Rent or lease agreement if not registered , it can be be end on 15 days notice.
 |
| Rent or lease agreement if not registered , it can be be end on 15 days notice |
۔99 سالہ لیز کا معاہدہ رجسٹرڈ نہیں تھا اور قانون کے مطابق ایسے معاہدے کو تسلیم نہیں کیا جاتا،
اس کیس میں، مدعا علیہ نے دعویٰ کیا کہ لیز کا معاہدہ 99 سال کے لیے تھا
، جسے 27 مارچ 1972 کو توسیع دی گئی تھی۔ مدعا علیہ کا کہنا تھا کہ لیز کی مدت کے اختتام کے بعد، جائیداد کو خالی کرنے کا کوئی سوال نہیں تھا کیونکہ لیز طویل مدتی تھی۔
اس کے برخلاف، عدالت نے فیصلہ دیا
کہ چونکہ 99 سالہ لیز کا معاہدہ رجسٹرڈ نہیں تھا اور قانون کے مطابق ایسے معاہدے کو تسلیم نہیں کیا جاتا، اس لیے لیز کی مدت کی کوئی قانونی حیثیت نہیں تھی۔ عدالت نے لیز کو ماہ بہ ماہ کی بنیاد پر چلنے والی سمجھا اور مدعا علیہ کو جائیداد خالی کرنے کا حکم دیا۔
ایجیکٹمنٹ کی درخواست جائز تھی
اس طرح، عدالت نے اس بات کو تسلیم کیا کہ مدعا علیہ کے پاس 99 سالہ لیز کا کوئی قانونی حق نہیں تھا، اور اس کے نتیجے میں ایجیکٹمنٹ کی درخواست جائز تھی۔
اس ججمنٹ کے مرکزی نکات درج ذیل ہیں:
1. **Leave to Contest Application**:
- عدالت نے فیصلہ کیا کہ مدعا علیہ کی "Leave to Contest Application" وقت پر دائر کی گئی تھی۔ اس کے لیے، عدالت نے اس اصول کو تسلیم کیا کہ پہلی تاریخ کو استثناء کر کے دس دن کی مدت شمار کی جاتی ہے، جیسا کہ سیکشن 8 کے تحت جنرل کلاز ایکٹ، 1956 میں بیان ہے۔
2. **Mutwalli کی حیثیت**:
- عدالت نے تسلیم کیا کہ Mutwalli (Zahid Moyeen) کو ejectment petition دائر کرنے کا اختیار ہے۔ عدالت نے فیصلہ دیا کہ Mutwalli کو Trust کی ملکیت کو کرایہ پر دینے اور وصول کرنے کا اختیار ہے اور اس لیے وہ "landlord" کے زمرے میں آتا ہے، جیسا کہ پنجاب رینٹڈ پرامس ایکٹ، 2009 کی تعریف کے مطابق۔
3. **99 سالہ لیز کا دعوی**:
- عدالت نے کہا کہ اگرچہ مدعا علیہ نے 99 سالہ لیز کا دعوی کیا، مگر چونکہ یہ معاہدہ رجسٹرڈ نہیں تھا، اس لیے اسے ماہ بہ ماہ لیز کے طور پر تسلیم کیا جائے گا، جو کہ 15 دن کی نوٹس پر ختم ہو سکتی ہے۔
4. **عدالت کا مجموعی فیصلہ**:
- عدالت نے نتیجہ اخذ کیا کہ ejectment petition کو درست اور قانونی طور پر تسلیم کیا جائے کیونکہ مدعا علیہ کے اعتراضات اور دعوے (99 سالہ لیز اور Mutwalli کی حیثیت) کو مسترد کیا گیا تھا۔
یہ نکات ججمنٹ میں فیصلہ شدہ قانونی سوالات اور ان کی بنیاد پر کیے گئے فیصلے کو مختصر طور پر بیان کرتے ہیں۔
اس کیس میں، عدالت نے یہ فیصلہ کیا کہ مدعا علیہ (M/S Phipsons Company) اور Trust کے درمیان لیز کا معاہدہ تھا، نہ کہ صرف Trust کے ساتھ۔ عدالت نے اس معاملے میں درج ذیل نکات پر توجہ دی:
1. **معاہدہ لیز**:
