Police zamanat per mulzam ko dubara arrest nahi kar sakti Lahore High Court.
لاھور ھائی کورٹ نے قرار دیا کہ پولیس ملزم کو جو ضمانت پر ھو اسکو دوبارہ کوئی نیا جرم لگا کر دوبارہ حراست میں نہیں لے سکتی۔
لاہور ہائی کورٹ کا یہ فیصلہ فوجداری انصاف کے نظام میں ضمانت کے تصور، شخصی آزادی اور پولیس اختیارات کی حدود کے حوالے سے ایک نہایت اہم اور رہنما نظیر ہے۔ عدالت نے واضح طور پر قرار دیا کہ جس ملزم کو کسی مقدمہ میں عدالتِ مجاز ضمانت دے چکی ہو، اسے محض نئے جرائم شامل کر کے دوبارہ گرفتار نہیں کیا جا سکتا، جب تک پہلے اس کی ضمانت منسوخ نہ کرائی جائے۔
مقدمہ کا پس منظر
زیرِ سماعت درخواست ضابطہ فوجداری کی دفعہ چار سو اکانوے کے تحت دائر کی گئی، جس میں درخواست گزار نے اپنے بیٹے کی بازیابی کی استدعا کی۔ ملزم کو ایک ایف آئی آر میں ابتدائی طور پر ضمانت دی جا چکی تھی اور یہ ضمانت حتمی حیثیت اختیار کر گئی تھی۔ بعد ازاں تفتیشی افسر نے اسی مقدمہ میں مزید دفعات شامل کر کے ملزم کو دوبارہ گرفتار کر لیا۔
بنیادی قانونی سوال
عدالت کے سامنے اصل سوال یہ تھا کہ کیا کسی ایسے ملزم کو، جو ایک ہی مقدمہ میں ضمانت پر ہے، محض نئی دفعات کے اضافے کی بنیاد پر دوبارہ گرفتار کیا جا سکتا ہے یا نہیں۔
ضمانت اور دوبارہ گرفتاری کا اصول
لاہور ہائی کورٹ نے قرار دیا کہ ضمانت ملزم کا ایک تسلیم شدہ قانونی حق ہے جو اس کی شخصی آزادی کے تحفظ سے جڑا ہوا ہے۔ جب ایک مرتبہ عدالتِ مجاز ضمانت دے دے تو پولیس کو یہ اختیار حاصل نہیں کہ وہ اپنی صوابدید پر، بغیر عدالتی اجازت کے، ملزم کو دوبارہ حراست میں لے لے۔
پنجاب پولیس رولز کی حیثیت
عدالت نے پنجاب پولیس رولز انیس سو چونتیس کے قاعدہ چھبیس اعشاریہ اکیس ذیلی قاعدہ چھ کا حوالہ دیتے ہوئے واضح کیا کہ پولیس افسر کو اس ملزم کو دوبارہ گرفتار کرنے کا اختیار حاصل نہیں جو ضمانت پر رہا ہو، الا یہ کہ متعلقہ عدالت سے ضمانت منسوخی کا حکم حاصل کیا جائے۔ یہ قاعدہ پولیس کے طرزِ عمل کے لیے ایک لازمی قانونی پابندی ہے۔
استغاثہ کی ذمہ داری
عدالت نے یہ اصول بھی طے کیا کہ اگر استغاثہ کے نزدیک نئی دفعات کی شمولیت سے معاملہ سنگین ہو گیا ہے تو قانون اسے یہ راستہ دیتا ہے کہ وہ عدالت سے ضمانت منسوخی کی درخواست دائر کرے۔ ملزم پر دوبارہ ضمانت لینے کا بوجھ نہیں ڈالا جا سکتا بلکہ استغاثہ کو یہ ثابت کرنا ہوتا ہے کہ نئی صورتِ حال میں ضمانت برقرار رہنے کے جواز ختم ہو چکے ہیں۔
پیشگی ضمانت پر اطلاق
عدالت نے اس اعتراض کو بھی مسترد کیا کہ مذکورہ اصول صرف بعد از گرفتاری ضمانت پر لاگو ہوتا ہے۔ فیصلہ میں واضح کیا گیا کہ چاہے ضمانت پیشگی ہو یا بعد از گرفتاری، دونوں صورتوں میں یہی اصول لاگو ہو گا کہ ضمانت کے بعد گرفتاری صرف عدالتی حکم سے ہی ممکن ہے۔
آئینی تحفظات
عدالت نے آئینِ پاکستان کے آرٹیکل نو اور آرٹیکل دس کا حوالہ دیتے ہوئے قرار دیا کہ کسی بھی شخص کو قانون کے مطابق طریقہ اختیار کیے بغیر آزادی سے محروم نہیں کیا جا سکتا۔ بغیر ضمانت منسوخی کے گرفتاری نہ صرف عدالتی حکم کی توہین ہے بلکہ بنیادی حقوق کی صریح خلاف ورزی بھی ہے۔
پولیس اختیارات پر قدغن
