PTD۔Lahore High Court Dismisses Revision Against Permanent Transfer Deed Due to Lack of Jurisdiction and Limitation
لاہور ہائیکورٹ کا فیصلہ: پرمیننٹ ٹرانسفر ڈِیڈ چیلنج کرنے کا اختیار سول عدالت کے پاس نہیں
لاہور ہائیکورٹ ملتان بینچ نے عبداللطیف انصاری بنام عرفان احمد وغیرہ کیس میں اہم فیصلہ سناتے ہوئے واضح کیا کہ پرمیننٹ ٹرانسفر ڈِیڈ (PTD) کو سول عدالت میں چیلنج نہیں کیا جا سکتا، بلکہ یہ معاملہ صرف Settlement Authorities کے دائرہ اختیار میں آتا ہے۔
کیس کا پس منظر
مدعی نے مؤقف اختیار کیا کہ 7½ مرلہ مکان ایک خاندانی پنچایت میں اس کے حصے میں آیا تھا، جبکہ اس کا بھائی محمد سفیان 5 مرلہ مکان کا مالک بنا۔ تاہم محمد سفیان نے دھوکے سے اپنے نام PTD جاری کرا لیا۔ مدعی نے الزام لگایا کہ وہ اصل مالک ہے اور تمام سرکاری واجبات بھی اس نے ادا کیے۔
شواہد کی کمی
ہائیکورٹ نے قرار دیا کہ مدعی نہ تو پنچایت کے انعقاد کا کوئی واضح ریکارڈ یا گواہ پیش کر سکا اور نہ ہی دھوکے کے الزامات کے ثبوت دے سکا۔ خود مدعی عدالت میں بطور گواہ پیش نہ ہوا، اور پیش کیے گئے گواہوں کی گواہی بھی ناقابلِ اعتبار تھی۔
قانونی نکتہ – دائرہ اختیار
عدالت نے قرار دیا کہ Displaced Persons (Compensation & Rehabilitation) Act 1958 کے سیکشن 25 کے تحت PTD کے تنازعات Settlement Authorities کے دائرہ اختیار میں آتے ہیں، اور سول عدالت اس پر سماعت نہیں کر سکتی۔ سپریم کورٹ کے فیصلوں (PLD 1984 SC 213 وغیرہ) کا حوالہ دیتے ہوئے عدالت نے کہا کہ PTD کو صرف متعلقہ اتھارٹی یا اپیل میں چیلنج کیا جا سکتا ہے۔
تاخیر (Limitation)
PTD سال 1965 میں جاری ہوا جبکہ مقدمہ 1979 میں دائر کیا گیا۔ Limitation Act کے تحت ایک سال یا زیادہ سے زیادہ چھ سال میں دعویٰ دائر ہونا چاہیے تھا، اس لیے یہ کیس سخت تاخیر کا شکار تھا اور ناقابلِ سماعت تھا۔
فیصلہ
ہائیکورٹ نے قرار دیا کہ نچلی عدالتوں نے شواہد اور قانون کو درست انداز میں پرکھا، اور ان کے فیصلوں میں کوئی خامی نہیں۔ نتیجتاً ریویژن درخواست خارج کر دی گئی اور کوئی خرچ عائد نہیں کیا گیا۔
Must read Judgement
Stereo. H C J D A-38.
JUDGMENT SHEET
IN THE LAHORE HIGH COURT
MULTAN BENCH MULTAN
JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
C.R No. 1789-D of 2016.
Abdul Latif Ansari.
Versus
Irfan Ahmad, etc.
J U D G M E N T
Date of hearing: 25.06.2025.
Petitioner by:
Mr. Tahir Mehmood, Advocate.
Respondents by: Sh. Tanzeel ul Rehman Ashraf, Advocate
Ch. Sultan Mahmood, J. The instant revision petition is
directed against the judgment and decree dated 20.10.2016, whereby the
learned District Judge, Dera Ghazi Khan, while dismissing the appeal
filed by the petitioner upheld the judgment and decree dated 28.07.2015
passed by learned Civil Judge 1
st Class, Dera Ghazi Khan.
2.
