Translate

12/24/2025

Specific performance | Decision on First and Second Purchaser in Property Dispute 2025 CLC 40


Specific performance | Decision on First and Second Purchaser in Property Dispute 2025 CLC 40.


First buyer and second buyer in specific performance 


ہائی کورٹ نے قرار دیا: پہلے خریدار کی agreement incomplete اور وہ زمین خریدنے کے لیے تیار نہیں تھا، اس لیے اس کا دعویٰ مسترد اور دوسرے خریدار کی خریداری برقرار رہی۔


پہلا اور دوسرا خریدار کے تنازع پر ہائی کورٹ کا فیصلہ

زمین کی خرید و فروخت کے مقدمات میں اکثر عدالتوں کو یہ فیصلہ کرنا پڑتا ہے کہ کون سا خریدار قانونی طور پر ترجیح رکھتا ہے، خاص طور پر جب پہلے خریدار کی ادائیگی مکمل نہ ہو اور دوسرا خریدار bona fide ہو۔ HAJI بمقابلہ SHABBIR AHMED کا کیس اسی اصول کی واضح مثال ہے۔

حقائق مقدمہ:

پہلا خریدار شبیّر احمد نے زمین کے لیے صرف earnest money ادا کی، لیکن باقی قیمت تین سال تک ادا نہیں کی اور مالک کو کوئی قانونی نوٹس نہیں بھیجا۔ اس دوران دوسرا خریدار HAJI اور دیگر نے زمین خرید کر possession حاصل کیا اور وہ bona fide purchasers for value without notice تھے۔

عدالتی فیصلے:

Trial Court نے پہلے خریدار کا دعویٰ مسترد کیا۔

Lower Appellate Court نے یہ فیصلہ overturn کر کے پہلے خریدار کے حق میں specific performance دے دی۔

ہائی کورٹ نے قرار دیا:

پہلے خریدار کی agreement incomplete تھی۔

وہ زمین خریدنے کے لیے تیار و رضا مند نہیں تھا۔

مالک کو کوئی نوٹس نہیں بھیجا گیا۔

دوسرا خریدار کی registered sale agreement مکمل اور قانونی اعتبار سے ترجیح یافتہ تھی۔

Civil revision allowed، Trial Court کا فیصلہ بحال اور پہلے خریدار کا دعویٰ مسترد۔

اہم سبق:

صرف earnest money دینا زمین خریدنے کے لیے کافی نہیں، باقی رقم وقت پر ادا کرنا ضروری ہے۔

Specific performance discretionary relief ہے اور عدالت کی صوابدید پر منحصر ہے۔

Bona fide purchasers کو قانونی تحفظ حاصل ہے اور ان کی registered sale agreements ترجیح رکھتی ہیں۔

مالک کو قانونی نوٹس نہ بھیجنے سے پہلے خریدار کی willingness مشکوک سمجھی جاتی ہے۔

نتیجہ:

اس کیس میں ہائی کورٹ نے پہلے خریدار کی ناکامی کو واضح کیا اور دوسرے خریدار کی قانونی خریداری کو برقرار رکھا، جو پاکستان میں زمین کے قانونی تنازعات میں ایک اہم precedent ہے۔


Must read Judgement

2025 C L C 40

[Sindh (Hyderabad Bench)]

Before Muhammad Faisal Kamal Alam, J

HAJI and another---Applicants

Versus

SHABBIR AHMED and others---Respondents

Civil Revision Application No. 33 of 2011, decided on 30th July, 2024.

Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)---

----Ss.12 & 22---Contract Act (IX of 1872), Ss.51 & 54---Suit for specific performance of contract of sale---Reciprocal promise---Failure to prove any subsequent payment qua balance sale consideration except payment of earnest money---Effect---Petitioners/subsequent purchasers claimed to be bona fide purchaser for value without notice and were in possession of suit property---Suit was filed by respondent/plaintiff seeking specific performance of agreement to sell earlier executed in his favour---Trial Court dismissed the suit but Lower Appellate Court decreed the same in favour of respondent/plaintiff---Validity---Respondent/plaintiff acknowledged that no notice was published for the information of general public about purchase of suit property---Petitioners/subsequent purchasers proved that they were bona fide purchasers for value without notice and possession of suit land was handed over to them by the owner/seller---Respondent/plaintiff failed to prove that except payment of earnest money any subsequent payment was made by him towards sale consideration---After passage of three years since the suit was filed, balance sale price was not paid by the respondent/plaintiff to show his bona fide and willingness to complete the sale transaction, rather in his evidence he has stated that he was not ready and willing to purchase the remaining area as mentioned in the sale agreement---No legal notice had been sent by the respondent/plaintiff to the owner/seller for completing the sale transaction in 03 years, which had adverse effect on his willingness to purchase the suit land---Sale agreement in favour of respondent/plaintiff remained incomplete as compared to registered sale agreement in favour of the petitioners, which stood completed, thus, that had preference---Relief of specific performance of contract is discretionary in view of S.22 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877---Evaluation of the evidence was not properly done by the Appellate Court and said significant legal principle about the discretionary relief had been overlooked while setting aside the decision of the Trial Court----Civil revision was allowed, in circumstances.

   Parkash Kumar for Applicants Nos.1 and 2.  

   Abdul Ghafoor Hakro for Respondent No.1.  

   Muhammad Arshad S. Pathan for Respondent No.2.  

For more information call us 0092-324-4010279 Whatsapp Dear readers if u like this post plz comments and follow us. Thanks for reading .as you know our goal is to aware people of their rights and how can get their rights. we will answer every question, so we need your help to achieve our goal. plz tell people about this blog and subscribe to our youtube channel and follow us at the end of this post.

12/23/2025

Doctrine of Lis Pendens in Pre-Emption Matters: Bona Fide Purchasers Bound by Final Decree (2025 SCMR 2095)

Doctrine of Lis Pendens in Pre-Emption Matters: Bona Fide Purchasers Bound by Final Decree (2025 SCMR 2095)



2025 SCMR 2095 — Doctrine of Lis Pendens 

(اصولِ زیرِ سماعت مقدمہ معاملہ)

ذیل میں آپ کے فراہم کردہ اقتباس کی سادہ اور جامع اردو تشریح پیش کی جا رہی ہے:

1) Lis Pendens کا اطلاق (Applicability)


اصولِ lis pendens دعویٰ حقِ شفعہ (Pre-emption) پر مکمل طور پر لاگو ہوتا ہے۔
مقدمہ کے دوران کی گئی کوئی بھی خرید و فروخت:
شفعہ کی ڈگری کی قانونی حیثیت کو متاثر نہیں کرتی۔
بعد میں خریدنے والا شخص عدالتی فیصلے کا پابند رہتا ہے۔

2) اہم استثناء (Exception)

lis pendens کے اطلاق میں واحد استثناء یہ ہے کہ:
اگر خریدار (vendee) مقدمہ کے دوران زمین ایسے شخص کو فروخت کرے جس کا حقِ شفعہ زیادہ مضبوط (superior) ہو،
اور یہ فروخت مدتِ تحدید (limitation) کے اندر ہو جس میں وہ شخص حقِ شفعہ استعمال کر سکتا ہو،
تو اس خاص صورت میں استثناء لاگو ہو سکتا ہے۔

3) Bona fide Purchaser کا دفاع

یہ دلیل کہ خریدار نیک نیتی (bona fide) سے خریدار ہے:
lis pendens کے خلاف مؤثر دفاع نہیں۔
مقدمہ کے دوران ہونے والی فروخت:
باطل نہیں ہوتی،
مگر وہ فروخت دعویٰ کے فریقین کے حقوق کو متاثر نہیں کر سکتی۔
نتیجتاً:
خریدار کی ملکیت مقدمہ کے حتمی فیصلے کے تابع رہتی ہے۔

