Supreme Court Restores Article 199 Petition in Land Demarcation Dispute – Scope of Review under Punjab Revenue Act Clarified.
سپریم کورٹ کا اہم فیصلہ: زمین کے حد بندی تنازع میں نظرثانی اور آرٹیکل 199 کی حدود کا تعین
مقدمہ: محمد صفیر و دیگر بنام محمد اعظم و دیگر
Civil Petition No. 888 of 2024
فیصلہ: 12 جون 2024
بینچ: جسٹس منیب اختر، جسٹس اطہر من اللہ
عدالت: سپریم کورٹ آف پاکستان
تعارف:
اس مقدمے میں سپریم کورٹ نے آئینی درخواست (رٹ پٹیشن) کی ناقابلِ سماعتی سے متعلق لاہور ہائیکورٹ کا فیصلہ کالعدم قرار دیتے ہوئے وضاحت کی کہ کس صورت میں آرٹیکل 199 کا استعمال ممکن ہے، جب نظرثانی کا متبادل قانونی راستہ موجود ہو۔
پس منظر:
مدعا علیہ محمد اعظم نے ریونیو حکام سے زمین کی حد بندی کی درخواست دی۔ گارڈوار کی رپورٹ کے مطابق محمد صفیر و دیگر نے زمین پر تجاوز کیا۔ اس رپورٹ اور اس کے بعد کے تمام ریونیو حکام کے فیصلوں کو محمد صفیر نے چیلنج کیا، لیکن ان کی اپیل اور نظرثانی کی درخواستیں مسترد ہو گئیں۔
انہوں نے لاہور ہائیکورٹ میں آئینی درخواست دائر کی، جسے عدالت نے محض اس بنیاد پر ناقابلِ سماعت قرار دے کر مسترد کر دیا کہ ریونیو ایکٹ 1957 کی دفعہ 8 کے تحت نظرثانی کی گنجائش موجود ہے۔
سپریم کورٹ کا تجزیہ اور فیصلہ:
سپریم کورٹ نے قرار دیا کہ:
صرف یہ کہ نظرثانی کا راستہ موجود ہے، کافی نہیں۔ عدالت کو یہ دیکھنا ہوگا کہ آیا وہ متبادل واقعی موثر، قابلِ عمل، قابلِ رسائی اور آئینی اعتراضات کے جواب کے لیے مناسب ہے یا نہیں۔
ہائیکورٹ نے محمد صفیر و دیگر کی طرف سے اٹھائے گئے نکات اور اعتراضات کا جائزہ ہی نہیں لیا، اور بغیر کسی تجزیے کے درخواست ناقابلِ سماعت قرار دے دی۔ یہ طریقہ درست نہیں تھا۔
دفعہ 8 کے تحت دی گئی نظرثانی کی گنجائش صرف تین مخصوص بنیادوں تک محدود ہے:
1. نیا اور اہم ثبوت جو پہلے دستیاب نہ تھا؛
2. ریکارڈ میں واضح غلطی؛
3. کوئی اور معقول وجہ جو پہلی دو وجوہات سے مماثلت رکھتی ہو۔
سپریم کورٹ نے واضح کیا کہ اگر درخواست گزار کی شکایات ان حدود سے باہر ہوں تو نظرثانی کا راستہ غیر مؤثر تصور ہو گا، اور ایسی صورت میں ہائیکورٹ آئینی دائرہ اختیار استعمال کر سکتی ہے۔
نتیجہ:
سپریم کورٹ نے ہائیکورٹ کا فیصلہ کالعدم قرار دیا اور معاملہ واپس ہائیکورٹ کو بھیج دیا تاکہ وہ دوبارہ، مکمل نکات کو مدنظر رکھ کر، آئینی درخواست کی قابلِ سماعتی پر فیصلہ کرے۔
اہم قانونی نکات:
آرٹیکل 199 کا استعمال صرف اس وقت محدود ہوتا ہے جب متبادل راستہ واقعی مؤثر ہو۔
دفعہ 8، ریونیو ایکٹ 1957 کے تحت نظرثانی کی حدود انتہائی مخصوص ہیں، اسے اپیل جیسا وسیع دائرہ نہیں دیا جا سکتا۔
ہائیکورٹ کو لازم ہے کہ وہ ہر مقدمے کے حقائق اور نکات کا جائزہ لے کر فیصلہ کرے، عمومی قاعدے کی بنیاد پر نہیں۔
Must read Judgement'
THE SUPREME COURT OF PAKISTAN
(Appellate Jurisdiction)
PRESENT:
Justice Munib Akhtar
Justice Athar Minallah
CIVIL PETITION NO.888 OF 2024
(Against the judgment dated 01.2.2024 of the
Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench passed in
Writ Petition No.3692 of 2022)
Muhammad Safeer and others
…
Petitioners
Versus
Muhammad Azam and others
…
Respondents
For the petitioners:
Mr. Taimoor Aslam Khan, ASC
For respondent No.1:
Ch. HafeezullahYaqoob, ASC
assisted by Sarang, AHC
Date of hearing:
12.06.2024
ORDER
Athar Minallah, J.- The petitioners have invoked the
jurisdiction of this Court conferred under Article 185(3) of the
Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 (‘Constitution’)
and they have sought leave against the judgment, dated 01.02.2024,
passed by the High Court whereby the petition filed under Article 199
was dismissed solely on the ground of maintainability.