Precisely, the facts leading to filing of the instant petition
are that petitioner Abdul Latif Ansari, instituted a suit for declaration
asserting that the suit property was previously evacuee property, which
is in his possession from the beginning. The petitioner, due to
employment obligations, had to go to Azad Kashmir. During his
absence, Muhammad Sufyan, the predecessor-in-interest of the
respondents, obtained a permanent transfer deed of the suit property in
his favour. Muhammad Sufyan was the elder brother of the petitioner,
in whom the petitioner had full trust. It was settled within the family
through Panchayat that the petitioner would be the owner of the 7 ½
Marla house, while Muhammad Sufyan would hold ownership of the 5-
Marla house. The petitioner further claims that all government dues
relating to the suit property were duly paid by him, and he has remained
in possession of the 7 ½ Marla house by virtue of the family
arrangement. Despite repeated requests, Muhammad Sufyan, the
predecessor-in-interest of the respondents, refused to transfer the
Civil Revision No. 1789-D of 2016
Page 2 of 7
aforesaid 7½ Marla house in favour of the petitioner, which ultimately
necessitated the filing of suit.
The suit was contested by the respondents-defendants No. 1 to 7
on factual as well as legal premises, who submitted their written
statement. Whereas, respondents No.8 & 10 filed their conceding
written statements and respondent No.9 make a statement not to pursue
the suit. From the divergent pleadings of the parties, the learned Trial
Court framed as many as 10 issues including the “Relief”. After
framing of issues, parties to the suit produced their respective evidence
and on completion of the same, learned Trial Court after hearing the
final arguments, dismissed the suit of petitioner vide impugned
judgment and decree dated 28.07.2015 against which he preferred an
appeal, which also met the same fate and dismissed vide impugned
judgment & decree dated 20.10.2016 by the learned lower Appellate
Court. Hence, this civil revision.
3.
Arguments heard. Record perused.
4.
Bare perusal of record reveals that by filing the suit, it was
the stance of petitioner that his share in the estate was affirmed through
a family settlement made under the Panchayat. However, the plaint is
completely silent about the particulars of the panchayat, its members,
day, date and year, when such panchayat convened. In support of the
evidence, neither the petitioner himself appeared, nor was any member
of the said panchayat produced before the learned Trial Court to
strengthen the stance. There is no direct evidence to establish the
occurrence of the panchayat. PW-1 Azhar Latif was not a direct
witness to the panchayat and therefore, his testimony holds no
probative value. PW-2 Razia Sultana in her statement did not mention
the particulars of the event of panchayat with exactitude. The
Panchayat was an event, which created financial obligations but the
petitioner has failed to prove the same. No non-reading or misreading
has been pointed out in this regard.
Another allegation is with respect to issuance of PTD by
employing fraudulent means but neither any details of the fraud has
been pleaded nor any evidence in this regard has been led
Civil Revision No. 1789-D of 2016
Page 3 of 7
5.
Both the learned Courts below have concurrently held that
suit was not maintainable for want of jurisdiction as the issue in hand
pertains to issuance of a Permanent Transfer Deed. The petitioner
contends that he is rightful owner of the suit property and disputes the
transfer of ownership through PTD issued in favor of Muhammad
Sufyan. The claim of an evacuee was to be assessed and verified under
the Registration of Claims (Displaced Persons) Act 1956. This Act of
1956 contained an ouster clause embodied in the Section 12. Through
the judgment cited as “Syed Abdur Rashid v. Pakistan through the
Secretary, Ministry of Refugees and Rehabilitation, Karachi etc.”
(PLD 1962 SC 42), the statutory ouster was upheld by the apex Court,
wherein it was held that judgment so passed by settlement authorities
could be impugned in writ jurisdiction but not through the civil suit.
The subject matter property is an urban property and an evacuee
having a verified claim had to be allotted property under the Displaced
Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958, to be more
precise the relevant rules made under the Act for allotment were to be
made under the Permanent Transfer (Houses and Shops) Rules, 1961;
firstly, a provisional transfer was to be made and eventually a
permanent transfer was to be made. But this was not as simple.