- عدالت نے واضح کیا کہ مدعا علیہ کو 1962 میں Trust کی طرف سے لیز پر دیا گیا تھا۔ 27 مارچ 1972 کو، مدعا علیہ نے یہ دعویٰ کیا کہ لیز کی مدت کو 99 سال کے لیے بڑھا دیا گیا تھا، اور یہ معاہدہ Trust کے موجودہ Mutwalli (چوہدری محمد افضل) کے ذریعے تسلیم کیا گیا تھا۔
2. **رجسٹریشن**:
- عدالت نے یہ بھی فیصلہ کیا کہ چونکہ 99 سالہ لیز کا معاہدہ رجسٹرڈ نہیں تھا، اس لیے قانون کے مطابق، یہ معاہدہ ماہ بہ ماہ کی بنیاد پر چلا جاتا ہے، جو 15 دن کی نوٹس پر ختم کیا جا سکتا ہے۔
3. **Trust کی حیثیت**:
- عدالت نے تسلیم کیا کہ اجراء کرنے والا Mutwalli، جو Trust کی جانب سے کرایہ وصول کرتا ہے اور Trust کی پراپرٹی کو کنٹرول کرتا ہے، قانونی طور پر کرایہ دار کو نکالنے کے لیے مجاز ہے اور اس طرح اس کو "landlord" کے زمرے میں شامل کیا۔
یہ فیصلہ اس بات پر تھا کہ اصل معاہدہ لیز تھا، اور Trust کے Mutwalli کی حیثیت قانونی طور پر اس معاہدے کی بنیاد پر ejectment petition دائر کرنے کی تھی۔
اس کیس کی کہانی درج ذیل ہے:
1. **پس منظر**:
- مدعا علیہ (M/S Phipsons Company) نے 1962 میں Trust سے ایک تجارتی جائیداد، جو کہ 16 مرلہ پر مشتمل تھی، لیز پر حاصل کی۔ ابتدائی لیز کا معاہدہ دس سال کے لیے تھا۔
2. **لیز میں توسیع**:
- 27 مارچ 1972 کو، مدعا علیہ نے دعویٰ کیا کہ لیز کی مدت کو 99 سال کے لیے بڑھا دیا گیا تھا، اور یہ توسیع Trust کے موجودہ Mutwalli (چوہدری محمد افضل) نے تسلیم کی تھی۔
3. **قانونی تنازعہ**:
- 30 جنوری 2014 کو، Trust کے Mutwalli (زاہد معین) نے مدعا علیہ کے خلاف ejectment petition دائر کی، کیونکہ وہ دعویٰ کر رہا تھا کہ لیز کی مدت ختم ہو چکی ہے اور مدعا علیہ کو جائیداد خالی کرنی چاہیے۔
4. **مدعا علیہ کا اعتراض**:
- مدعا علیہ نے اعتراض کیا کہ ejectment petition میں دائر کرنے والے Mutwalli کے پاس اتھارٹی نہیں تھی کیونکہ یہ Trust کی طرف سے نہیں بلکہ Mutwalli کی ذاتی حیثیت میں دائر کی گئی تھی۔ انہوں نے یہ بھی دعویٰ کیا کہ لیز کا معاہدہ 99 سال کے لیے تھا، اور اس وجہ سے ejectment petition کا کوئی جواز نہیں تھا۔
5. **عدالت کا فیصلہ**:
- عدالت نے فیصلہ دیا کہ مدعا علیہ کی "Leave to Contest Application" وقت پر دائر کی گئی تھی۔ اس کے علاوہ، عدالت نے یہ بھی تسلیم کیا کہ Mutwalli کو قانونی طور پر ejectment petition دائر کرنے کا اختیار تھا۔ عدالت نے مدعا علیہ کے 99 سالہ لیز کے دعوے کو مسترد کیا کیونکہ وہ معاہدہ رجسٹرڈ نہیں تھا، اور قانون کے مطابق، یہ لیز ماہ بہ ماہ کی بنیاد پر چل رہی تھی۔
6. **نتیجہ**:
- عدالت نے ejectment petition کو جائز قرار دیا اور مدعا علیہ کو جائیداد خالی کرنے کا حکم دیا، یہ فیصلہ ان تمام اعتراضات کو مدنظر رکھتے ہوئے کیا گیا کہ Mutwalli کی حیثیت اور 99 سالہ لیز کے دعوے کی قانونی حیثیت۔
یہ کہانی مختصراً اس کیس کے اہم واقعات اور قانونی فیصلوں کی عکاسی کرتی ہے۔
Must read judgement
Stereo. HCJDA.38.