2.
An application was filed by Muhammad Azam (‘respondent
No.1’) before the revenue officials for demarcation of the property
described therein. The Gardawar Halqa (‘respondent No.6’), after
completing the demarcation proceedings, vide report dated 13.10.2021
had concluded that encroachments were made by the petitioners. The
latter preferred an appeal before the Assistant Commissioner
(‘respondent No.4’) and it was dismissed vide order dated 17.1.2022.
The petitioners invoked the revisional jurisdiction and their petition
was dismissed by
the
Additional Commissioner (Revenue)
[‘respondent No.3’] vide order dated 13.4.2022. The petitioners then
CP 888/24
assailed the orders before the Member (Judicial-IV), Board of Revenue,
Punjab (‘respondent No.2’) and their revision petition was also
dismissed vide order dated 06.12.2022. The petitioners ultimately
invoked the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court, vested under
Article 199 of the Constitution, but the petition was dismissed on the
sole ground of maintainability. The learned High Court was of the view
that the remedy provided under section 8 of the Punjab Board of
Revenue Act 1957 (‘Act of 1957’) was adequate and efficacious and,
therefore, the petition under Article 199 was not competent.
3.
We have heard the learned counsel for the parties. The
petitioners had challenged the orders passed by the respective revenue
officials before the High Court by invoking the jurisdiction vested in it
under Article 199 of the Constitution. They had raised multiple
grounds in their petition for challenging the said orders. However, the
High Court was of the opinion that since the remedy by way of review,
provided under Section 8 of the Act of 1957, was adequate and
efficacious, therefore, the petition under Article 199 of the Constitution
was not maintainable.
4.
We have noted that the High Court, without adverting to the
grounds expressly taken by the petitioners in their petition, concluded
that the remedy by way of review provided under section 8 of the Act of
1957 was adequate and efficacious for the purposes of entertaining the
petition under Article 199 of the Constitution. It is settled law that the
rule that the High Court will not ordinarily entertain a petition under
Article 199 when an adequate remedy is available and such remedy
only regulates the exercise of constitutional jurisdiction and does not
affect its existence. When the law provides an adequate remedy,
constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 will ordinarily only be
exercised in exceptional circumstances. The exceptional circumstances
CP 888/24
which may justify exercising jurisdiction when an adequate remedy is
available are when the order or action assailed before the High Court
is palpably without jurisdiction, manifestly malafide, void or corum non
judice. The tendency to bypass a statutory remedy is ordinarily
discouraged so that the legislative intent is not defeated. The High
Court, while exercising its discretion, must take into consideration the
facts and circumstances in each case in order to determine whether
the remedy provided under the statute is illusory or not. These
principles have been consistently highlighted by this Court.1
5.