عدالت نے سخت الفاظ میں نشاندہی کی کہ اگر پولیس کو یہ اجازت دے دی جائے کہ وہ محض نئی دفعات شامل کر کے ضمانت یافتہ ملزم کو گرفتار کر لے تو یہ عدالتی فیصلوں کو بے معنی بنا دے گا اور شخصی آزادی کو تفتیشی اداروں کی صوابدید پر چھوڑ دے گا، جو قانون کی حکمرانی کے سراسر منافی ہے۔
عدالتی نتیجہ
لاہور ہائی کورٹ نے قرار دیا کہ ملزم کی گرفتاری غیر قانونی، غیر آئینی اور قانون کے منافی ہے۔ چنانچہ گرفتاری کو کالعدم قرار دیتے ہوئے درخواست نمٹا دی گئی۔ ساتھ ہی اعلیٰ پولیس افسر کی جانب سے اس امر کی یقین دہانی کو بھی ریکارڈ کا حصہ بنایا گیا کہ ذمہ دار اہلکاروں کے خلاف قانون کے مطابق کارروائی کی جائے گی۔
قانونی اہمیت
یہ فیصلہ فوجداری قانون میں ضمانت کے تقدس، عدالتی اختیار کی بالادستی اور پولیس کے اختیارات کی واضح حد بندی کرتا ہے۔ یہ نظیر اس اصول کو مضبوط کرتی ہے کہ ضمانت محض ایک رسمی رعایت نہیں بلکہ شخصی آزادی کا آئینی تحفظ ہے، جسے بغیر عدالتی اجازت کے پامال نہیں کیا جا سکتا۔
Must read judgement
Judgment Sheet
IN THE LAHORE HIGH COURT, LAHORE
JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
Crl. Misc. No. 10162-H/2024
(Mujtaba Saleem Butt vs. Incharge Investigation, etc.)
JUDGMENT
Date of hearing:
20.02.2024
Petitioner by:
Mr. Sajid Naseer Ch., Advocate.
State by:
Hafiz Asghar Ali, Deputy Prosecutor
General with Liaqat Ali Malik, DIG
(OCU) and Zahid, DSP
Respondents No.3
and 4 by:
Mr. Tahir Khokhar, Advocate.
Amicus Curiae
Mr. Amad Tahir Ch, Advocate.
ALI ZIA BAJWA, J.:- Through this Habeas Petition
filed under Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898
(hereinafter ‘the Code’), the petitioner seeks the recovery of his son,
namely Rashid Hassan Butt (‘the Detenu’). In pursuance of the order of
this Court, the Detenu was produced before the Court by Respondent
No. 2, Afzal Sub-Inspector of Anti Vehicle Lifting Squad (‘AVLS’)
Mustafa Town Police Station, Lahore. It has been stated by
Respondent No.2 that the Detenu was arrested in connection with Case
FIR No. 2219/23 initially registered under Section 381-A of Pakistan
Penal Code, 1860 (‘PPC’) with Shera Kot Police Station, Lahore.
2.
Earlier the Detenu applied for his ad-interim pre-arrest bail
in the afore-referred criminal case, which was confirmed by the Court
of Sessions vide consolidated order dated 21.09.2023. That order
Crl. Misc. No. 10162-H/2024
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remained unchallenged, hence, the same attained finality. Thereafter the
investigating officer i.e. Respondent No.2 added offences under
Sections 420, 468 and 471, PPC in the case and arrested the Detenu.
The short but crucial question of law involved in this case is whether an
accused person, who has been granted bail in a criminal case by the
Court of competent jurisdiction, can be arrested in the same case under
the garb of the addition of new offences.
3.
Arguments of parties heard and record perused.
4.
In the evolving landscape of criminal jurisprudence, a
pivotal issue emerges when additional charges are levied against an
accused who has already secured bail for the initial charge(s). This
scenario presents a complex interplay between the rights of the accused
and the interests of justice, necessitating a judicious approach to bail
proceedings. Traditionally, the addition of new charges against a bailedout accused has prompted a debate on the procedural steps that should
follow. On one hand, there exists a perspective that mandates the
accused to seek bail afresh for the newly added offences, treating them
as separate grounds for judicial scrutiny. This view emphasizes the
autonomous nature of each offence and its distinct implications for the
accused’s liberty. However, a more nuanced approach considers the
procedural economy and the overarching principles of fairness and
justice that when additional offences are added to an accused’s charges,
though it is imperative to re-evaluate the grounds upon which bail was
initially granted but, this reconsideration does not necessitate a
redundant plea for bail by the accused rather, shifts the onus onto the
prosecution to seek the cancellation of the existing bail. Under this
approach, the prosecution bears the responsibility to demonstrate that
the addition of new charges substantively alters the landscape of risk
and considerations that underpinned the original bail decision.
Crl. Misc. No. 10162-H/2024
(3)
5.
For the proposition in hand, it will be advantageous to
consider the relevant Rule i.e. Rule 26.21(6) of The Punjab Police
Rules, 1934 (hereinafter ‘The Rules’) which has been reproduced
below: -
“26.21. Bail and recognizance. –
.
.
.
(6) No police officer has power to re-arrest an accused person who has
been released on bail under section 497, Code of Criminal Procedure.
When re-arrest is deemed necessary, the police shall apply to a
competent court for the cancellation of the bail bond and the issue of a
warrant in accordance with the provisions of Section 497(5) Code of
Criminal Procedure.”
The Rules, particularly those outlined in Volume-III, stipulate clear
procedure for the conduct of police officers during the investigation
and process to be opted for the arrest of the accused. The aboveprovided Rule explicitly requires that in cases where an accused has
already been released on bail for certain charges, any intention to
arrest the accused for additional charges must be accompanied by an
application for the cancellation of bail, presented before the competent
court as envisaged under Section 497(5) of the Code, which shall be
decided after issuance of notice to the accused. Reliance can be placed
on the ratio rendered in Waqar Ahmed1 wherein while considering a
situation where subsequently some offence(s) were added by the
investigating agency it was ruled by the Division Bench as infra: -
“However it would not be justified to commit him to custody
straightaway but what the law of propriety would demand is that
such person be not deprived of his liberty without providing him
an opportunity of hearing by serving him with such show cause
notice by the court.”
In Pradeep Ram2 Supreme Court of India while considering a legal
proposition that whether in a case where an accused has been bailed out
1 Waqar vs. Chairman NAB, Islamabad – PLD 2015 Sindh 295
2 Pradeep Ram vs. The State Of Jharkhand – AIR 2019 SC 3193
Crl. Misc. No. 10162-H/2024
(4)
in a criminal case, in which case, subsequently new offences are added,
is it necessary that bail earlier granted should be canceled for taking the
accused in custody, after an exhaustive deliberation ruled as under: -
“In a case where an accused has already been granted bail, the
investigating authority on addition of an offence or offences may
not proceed to arrest the accused, but for arresting the accused
on such addition of offence or offences it need to obtain an order
to arrest the accused from the Court which had granted the bail.”
The legal position that emerges from the above discussion is that once
an accused person has been granted bail, he cannot be arrested by the
investigating agency without seeking cancellation of bail granted by the
court of competent jurisdiction by way of filing an application under
Section 497(5) of the Code. Rule 26.21(6) of the Rules mandates that
any such action must be taken with explicit permission of the Court,
ensuring judicial oversight, and safeguarding the rights of the accused.
6.
Allowing the police to arrest an accused who has already
been granted bail by merely adding new offences to the case, without
first seeking the cancellation of the existing bail, would effectively
grant law enforcement agencies the unrestricted authority to circumvent
judicial orders. This practice, if left unchecked, portends a perilous shift
towards a regime where the liberties of individuals are held in abeyance
by the caprices of prosecutorial discretion. The jurisprudence
surrounding bail is predicated on the presumption of innocence, a
cornerstone of criminal law, and serves as a bulwark against the
potential for arbitrary detention. To permit law enforcement agencies to
nullify this judicial safeguard by the mere expedient of adding charges
post hoc is to erode the foundations of our legal system. Such a course
of action not only flouts the explicit mandates of the law but also
infringes upon the accused’s fundamental right to liberty, as enshrined
in the Constitution.
Crl. Misc. No. 10162-H/2024
(5)
7.
Moreover, this approach opens Pandora box of legal
uncertainties, where the grant of bail could be rendered nugatory by the
subsequent prosecutorial maneuvers. It establishes a precedent that
could lead to rampant abuse of power, allowing for the detention of
individuals ad infinitum, by the simple device of adding new offences
against them. The prospect of such unbridled discretion vested in the
investigating agency is antithetical to the rule of law and the principles
of justice and equity. This practice would not only undermine the
sanctity and finality of judicial decisions but also endanger the
foundational principles of our legal system that aim to protect
individual liberties against arbitrary detention. Such an approach would
give law enforcement agencies a de facto license to frustrate judicial
orders, enabling them to detain any bailed-out accused at will by the
simple expedient of adding new charges.
8.
Therefore, it is incumbent upon this Court to staunchly
oppose such practices that imperil the liberty of the citizenry and detract
from the integrity of the judicial process. The arrest of an individual
granted bail by a Court of competent jurisdiction, without first seeking
the cancellation of said bail on legitimate grounds, is an affront to the
procedural safeguards designed to protect against the misuse of state
power. The addition of offences after the grant of bail cannot serve as a
carte blanche for investigating agencies to circumvent the due process
rights of the accused. This would lead to a dangerous precedent,
eroding trust in the judicial process and the principle of fairness that
underpins our legal system, ultimately rendering the concept of bail
meaningless and jeopardizing the rights of the accused to fair and
impartial treatment under the law. The approach advocating for the
prosecution’s initiation of bail cancellation proceedings upon the
addition of new offences offers a balanced mechanism for reassessing
an accused’s eligibility for bail. By placing the evidentiary burden on
the prosecution to justify bail revocation and concurrently allowing the
Crl. Misc. No. 10162-H/2024
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accused an opportunity to defend their continued entitlement to bail, the
legal framework honors both the dynamics of criminal litigation and the
fundamental rights of individuals. Thus, this Court holds that even if
during the interrogation new offences are added or during the trial,
additional offences are added in the charge framed against a bailed-out
accused, the prosecution has to seek cancellation of his bail before
arresting such accused against these newly added offences. This
approach will not only reaffirm the supremacy of the judiciary in
matters of bail but will also serve as a necessary check on the potential
for police overreach, ensuring that the scales of justice remain evenly
balanced.
9.
The contention of the learned Law Officer is that Rule
26.21 (6) of the Rules only deals with the cases where the accused is
released on post-arrest bail under Section 497 of the Code and not with
the cases where the accused is admitted to pre-arrest. I am afraid the
objection raised by the learned Law Officer is highly misconceived,
stemming from a bare and superficial reading of the Rule ibid without
grasping its underlying essence and purpose. The argument overlooks
the fundamental principles of justice and liberty that the Rule seeks to
protect, failing to appreciate its broader applicability in safeguarding
the rights of individuals against arbitrary arrest. It is essential to
consider beyond the mere text and understand the Rule in the context of
its intent to uphold the sanctity of judicial decisions granting bail,
ensuring that such decisions are not circumvented without proper legal
process. To address the challenge of applying the principle that an
accused, once released on bail, cannot be re-arrested without first
seeking the cancellation of that bail to cases of pre-arrest bail, it is
essential to understand both the historical context and the underlying
rationale of the law.
Crl. Misc. No. 10162-H/2024
(7)
10.
The protection provided in Rule 26.21(6) of the Rules, was
crafted in a legal environment where only post-arrest bail was
recognized. The Constitutional Courts have always been actively
engaged in filling legislative gaps and ensuring that the law evolves in
response to emerging challenges. It was perhaps for the first time in
December 1948 that by interpreting the latter part of Section 498 of the
Code in Hidayat Ullah Khan’s Case (PLD 1949 Lah. 21 =AIR 1949
Lah. 77), the power vesting in the High Courts and the Courts of
Sessions to admit persons to bail before they could be arrested, was
authoritatively discovered by a Full Bench of the Lahore High Court.3
The evolution of the law of pre-arrest bail as a judge-made law postpartition starting from the Hidayat Ullah Khan supra, reflects the legal
system’s adaptability and its commitment to protect the individual’s
rights and liberties. This landmark judgment laid the foundation for the
legal construct of pre-arrest bail in our country, which has since
evolved through the diligent scrutiny and thoughtful adjudications of
our Constitutional Courts. The Jurisprudence on pre-arrest bail evolved
through a series of judgments by the Superior Courts of Pakistan.4
These judgments have not only interpreted but also expanded the
contours of the law of pre-arrest bail, adapting it to the changing
dynamics of criminal law and societal needs.
11.
In arguing for the application of the principle expounded
in Rule 26.21(6) of the Rules to cases of pre-arrest bail, one must lean
on the foundational tenets of justice, liberty, and the Rule of law. The
essence is to protect the liberty of an accused who has been deemed
eligible for bail, regardless of the bail’s temporal stage, before or after
3 Rana Muhammad Arshad vs. The State – PLD 2009 SC 427
4 The Crown v. Khushi Muhammad (PLD 1953 F.C. 170), Muhammad Ayub v. Muhammad
Yaqub (PLD 1966 SC 1003), Sadiq Ali v. The State (PLD 1966 SC 589), Zahoor Ahmad v. State
(PLD 1974 Lah. 256) (cited with approval in PLD1983 SC 82), Muhammad Anwar Samma &
another v. The State (1976 SCMR 45), Murad Khan v. Fazal-e-Subhan & another (PLD 1983 SC
82), Muhammad Safdar and others v. The State 1983 SCMR 645), Zia-ul-Hassan v. The State
(PLD 1984 SC 192) and Mst. Qudrat Bibi v. Muhammad Iqbal and another (2003 SCMR 68)
Crl. Misc. No. 10162-H/2024
(8)
his arrest. It stands to reason that its framers would have explicitly
extended its protection to pre-arrest bail scenarios, had the concept
been legislatively or judicially recognized at that time. The principle
of not re-arresting a bailed-out accused without seeking cancellation
of bail aligns with the broader legal principles of fairness,
predictability, and respect for judicial decisions. Extending this
principle to pre-arrest bail cases does not represent a radical departure
from established legal norms but rather an affirmation of the law’s
inherent values. It acknowledges that the rationale preventing
arbitrary re-arrest post-bail applies with equal force to those admitted
to pre-arrest bail, as both scenarios involve individuals who, in the
eyes of the law, should not be detained without compelling, judicially
scrutinized reasons.
12.
Therefore, applying this principle to pre-arrest bail cases
is both a logical extension of existing legal protections and a
necessary step to ensure consistency, fairness, and respect for
individual liberties across the Criminal Justice System. It underscores
the principle that bail, once granted, recognizes an individual’s right
to freedom and should not be undermined without due process and
judicial oversight. This approach strengthens the integrity of the bail
system and reaffirms the judiciary’s role in safeguarding against the
arbitrary exercise of power. This procedural sanctity is not merely
perfunctory; it is the cornerstone upon which the edifice of justice
rests, ensuring that the liberties of individuals are not trifled with
capriciously.
13.
Therefore, it is held that the arrest of the accused, in
blatant contravention of Rule 26.21(6) of the Police Rules, 1934, and
the principles enshrined within our legal edifice, is both untenable and
impermissible. The essence of justice demands that once a Court has
granted bail, pre-arrest or post-arrest, considering the gamut of facts
Crl. Misc. No. 10162-H/2024
(9)
and allegations, such a decision must be respected and cannot be
superseded by subsequent police action without first seeking judicial
recourse for the cancellation of said bail. To uphold otherwise would
be to sanction a travesty of justice, undermining both the authority of
the judiciary and the rights of the accused. It is upon these grounds
that the sanctity of bail, granted after due deliberation of all pertinent
facts, must remain inviolable, thereby reinforcing the paramountcy of
the judiciary in the preservation of justice and the rule of law.
14.
Now, after having held that this Rule is equally
applicable to the cases of accused who are admitted to pre-arrest bail,
it is imperative to note that the core issue revolves around the
infringement of the fundamental rights, particularly the right to life
and liberty as enshrined under Article 9 of the Constitution of Islamic
Republic of Pakistan, 1973 (‘the Constitution’), which unequivocally
states that “No person shall be deprived of life or liberty save in
accordance with law.” It is incumbent upon the state and its
apparatuses to ensure that no individual’s life or liberty is curtailed
without due process. Moreover, the procedural safeguards
surrounding arrest and detention, as stipulated under Article 10 of the
Constitution, have been ostensibly disregarded in this case. It has been
reiterated more than once by the Constitutional Courts of our country
that the state and its organs must adhere strictly to the legal provisions
when depriving any individual of his liberty to ensure that the
fundamental rights to life and liberty are not transgressed. Respondent
No.2, by arresting the Detenu without adhering to the proper legal
channels, has not only disregarded the authority of the Court but also
violated the rights of the Detenu as enshrined under the law.
Therefore, the arrest of the Detenu was patently illegal having no legal
justification
Crl. Misc. No. 10162-H/2024
(10)
15.
Today, DIG, OCU, Lahore appears before the Court and
submits that he has taken cognizance of the matter. He further submits
that the Detenu should not have been arrested without filing an
application for cancellation of his bail granted by the Court of
Sessions. He assures the Court that proper inquiry shall be carried out
and delinquent police official(s) shall be dealt with strictly as per the
law.
16.
While declaring the arrest of the Detenu illegal, this
petition stands disposed of.
(ALI ZIA BAJWA)
JUDGE
The judgment was pronounced on 20.02.2024 and after completion it was signed