Judgment Sheet.
IN THE LAHORE HIGH COURT LAHORE
JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT.
Case No. W.P.No.1913/2020
M/S Phipsons Company (Pvt.) Limited
Versus
Zahid Moyeen etc
JUDGMENT
Date of hearing 11.7.2024
Petitioner by
M/S Nadeemuddin Malik and H.M.
Zeeshan Khan, Advocates.
Respondents by M/S Malik Faisal Khalid, Malik Sahib
Khan Awan and Qamar Zia Sandhu,
Advocates.
Abid Aziz Sheikh, J.-. This constitutional
petition is directed against the final order dated
20.12.2017 and judgment dated 12.12.2019 passed by
learned Special Judge (Rent) and Appellate Court
respectively, whereby the ejectment petition filed by
respondent No.1 (respondent) against the petitioner
(petitioner) was allowed.
2.
Relevant facts are that respondent being a
Mutwalli of Ghulam Rasool Trust (Trust) filed
ejectment petition on 30.1.2014 against the petitioner in
respect of portion of the property (basement) measuring
16 marla situated at 60-Shahrah-e-Quaid-E-Azam,
W.P.No.1913/2020
2
Ghulam Rasool Trust Building, Lahore (herein after
referred to as rented premises). The petitioner filed
leave to contest application under section 22(2) of the
Punjab Rented Premises Act, 2009 (Act), however, the
same was treated beyond period of ten days by Courts
below, nonetheless the ejectment petition was decided
on merit and allowed by learned Special Judge (Rent)
vide impugned final order dated 20.12.2017, which was
also maintained by Appellate Court on 12.12.2019,
hence this constitutional petition.
3.
Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that
petitioner appeared before the Court for the first time on
23.4.2014 and filed leave to contest application on
03.5.2014. He submits that first day of appearance
i.e.23.4.2014 was required to be excluded while
calculating period of ten days under section 22(2) of the
Act in view of section 8 of the Punjab General Clauses
Act, 1956 (Act of 1956), hence leave to contest
application was within a period of ten days. He further
submits that ejectment petition was filed by one Zahid
Moyeen being a Mutwalli (Mutwalli) of the Trust and
not by the Trust itself, hence he had no authority or
locus-standi to file ejectment petition. In this context, he
further explained that in the earlier round of litigation,
three similar ejectment petitions were filed in year
P.No.1913/2020
3
1989, 1999 and 2000 but all those ejectment petitions
were either filed by the Trust through its Mutwalli or by
Mutwalli alongwith the Trust, hence this ejectment
petition only by Mutwalli without any authority to file
the same is not maintainable. He next argued that
admittedly, the original lease with the Trust was for 10
years vide lease agreement dated 05.1.1962, however,
on 27.3.1972, it was unanimously agreed that lease will
be for 99 years and said mutual agreement was duly
acknowledged by the then Mutwalli on 28.3.1972. He
submits that though the respondent has denied the above
assertion and claiming that lease was only for 10 years,
however, this being a disputed question of fact could
not be decided without grant of leave to contest and
recording of evidence, hence impugned order and
judgment is not sustainable.
4.
Learned counsel for the respondent on the other
hand submits that leave to contest application being
beyond period of ten days was barred by time. He
further submits that scheme was formulated for the
management, control and administration of waqf
properties of Trust through award dated 18.6.1989 and
under the said award, Mutwalli is not only empowered
to give on rent or lease out any property of the waqf but
he is also receiving the rent and operating the bank
W.P.No.1913/2020
4
accounts of the Trust on behalf of the Trust, therefore,
he falls within the definition of landlord under section
2(d) of the Act, hence can file the ejectment petition. On
merit, he submits that the rented premises was handed
over to the petitioner in year 1962 for period of 10
years, which expired in year 1972 and thereafter, lease
was renewed from year to year basis till 2013 but
thereafter, the lease was not further extended. Submits
that no document was executed between the parties for
99 years perpetual lease. He submits that in the earlier
ejectment petition filed in year 1989, the parties
effected compromise on 29.5.1991 but it is nowhere
specifically agreed in said compromise that lease is or
was for period of 99 years. Further submits that in the
subsequent ejectment petitions filed in year 1999 and
2000, petitioner filed written replies but never claimed
that lease is for 99 years, hence it is afterthought and
cannot be a ground for leave to contest the ejectment
petition. Submits that notwithstanding the above factual
position, in any case, the so called 99 years lease being
not a registered document, will be treated on month to
month basis after lapse of 11 months and therefore,
ejectment petition was maintainable.
5.
Arguments heard. Record perused.
W.P.No.1913/2020
5
6.
Before touching merits of the case, I would like
to decide the legal objection that whether the leave to
contest application was within time or not. In this
regard, it is admitted position on record that the
ejectment petition by the respondent was filed on
30.1.2014, in which, the petitioner made its first
appearance in the Court on 23.4.2014 and thereafter,
filed leave to contest application on 03.5.2024. The
petitioner under section 22(2) of the Act was required to
file leave to contest application within ten days of the
first appearance. Admittedly, if the day of first
appearance i.e. 23.4.2024 is included to compute the
period of ten days, leave to contest application is time
barred, however, if the said day is excluded, then the
leave to contest application is within a period of ten
days. Now the core legal question is that whether the
first day of appearance is to be excluded or not for
computing the ten days limitation under section 22(2) of
the Act.
7.
The above legal question has already been
examined by this Court in case titled Abdul Karim vs.
Shakeel Ahmad etc (2012 CLC 261)and held that in
view of section 8 of the Act of 1956, the first day of
appearance will be excluded for computing the period
of ten days. In the aforesaid case, the first appearance
W.P.No.1913/2020
6
before the Court was 05.9.2008 and the leave to contest
application was filed on 15.9.2008. However, this Court
held that in view of section 8 of the Act of 1956, the
first day shall be excluded, hence leave to contest
application was within ten days. The relevant part of the
judgment is reproduced hereunder:-
“The submission of learned counsel for the
petitioner is equally not convincing in view of
section 8 of West Pakistan General Clauses Act,
1956 which provides the exclusion of the first day
in calculating the period of limitation. This
provision more particularly is applicable to the
statutes to which the Limitation Act, 1908 is not
applicable. If the time of 10-days prescribed for
filing leave application is counted according to
the provisions of section 8 then the application
filed by the respondent on 15-9-2008 is well
within time. The word “within” has been used in
different other special statutes also; the
interpretation for calculating time period shall be
governed by provisions of General Clauses Act,
1956. Keeping in view this beneficial
interpretation of section 8 of Act (supra) this
Court is of the view that the application filed by
the respondent for contesting the ejectment
petition was within the statutory period”.
Similarly in case of Mst. Saima Zameer vs. Muhammad
Javed Iqbal (2017 CLC 1695), recovery suit was filed
under Order XXXVII of the Code of Civil Procedure,
1908 (CPC) and as per Appendix-B of Form-IV of
CPC, the leave to appear and defend was to be filed
within ten days of the service of the summons. In said
case, the service was effected on 15.4.2011 whereas the
application for leave to appear and defend was filed on
25.4.2011, however, this Court held that in view of
W.P.No.1913/2020
7
section 8 of the Act of 1956 and section 9 of General
Clauses Act, 1897 (Act of 1897), the day of service will
be excluded from computing the period of ten days.
Relevant extract from the judgment is reproduced
hereunder:-
“The service of summons in summary suit is
effected through summons available in the
Appendix 'B' of Form IV of the C.P.C. It is
mentioned that "within 10 days from the service"
the defendant has to obtain leave to appear and
defend the suit. As the service was effected on
15.04.2011, therefore, within 10 days means
excluding 15.04.2011 and the last date for
obtaining the leave to appear and defend was
25.04.2011, therefore, the application for leave to
appear and defend the suit has been filed within
the prescribed period of limitation. To strengthen
this legal position, it is necessary to reproduce
the language of Section 9 of the General Clauses
Act, 1897 as well as Section 8 of the West
Pakistan General Clauses Act, 1956, respectively,
as follows:-
"9. Commencement and termination of
time.--- (1) In any [Central Act] or
Regulation made after the commencement
of this Act, it shall be sufficient for the
purpose of excluding the first in a series of
days or any other period of time, to use the
word "from", and, for the purpose of
including the last in a series of days or any
other period of time, to use the word "to".
(2) This section applies also to all [Central
Acts] made after the third day of January,
1868, and to all Regulation made on or
after the fourteenth day of January, 1887."