4) نوٹس کے بغیر خریدار بھی پابند

حتیٰ کہ ایسا خریدار بھی جسے:
مقدمہ کی کوئی اطلاع نہ ہو،
وہ بھی عدالتی فیصلے کا پابند ہوگا۔
نیک نیتی کے باوجود:
مقدمہ کے نتیجے کا خطرہ (risk) خریدار خود برداشت کرے گا۔

5) سپریم کورٹ میں زیرِ سماعت ہونے کی صورت

اگر زمین:
سپریم کورٹ میں زیرِ سماعت مقدمہ کے دوران فروخت ہو،
یا اس پر تعمیرات کی جائیں،
تو:
خریدار یا تعمیر کرنے والا اپنے خطرے اور خرچ پر یہ سب کرے گا،
اور بعد میں آنے والا فیصلہ اس پر لازماً لاگو ہوگا۔
خلاصہ (Key Takeaway)
مقدمہ کے دوران جائیداد کی خرید و فروخت یا تعمیر،
خریدار کو عدالتی فیصلے سے نہیں بچا سکتی۔
lis pendens کا اصول نیک نیتی، عدمِ اطلاع اور بعد کی فروخت—سب پر غالب رہتا ہے،
سوائے ایک محدود استثناء کے جو اعلیٰ حقِ شفعہ سے متعلق ہے۔
اگر آپ چاہیں تو میں اسی فیصلے کو مختصر کیس لا نوٹس، بلاگ آرٹیکل، یا عدالتی نظائر کے لیے ہیڈ نوٹس کی شکل میں بھی تیار کر سکتا ہوں۔

Must read Judgement

2025 SCMR 2095

Doctrine of lis pendens-

--Applicability---Exception stated---The doctrine of lis pendens is fully applicable to suits for pre-emption---Validity of a pre-emption decree is not affected by any sale made during litigation and is binding on the purchaser---The only exception to the doctrine of lis pendens applicable to pre-emption claims is in one situation, where the sale by the vendee is to one who has a superior right of preemption provided that the sale is within the period of limitation when such right can be exercised.

Lis pendens---Principle---Defence against lis pendens---Being bona fide purchaser, plea of---A transfer by ostensible owner does not automatically become void simply because it was made pendente lite but such transfer cannot affect the rights of the other parties in the suit, thereby making the sale subject to the outcome of the decree---In other words, a bona fide purchaser, who retains title, remains bound by the final decree and bears the risk that any rights declared in the suit will prevail over their purchase---Even a bona fide purchaser without notice of litigation is bound by the result of the suit---Where a suit land is alienated during pendency of proceedings before the Supreme Court any person who purchases the land or raised construction thereon would be doing so at his own risk and cost.


For more information call us 0092-324-4010279 Whatsapp Dear readers if u like this post plz comments and follow us. Thanks for reading .as you know our goal is to aware people of their rights and how can get their rights. we will answer every question, so we need your help to achieve our goal. plz tell people about this blog and subscribe to our youtube channel and follow us at the end of this post.

12/22/2025

DRC Has No Power to Evict or Restore Possession; Only Tribunal Can Pass Coercive Orders — Lahore High Court, Multan Bench

DRC Has No Power to Evict or Restore Possession; Only Tribunal Can Pass Coercive Orders — Lahore High Court, Multan Bench.



DRC کے اختیارات اور ٹربیونل کی حدود — لاہور ہائیکورٹ ملتان بینچ کا اہم فیصلہ

تمہید

لاہور ہائیکورٹ ملتان بینچ نے W.P. No.15267 of 2025 میں پنجاب پروٹیکشن آف اونرشپ آف امووایبل پراپرٹی آرڈیننس 2025 کے تحت Dispute Resolution Committee (DRC) اور ