Bail in 302 case on statutory ground.
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| Bail in 302 case on statutory ground |
جائزہ
سپریم کورٹ آف پاکستان میں محمد عثمان کے کیس کا جائزہ لیا گیا، جسے 29 اپریل 2021 کو گرفتار کیا گیا تھا اور اس پر پاکستان پینل کوڈ کی دفعہ 302، 148، 149، اور 109 کے تحت سنگین جرائم کا الزام لگایا گیا تھا۔ عثمان نے ایک اہم دلیل کے طور پر قانونی تاخیر کا حوالہ دیتے ہوئے متعدد بار ضمانت کی درخواست دی تھی۔ ان کی ضمانت کی درخواستوں کے سابقہ مسترد ہونے کے باوجود، اس نے دلیل دی کہ وہ اپنے مقدمے کی سماعت میں تاخیر کی وجہ سے ضمانت کا حقدار ہے، جو قانون کے ذریعہ مقرر کردہ دو سال کی حد سے تجاوز کر چکی ہے۔
عدالت نے پایا کہ قانونی تاخیر کی دلیل درست ہے
عدالت نے پایا کہ قانونی تاخیر کی دلیل درست ہے، کیونکہ تاخیر عثمان سے نہیں بلکہ شریک ملزمان کے مفرور ہونے کی وجہ سے ہوئی۔ اس طرح عثمان کو قانونی تاخیر کی بنیاد پر ضمانت دی گئی۔ عدالت نے اس بات پر زور دیا کہ قانونی مدت ختم ہونے کے بعد ان حالات میں ضمانت کا حق خودکار ہے، بشرطیکہ تاخیر ملزم کے اقدامات کی وجہ سے نہ ہو۔
درخواست کو اپیل میں تبدیل کرکے منظور
اس طرح درخواست کو اپیل میں تبدیل کرکے منظور کرلیا گیا۔ عثمان کو مطلوبہ مالی ضمانتیں پوری کرنے کے بعد ضمانت پر رہا کیا جانا تھا، باقی قانونی مسائل باقی تھے۔
قتل کے مقدمہ (دفعہ 302 PPC) میں قانونی تاخیر پر ضمانت — سپریم کورٹ کا واضح اصول
سپریم کورٹ آف پاکستان نے محمد عثمان بنام ریاست
(Criminal Petition No.1233 of 2023, فیصلہ مورخہ 30 نومبر 2023) میں ایک بار پھر یہ اصول واضح کر دیا ہے کہ دفعہ 302 PPC جیسے سنگین مقدمات میں بھی اگر ٹرائل قانونی مدت میں مکمل نہ ہو اور تاخیر ملزم کی وجہ سے نہ ہو تو وہ قانونی حق کے طور پر ضمانت کا مستحق ہو جاتا ہے۔
مقدمے کا پس منظر
محمد عثمان کو:
29 اپریل 2021 کو گرفتار کیا گیا
اس پر دفعہ 302، 148، 149 اور 109 PPC کے تحت مقدمہ درج تھا
ملزم نے:
پہلے ضمانت میرٹس پر مانگی (مسترد ہوئی)
بعد ازاں قانونی تاخیر (Statutory Delay) کی بنیاد پر ضمانت طلب کی
اہم نکتہ یہ تھا کہ:
دو سال سے زائد عرصہ گزرنے کے باوجود
ٹرائل مکمل نہ ہو سکا
قانونی سوال
کیا دفعہ 302 جیسے سنگین جرم میں بھی:
اگر دفعہ 497(1) Cr.P.C. کے تیسرے پروائزو کے تحت
قانونی مدت مکمل ہو جائے
اور تاخیر ملزم کی وجہ سے نہ ہو
تو کیا ملزم ضمانت کا حق دار ہے؟
سپریم کورٹ کا اصولی مؤقف
1۔ قانونی تاخیر پر ضمانت ایک حق ہے، رعایت نہیں
عدالت نے واضح کیا کہ:
قانونی مدت پوری ہونے کے بعد
ضمانت عدالتی صوابدید نہیں رہتی
بلکہ ملزم کا آئینی و قانونی حق بن جاتی ہے
2۔ بار بار ضمانت کی درخواست
— استثناء
عام اصول یہ ہے کہ:
ایک ہی بنیاد پر بار بار ضمانت نہیں مانگی جا سکتی