Authorities would determine the entitlement of the claimant and if the
property was beyond his entitlement, then he could under it good by
paying the differential amount and where his entitlement was over and
above the assessed value of the property from he could take another
property or cash as compensation. These Rules were made under
Section 10 of the ibid Act of 1958. The Act of 1958 also contains an
ouster clause under Section 25 which curtails powers of the Civil Court
to adjudicate upon the matters falling within the realm of the
settlement authorities. Section 25 reads as under: -
“Save as otherwise provided in this Act, no Civil Court shall
have jurisdiction in respect of any matter which the Central
Government [or the Provincial Government] or an officer
appointed under this Act is empowered under his Act to
determine, and no injunction, process or order shall be
granted by any Court or other authority in respect of any
action taken or to be taken in exercise of any power
conferred by or under this Ac
ision No. 1789-D of 2016
Page 4 of 7
The Rule 7 of Permanent Transfer (Houses and Shops) Rules, 1961
allowed the settlement authorities to cancel any unlawful allotment.
6.
However, through a Notification dated 27th of December
1964 the said rule was omitted. Now, a situation cropped up and
anyone aggrieved by a fraudulent allotment the remedy provided under
the law. The matter reached to this Court and through the judgment
cited as “Abdul Karim v. Sh. Muhammad Rafique, Settlement
Commissioner with powers of Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation
Commissioner, Lahore and others (PLD 1966 Lahore 33), it was held
that after the omission of Rule 7, the Settlement Authorities had no
power to cancel a PTD. thus a suit was maintainable because there was
no forum to agitate. However the Hon’ble Supreme Court in a case
titled as Mohammed Ismail versus Mst. Shamsun Nisa and others CP
#104 of 1965 held that, “there is no substance in this contention as the
order of issuance of permanent transfer deed was still subject to appeal
and revision in accordance with the provisions of the Displaced
Persons (Compensation & Rehabilitation) Act of 1958” thus omission
of Rule 7 was considered of little consequence and ouster clause
contained in section 25 was given due credence by the courts.
7.
It has been the consistent view of the Superior Courts that
Civil Courts would have no jurisdiction to determine the question of
the validity of the transfer of land in view of the sections 22 and 25 of
the Displaced Persons (Compensation & Rehabilitation) Act of 1958
which debar any court from questioning any order made by any Officer
appointed under the said Act; an order passed under the Act can
therefore be challenged either in accordance with the Act or under
Article 98 of the Constitution of 19621. Although, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court approved writ jurisdiction in tandem to the orders
passed by the Settlement Authorities but did not approve filing of civil
suits2
.
1 Mr. Muhammad Ismail Asghar v. The Improvement Trust, Rawalpindi PLD 1965 Supreme Court
698.
2 Mohammed Iqbal Khan versus the chief settle commissioner and others PLD 1965 Supreme Court
Civil Revision No. 1789-D of 2016
Page 5 of 7
8.
Other than the question of jurisdiction of civil court, there
is another question of inheritance in this case which is paramount as
the plaintiff/petitioner claims to be have a claim in his own right and
claimed that PTD Holder i.e. his real elder brother Sufyan got the
subject matter property in lieu of the property of the common ancestor.
9.
This principle was also decided in Sher Bahadar Khan vs.
Qazi Islam-ud-Din (PLD 1984 SC 213). In this case, the petitioner's
suit directly challenged the PTD, which, under the law, was not within
the purview of the Civil Court to entertain. The Supreme Court held
that the Civil Court cannot entertain a suit to challenge or interpret a
PTD, as such actions fall within the exclusive domain of the
Settlement Authorities and further holds that the PTD is a formal
document issued following a decision of the Settlement Authority and
its validity can only be contested through an appeal within the
settlement hierarchy, not through civil litigations.