"8. Commencement and termination of
time.-- In any West Pakistan Act, it shall be
sufficient, for the purpose of excluding the
first in a series of days or any other period
of time to use the word "from" and for the
purpose of including the last in a series of
days or any other period of time to use the
word "to".
It is clear that within 10 days from the service
means that day of service be excluded from
W.P.No.1913/2020
8
computing the period of 10 days, therefore, the
time provided for filing an application for leave
to appear and defend the suit was till 25.04.2011
when the day of service i.e. 15.04.2011 is
excluded from computing the period of 10 days”.
In the case of Babar Jahangir and another vs.
Nadir Ali (2022 YLR 570), the same view was also
expressed by Sindh High Court in respect of leave to
contest application filed in suit under Order XXXVII
CPC. The relevant text of the judgment is reproduced
hereunder:-
“The service of the summons in the summary suit
is effected through summons available in the
Appendix „B‟ of Form IV of the C.P.C. It is
mentioned that “within 10 days from the service”
the defendant has to obtain leave to appear and
defend the suit. As the service was effected on
16.3.2018, copy of the same is available on
record, therefore, within ten days means
excluding 16.3.2018 at lest the date of obtaining
of leave to appear and defend was 26.3.2018,
therefore, the application for leave to appear and
defend the suit has been filed within the
prescribed period of limitation”.
The Supreme Court in case of Raja vs. Tanveer Riaz
and others (PLD Supreme Court 466), while
computing the period of 30 days for deposit of zar-esome under section 24 of the Preemption Act, 1991
excluded the day on which order directing the preemptor to make the deposit was passed, in view of
section 8 of the Act of 1956.
8.
In view of above discussion and case law, there is
no manner of doubt that application for leave to contest
W.P.No.1913/2020
9
filed by the petitioner was within statutory period of ten
days prescribed under section 22(2) of the Act, hence
was not barred by time.
9.
Notwithstanding the above legal position, it is
noted that leave to contest application filed by the
petitioner was not dismissed merely being time barred,
rather same was discussed and decided on merits, hence
there is no need to remand the case, rather this Court
can adjudicate that whether the petitioner is entitled for
leave to contest the ejectment petition on merits. In this
regard, the perusal of leave to contest application shows
that it is not disputed that petitioner is tenant of the
Trust, however, the main contentions of the petitioner is
that ejectment petition has not been filed by the Trust
but by Mutwalli, who is not authorized to file ejectment
petition and secondly vide correspondence dated
27.3.1972 and 28.3.1972 with the then Mutwalli (Ch.
Muhammad Afzal), the lease was extended for 99 years
which will now expire in March, 2071, hence the
ejectment petition is premature.
10. I have carefully examined above contentions on
merits. So far as the maintainability of ejectment
petition by Mutwalli is concerned, admittedly, the waqf
properties were dedicated by Ch. Ghulam Rasool under
the waqf deed dated 29.10.1917. However,
W.P.No.1913/2020
10
subsequently, the dispute and difference arisen between
the parties with regard to the control, management and
supervision of the waqf properties and consequently, the
arbitration was carried out between respective parties
and arbitration award (arbitration award) was passed
on 18.6.1989. Under the aforesaid arbitration award, the
Mutwalli inter-alia has the following powers:-
Powers of Mutwalli.
----------------------------
(b)
The Mutwalli shall have the powers to
engage Vakil, Advocate or a Mukhtar for the
conduct of cases for and against the property
made waqf.
-------------------------------
(d)
That it would be in the competency of the
Mutwalli of each unit to give on rent and lease
out any property/properties for any period of time
as he may deem fit and proper for the benefit of
the waqf.
From the above clauses of arbitration award, it is
manifest that Mutwalli is not only empowered to engage
counsel for the conduct of cases for the waqf property
but he would also be competent to lease the property of
the waqf. Beside above, the present Mutwalli (Zahid
Moyeen) is not only receiving the rent from the
petitioner on behalf of Trust (as evident from the
petitioner letter dated 25.9.2008) but he is also
authorized by the Trust to operate bank account of the
Trust where the said rent is being deposited. Under
section 15 of the Act, the “landlord” may seek eviction
W.P.No.1913/2020
11
of the tenant on various grounds mentioned therein. The
term “landlord” is defined under section 2(d) of the Act
which means owner of premises and includes a person
entitled or authorized to receive rent in respect of the
premises. In view of the above factual and legal positon,
notwithstanding the fact that property is vested in the
Trust, the Mutwalli being authorized to lease out the
property and also receiving rent fall within the
definition of landlord and could file ejectment petition.