The power of review stems from the statute and, therefore, it is
to be exercised by a court or an authority having regard to the
conditions and limitations expressly prescribed by the legislature. The
scope of review is distinct from that of an appeal. In case of an appeal
all questions of fact and law are to be considered but the scope of a
review is limited to the conditions and limitations expressly provided
under the relevant statue which confers the power. Sub-section (1) of
section 8 of the Act of 1957 sets out the scope and the grounds for
exercising the power of review. The three grounds expressly stated in
section 8(1) of the Act of 1957 are:(i) discovery of new and important
matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not
within the knowledge or could not be produced by the person seeking
review at the time when the decree was passed or the order was made,
(ii) some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record and lastly,
1Commissioner of Income Tax v. Messrs Eli Lilly Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd. (2009 SCMR 1279),
Collector of Customs, Customs House, Lahore and 3 others v. Messrs S.M. Ahmad and
Company (Pvt.) Limited, Islamabad (1999 SCMR 138), Khalid Mehmood v. Collector of
Customs, Customs House, Lahore 1999 SCMR 1881), Ch. Muhammad Ismail v.
FazalZada, Civil Judge, Lahore and 20 others(PLD 1996 SC 246), Income-Tax Officer
and another v. M/s. Chappal Builders (1993 SCMR 1108), Commissioner of Income
Tax, companies-II and another v. HamdardDawakhana (Waqf), Karachi (PLD 1992 SC
847), AbdurRehman v. Haji Mir Ahmad Khan and another (PLD 1983 SC 21), The
Murree Brewery Co. Ltd. v. Pakistan through the Secretary to Government of Pakistan,
Works Division and 2 others (PLD 1972 SC 279), Col. Nawabzada Muhammad Amir
Khan v. The Controller of Estate Duty and others (PLD 1961 SC 119), Tariq Transport
Company, Lahore v. The Sargodha-Bhera Bus Service, Sargodha and others (PLD 1958
SC 437)
CP 888/24
‘for any other sufficient reason’. The review jurisdiction conferred
under section 8 of the Act of 1957 is, therefore, confined and limited to
the said three grounds. This Court has held in the case of Muhammad
Din2 that the expression ‘for any other sufficient reason’ does not
extend to every cause which would make the remedy by way of review
available but such cause must be relatable to the circumstances as
discovery of new and important matter or some mistake or error
apparent on the face of the record. The expression, therefore, is to be
read ejusdem generis with the preceding expressions or grounds. Any
other interpretation would change the nature of the review contrary to
the legislative intent, because the legislature had indeed not intended
to provide the remedy of an appeal. The scope of the review jurisdiction
under section 8 of the Act of 1957 is, therefore, restricted to the
grounds expressly prescribed by the legislature.
6.
We have gone through the impugned judgment and it is obvious
from its plain reading that the High Court, without adverting to the
grounds taken by the petitioners, had dismissed the petition solely on
the ground that the remedy of review under section 8 of the Act of
1957 was adequate. This conclusion, without examining the grounds
taken by the petitioners, was not sustainable. The High Court could
only have formed an opinion whether the remedy under section 8 of
the Act of 1957 was adequate and efficacious in the light of the facts
and circumstances of the matter before it, particularly having regard
to the grounds taken by the petitioners in their petition. Any ground
taken and not covered within the scope of the jurisdiction of review
provided under section 8 of the Act of 1957 would have rendered the
remedy illusory and definitely not adequate for the purposes of
exercising jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution. This
2Muhammad Din and others v. Muhammad Amin and others (PLD 1994 SC 288)
CP 888/24
Court, in the case of Syed Asad Hussain3 has observed that the
expression adequate remedy represents an efficacious, reachable,
accessible, advantageous and expeditious remedy. The High Court,
therefore, misdirected itself by excluding from consideration the
grounds taken by the petitioners so as to determine whether the
review jurisdiction was adequate in the context of exercising
jurisdiction vested in it under Article 199 of the Constitution.
Moreover, the expansive interpretation given to the expression 'for any
other sufficient reason' amounted to changing the scope of the review
jurisdiction not intended by the legislature. If the High Court, after
examining the grounds taken by the petitioners and the facts and
circumstances of the case in hand was satisfied that they were covered
within the scope of the remedy expressly provided under section 8 of
the Act of 1957 then it would have been justified in deciding the
question of maintainability of the petition under Article 199 of the
Constitution. We are afraid that this was not what the High Court did
in the case before us.
7.
For the foregoing reasons, we convert this petition into an appeal
and the same is allowed by setting aside the impugned judgment.
Consequently, we remand the matter to the High Court for deciding
the question of maintainability in the light of the principles highlighted
above.
Judge
Judge
Islamabad the
12th June 2024
APPROVED FOR REPORTING