The petitioner’s primary grievance in the instant case is the
issuance of the PTD in favor of Muhammad Sufyan, asserting
ownership and possession of the suit property. However, the petitioner
has failed to challenge the PTD before the appropriate Settlement
Authorities, which is the designated forum for addressing grievances
related to the issuance of such documents. The relevant law provides
that if a party is aggrieved by the issuance of a PTD, the proper course
of action is to appeal the decision within the settlement framework. In
the present case, the petitioner did not avail the said remedy at the
relevant time. This procedural lapse is significant. The petitioner’s
failure to challenge the PTD before the Settlement Authorities is fatal
to this case and further underscores the lack of jurisdiction for the Civil
Court as established in the Sher Bahadar Khan case, the proper
course of action for challenging the PTD was to seek relief from the
Settlement Authorities. In a judgment cited as Muhammad Saleem and
others v. Sardar Ali and others (2004 SCMR 1640) wherein, while
adjudicating a case under the Displace Persons (Rehabilitation and
Compensation) Act 1958, law point decided in the case of the
Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act 1958 was followed (the
Civil Revision No. 1789-D of 2016
Page 6 of 7
reliance was placed on case law titled as “Ahmad Din v. Muhammad
Shafi and others” (PLD 1971 SC 762)) it was categorically held that
question of inheritance of deceased right holder was required to be
decided under the relevant paragraphs of the settlement scheme as such
it was a matter within the exclusive jurisdiction of the settlement
authorities and jurisdiction of the civil court in such matter is barred.
In another case law titled as Nasir Fahimuddin and others v.
Charles Philips Mills and others (2017 SCMR 468), the Hon'ble
Supreme Court of Pakistan held that civil court has no jurisdiction,
especially where no attempt had been made to challenge the PTDs
before the concerned Settlement Authorities.
There is a string of judgments which hold that after the
promulgation of the Evacuee Property and Displaced Persons Laws
(Repeal) Act, 1975, all claims pending before cutoff date i.e.
30.06.1974, the officer notified under section 2(2) of the Repealing Act
was competent to proceed and decide the objections against PTO or
PTD but the jurisdiction of notified officer was only restricted to the
pending proceedings. It hardly needs reiteration that after the
promulgation of the Repealing Act, the officers notified under that Act,
do not possess the jurisdiction to declare any PTO or PTD regarding
which no proceedings were pending on the cutoff date, as null and void
on the grounds of fraud and forgery; they can only deal with and
decide the pending proceedings and cannot initiate any new
proceeding. Anyone who wants to challenge any PTO or PTD issued
under the repealed laws, and has locus standi to do so, is to knock at
the doors of Civil Court, a court of plenary jurisdiction, for the redress
of his grievance3.
10.
In Muhammad Din’s case, having held as noted above
the Court gave due weight to the law of limitation and decided the case
on that basis. Following the same and juxtaposing the facts of this case
to the principles noted in the said judgment it comes to fore that as per
Article 14 of the First Schedule to the Limitation Act 1908, the period
3 Muhammad Ayub v. Ghulam Muhammad 2005 SCMR 1650 &
Muhammad Din v. The Deputy Settlement Commissioner and others 2022 SCMR 148
Civil Revision No. 1789-D of 2016
Page 7 of 7
of limitation for instituting a suit to set aside any act or order of an
officer of Government made by him in his official capacity, not
otherwise expressly provided for in the said Act, is one year from the
date of the act or order; while under the residuary Article 120, the
period of limitation is six years. Whichever of these two periods is
applied, the suit of the petitioner having been instituted on 27.02.1979
to challenge the PTD dated 22.05.1965 was badly barred by the law of
limitation4
.
11.
Learned counsel for the petitioner has failed to
demonstrate before this Court any misreading or non-reading of
evidence, or to point out any material illegality or irregularity
committed by the learned Courts below. On the contrary, it appears
that the oral and documentary evidence produced by the parties has
been duly appreciated in accordance with law and the suit of the
petitioner-plaintiff has rightly been dismissed. Even otherwise,
concurrent findings on facts cannot be disturbed when the same do not
suffer from misreading and non-reading of evidence, howsoever
erroneous in exercise of revisional jurisdiction under section 115, Code
of Civil Procedure, 19085.
12.
This Court finds no illegality, infirmity, or jurisdictional
defect in the impugned judgments and decrees passed by the learned
Courts below. The findings are well-reasoned, in consonance with law,
and do not warrant any interference in revisional jurisdiction.
13.
Looking at it from any angle, and for the foregoing
reasons, the revision petition in hand, having no force or substance,
stands dismissed. No order as to cost.
[
(Ch. Sultan Mahmood)
Judge
Approved for Reporting.
Judge
M. Shahzad/*
4 Muhammad Din v. The Deputy Settlement Commissioner and others 2022 SCMR 1481.
5
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