11. Regarding the next contention of the petitioner
that lease was extended for period of 99 years vide
petitioner’s offer dated 27.3.1972 acknowledged and
responded by the then Mutwalli on 28.3.1972, suffice it
to note that though respondent has vehemently denied
the said assertion and claimed that lease was not further
extended after 13.7.2013, however, even for the sake of
argument if it is accepted that lease period was extended
for period of 99 years, the said lease agreement being
admittedly not a registered instrument as required under
section 17(d) and 49 of the Registration Act, 1908
(Registration Act) read with section 107 of the
Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (Transfer of Property
Act), shall deem to be a lease from month to month
basis terminable on part of lessor or lessee by 15 days
notice.
12. The above legal position has been settled by
Supreme Court in Habib Bank Limited vs. Dr.
Munawar Ali Siddiqui (1991 SCMR 1185) where it is
held as under:-
“ At this juncture, it may be pertinent to deal with
the question, whether a lease in perpetuity can be
created by a lease agreement, and if not, what
rights the petitioner acquired under the lease
agreement in issue. In this behalf, it may be
pertinent to refer to section 107 of the Transfer of
Property Act, 1882, and sections 17(d) and 49 of
the Registration Act. Above section 107 of the
former Act inter alia provides that a lease of
immovable property from year to year or for any
term exceeding one year or reserving a yearly
rent can only be made by a registered instrument,
whereas section 17(d) of the latter Act requires
compulsory registration of a lease of the nature
covered by section 107 of the former Act. Section
49 of the latter Act provides for effect of
non-registration of documents required to be
registered as follows:--
"No document required to be registered under
this Act or under any earlier law providing for or
relating to registration of documents shall-
(a) operate to create, declare, assign, limit or
extinguish, whether in present or in future, any
right, title or interest, whether vested or
contingent, to or in immovable property, or
(b) confer any power to adopt, unless it has been
registered."
It may he advantageous at this stage to refer to
the case of Darbarilal Mudi and others :v.
Raneegano Coal Association Ltd., reported in
AIR 1944 Patna 30, in which a Division Bench of
the Patna High Court held that a permanent
lease, which has not been created by a registered
instrument, is void under the provisions of
section 107 and the tenancy is under section 106
deemed to be a lease from month to month
terminable either on the part of the lessor or the
lessee by 15 days notice. We are, therefore, of the
W.P.No.1913/2020
13
view that the lease agreement, the copy of which
has been filed with the above petition for leave, is
not a legal document of the nature, on the basis
of which the petitioner could have acquired lease
in perpetuity”.
In this context, reliance is also placed on Supreme Court
judgments tilted Govt. of Sindh etc vs. Muhammad Shafi
etc (PLD 2015 SC 380) and Mirza Book Agency etc vs.
Additional District Judge etc (2013 SCMR 1520) and
judgments of this Court in Star Holdings vs. Dr. Nishat
Afza Qureshi (2019 CLC 909), Messrs IRIS
Communications (Pvt.) Ltd vs. Ahmad Khalid (2019
MLD 772) and Israr Hussaain vs. Imtiaz Ahmad Sheikh
etc (2024 CLC 486).
13. It is also pertinent to note that though under
section 5(3) of the Act, the Rent Registrar shall enter
the particulars of the tenancy in a Register and also affix
his official seal on the tenancy agreement, however,
under section 5(4) of the Act, this entry will not absolve
the landlord or tenant of the liability to register the
tenancy agreement under the law relating to the
registration of documents. Therefore, the law settled in
aforesaid judgments and the effect of the nonregistration are applicable to all the rent deeds even
after the promulgation of the Act.
14. In view of above discussion, though Courts below
have wrongly held that application for leave to contest
W.P.No.1913/2020
14
was not within the prescribed period of ten days, hence
to that extent, impugned orders are not sustainable,
however, on merits, no ground for leave to contest is
made out hence ejectment petition was lawfully allowed
against the petitioner.
15. For what has been discussed above, this petition
being meritless is dismissed.
(Abid Aziz Sheikh)
Judge
Approved for Reporting.
Judge