لیکن عدالت نے قرار دیا:
قانونی تاخیر ایک نئی اور خودمختار بنیاد ہے
اگر یہ بنیاد بعد میں پیدا ہو تو نئی درخواست قابلِ سماعت ہو گی
3۔ شریک ملزمان کی وجہ سے تاخیر ملزم کے خلاف نہیں جا سکتی
عدالت نے قرار دیا کہ:
اگر ٹرائل میں تاخیر:
شریک ملزمان کے مفرور ہونے
یا ان کی گرفتاری و دوبارہ فردِ جرم
کی وجہ سے ہو
تو:
یہ تاخیر زیرِ حراست ملزم کے کھاتے میں نہیں ڈالی جا سکتی
رشتہ داری (قریبی عزیز ہونا) بذاتِ خود:
ملزم کو ذمہ دار نہیں بناتی
جب تک:
ریاست واضح شواہد سے ملی بھگت ثابت نہ کرے
4۔ دفعہ 497(1) Cr.P.C. کا تیسرہ پروائزو — تشریح
عدالت نے واضح کیا کہ:
دو سال (302 کے مقدمات میں)
مکمل ہونے پر
اگر ٹرائل ختم نہ ہو
تو:
ضمانت خود بخود قابلِ اطلاق ہو جاتی ہے
سوائے اس کے کہ:
ریاست یہ ثابت کرے کہ:
تاخیر ملزم یا اس کے نمائندے کی وجہ سے ہوئی
5۔ آخری گواہ کا بیان بھی ضمانت کے حق کو ختم نہیں کرتا
عدالت نے قرار دیا کہ:
محض آخری گواہ کا بیان ریکارڈ ہونا
ٹرائل کی تکمیل نہیں کہلا سکتا
اور اس بنیاد پر قانونی ضمانت کا حق ختم نہیں کیا جا سکتا
عدالتی فیصلہ
سپریم کورٹ نے:
درخواست کو اپیل میں تبدیل کیا
اپیل منظور کی
محمد عثمان کو:
2,00,000 روپے کے مچلکوں کے عوض
ضمانت پر رہا کرنے کا حکم دیا
یہ بھی واضح کیا گیا کہ:
یہ مشاہدات عارضی نوعیت کے ہیں
اور ٹرائل کورٹ کے فیصلے پر اثرانداز نہیں ہوں گے
قانونی خلاصہ (Key Takeaways)
🔹 دفعہ 302 میں بھی قانونی تاخیر پر ضمانت ممکن ہے
🔹 دو سال کی مدت مکمل ہونا فیصلہ کن ہے
🔹 تاخیر اگر شریک ملزمان کی وجہ سے ہو تو ملزم ذمہ دار نہیں
🔹 قانونی ضمانت صوابدید نہیں بلکہ حق ہے
🔹 ریاست پر لازم ہے کہ ملزم کی غفلت ثابت کرے
Must read judgement
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PAKISTAN
(Appellate Jurisdiction)
Present:
Mr. Justice Amin-ud-Din Khan
Mr. Justice Athar Minallah
CRIMINAL PETITION NO.1233 OF 2023
(Against the judgment dated 03.10.2023 of the
Lahore
High
Court,
Lahore
passed in
Cr.Misc.No.53730-B of 2023)
Muhammad Usman s/o Muhammad Arshad
…Petitioner
Versus
The State & another
…Respondents
For the Petitioner:
Mr. Qaiser Imam, ASC
For the State:
Mr. Ali Ahmed Gillani, Additional Prosecutor
General, Punjab a/w Mushtaq, Inspector.
Date of hearing:
30.11.2023
ORDER
Athar Minallah, J. Muhammad Usman, son of Muhammad Arshad
(‘the petitioner’), was arrested on 29.04.2021 because he was
nominated in FIR No.139/2021, dated 30.3.2021, registered at the
Police Station Phularwan, District Sargodha for allegedly committing
the offences under sections 302, 148, 149 and 109 of the Pakistan
Penal Code, 1860 (‘PPC’).
2.
The petitioner had filed his first application seeking bail on
merits and it was dismissed by the High Court on 27.9.2022. He then
filed another petition which was not pressed in order to avail the
remedy on the fresh ground of delay in conclusion of trial. This
ground had not ripened when the two petitions were filed. Since the
second petition was not pressed, therefore, it was dismissed by the
High Court vide order dated 19.5.2023. Consequently, a third petition
was filed on the sole ground of seeking bail on statutory delay. The
petition was, however, dismissed vide order dated 10.8.2023 on
account of non-prosecution. The petitioner filed a fresh petition and it
was dismissed by the High Court vide the impugned judgment dated
Crl.P.1233/2023
2
03.10.2023. The petitioner has, therefore, sought leave against the
impugned judgment.
3.
We have heard the learned counsel and the learned Additional
Prosecutor General, Punjab.
4.
It is settled law that a second bail petition repeating the same
grounds that were earlier taken is not competent.1 Moreover, the
grounds raised by an accused in a subsequent bail application which
were available at the time of filing of the earlier petition could also not
be treated as fresh grounds nor urged for the purposes of seeking the
same relief. This Court has already highlighted the principles
regarding maintainability of a subsequent bail petition.2 If the ground
on which bail has been sought subsists when a bail petition is
withdrawn then such a ground can also not be taken again.3
However, the exception to this rule is in the case of entitlement of bail
on statutory grounds as has been held by this Court. If any act or
omission of the accused has hindered the conclusion of trial within
the period specified in the third proviso of section 497 (1) of the Code
of Criminal Procedure, 1868 (‘Cr.P.C.’) then a right, as contemplated
thereunder, will not accrue in the latter's favour and, therefore, he or
she, as the case may be, would not become entitled to be released on
bail on the statutory ground of delay in conclusion of the trial.
Nonetheless, if after the rejection of the plea of bail on statutory
grounds, the accused has subsequently corrected himself/herself and
has abstained from doing any act or omission in the following period
specified under the third proviso, then a fresh ground would accrue
to the accused to invoke the jurisdiction of the court for grant of bail.
The third proviso to section 497 (1) of Cr.P.C. would thus become
1 Shahbaz Akmal v. The State and another (2023 SCMR 421)
2 Nazir Ahmed & another v. The State & another (PLD 2014 Supreme Court 241)
3Shahbaz Akmal v. The State and another (2023 SCMR 421)
Crl.P.1233/2023
3
operative as and when the period specified therein has expired but
the trial has not concluded without any fault on part of the accused.4
5.
In the case in hand, the ground of statutory delay was
not available to the petitioner when he had sought the concession of
bail through the two attempts made by him. It was during
subsistence of the second bail petition that the period specified under
the third proviso had ripened and, therefore, a fresh ground became
available to seek bail. The petition before the High Court was
dismissed for non-prosecution and such dismissal did not prejudice
his right to file a fresh petition before the High Court, which he did.
The petition was competent because a fresh ground of delay in
conclusion of trial had become available to him. There is no force in
the argument advanced by the prosecution that the petition was not
maintainable on the touchstone of principles laid down by this Court.
6.
The next question that requires to be examined is
whether a right had accrued in favour of the petitioner to be released
on bail because of delay in the conclusion of the trial as contemplated
under the third proviso of section 497(1). It is not disputed that the
two year period specified in the third proviso of section 497 (1) of the
Cr.P.C. has passed and, therefore, this crucial condition has been
met. It is also not disputed that, despite more than two years of
continuous incarceration of the petitioner, the trial has not
concluded. The delay in conclusion of trial is not attributable to the
petitioner nor his counsel, rather, it has been on account of the
abscondance of the co-accused and their surrender or arrest at
different times. Each time the charge had to be reframed. In response
to our repeated queries, the learned State Counsel could not
persuade us that the delay in conclusion of the trial could be
4
Syed Ayesha Subhani v. The State and others (PLD 2023 Supreme Court 648)
Crl.P.1233/2023
4
attributed to the petitioner. The petitioner was not at fault and yet he
had to suffer the hardship of incarceration of more than two years.
The co-accused are stated to be close relatives of the petitioners and,
therefore, the State Counsel has argued that his complicity could not
be ruled out. The legislature has expressly confined the delay under
the third proviso to an act or omission of the 'accused' or 'any person
acting on his behalf'. The accused cannot be made liable for the acts
or omissions of a co accused regardless of the relationship, except
when the prosecution can clearly show, based on undisputed facts
that the accused seeking bail was complicit. The latter's acts and
omissions, or those of a person acting on his behalf, are crucial and
could be considered for the court to determine the right to be released
on bail on the ground described under the third proviso. The delay
caused by the co accused is not attributable to the petitioner because
no act or omission on the latter's part nor a person acting on his
behalf could be shown.
7.
The object of recognition of a right to be released on bail
on statutory ground, subject to meeting the conditions described
under the third and fourth provisos of section 497(1) of the Cr.P.C. is
to ensure that criminal trials are not unnecessarily delayed and that
the prosecution is not enabled to prolong the incarceration or
hardship of an accused awaiting trial. The right of an accused to seek
bail on statutory grounds cannot be defeated for any other reason
except on the ground as has been explicitly described under the third
and fourth provisos to section 497(1) of Cr.P.C. The accused becomes
entitled to bail as of right after the statutory period expressly stated
in clauses (a) and (b), as the case may be, have expired and the trial
has not concluded. This accrual of right is manifest from the
language of the third proviso. Such a right can only be defeated if the
Crl.P.1233/2023
5
prosecution is able to show that the delay in the trial was attributable
to an act or omission of the accused or a person acting on his behalf.
If the prosecution succeeds in showing to the satisfaction of the court
that the accused was at fault then the right stands forfeited. It has
been held by this Court that the right recognized under the third
proviso of section 497(1) cannot be denied to an accused on the basis
of discretionary powers of the court to grant bail. The right has not
been left to the discretion of the court, rather, its accrual is subject to
the fulfillment of the conditions mentioned under the third proviso of
section 497(1) of the Cr.P.C. Moreover, while calculating the quantum
of delay attributable to an accused, the court is required to consider
whether or not the progress and conclusion of the trial was in any
manner delayed by the act and omission on the part of the accused.
While ascertaining the delay, the cumulative effect in disposal of the
case has to be considered and its assessment cannot be determined
on the basis of mathematical calculations by excluding those dates
for which adjournments had been sought by the accused or the
latter’s counsel. The main factor for consideration is the attendance of
the witnesses and whether, despite the matter having become ripe for
the recording of evidence, whether the delay was caused by the
defence. The recording of the statement of a last witness would also
not defeat the right recognized under the third proviso and it would
be unreasonable to conclude that the trial has been completed.5
8.
On the touchstone of the principles highlighted herein
above, a right has accrued in favour of the petitioner under the third
proviso of section 497(1) of the Cr.P.C., to be released on bail because
the conditions have been met and the prosecution was not able to
5 Nazir Hussain v. Zia-ul- and others (1983 SCMR 72), Sher Ali alias Sheri v. The
State (1998 SCMR 190), Akhtar Abbas v. State (PLD 1982 SC 424), Moundar and
others v. The State (PLD 1990 SC 934), Abdul Rashid v. The State (1998 SCMR
897), Zahid Hussain Shah v. The State (PLD 1995 SC 49), Muhammad Siddique v.
Muhammad Behram and another (1998 PCr.L.J. 358)
Crl.P.1233/2023
6
persuade us that the delay in conclusion of trial can be attributed to
the petitioner nor that the mischief contemplated under the fourth
proviso is attracted.
9.
For the above reasons, this petition is converted into an
appeal and is allowed. The petitioner is, therefore, extended the
concession of bail subject to his furnishing bail bond in the sum of
Rs.200,000/- (rupees two hundred thousands) with one surety each
in the like amount to the satisfaction of the trial court. The petitioner
shall be released forthwith if not required to be incarcerated in
connection with some other matter. It is noted that the observations
recorded in this order are based on the tentative assessment of the
record which was placed before us and, therefore, it shall not in any
manner prejudice the proceedings pending before the trial court.
Judge
Judg