and others (PLD 2011 Lahore 179)

W.P.No.97 of 2024

15.

The nutshell of above discussion is that the

petitioner was precluded to file a complaint through

attorney, which was rightly dismissed by the trial Court and

the order was affirmed by the revisional Court, which is

unexceptionable. The petitioner has failed to point out any

perversity or material irregularity, warranting exercise of

constitutional jurisdiction by this Court.

16.

For what has been discussed above, this petition

is bereft of any merits, resultantly, it is dismissed in limine.

(MIRZA VIQAS RAUF)

JUDGE

Approved for reporting.

JUDGE

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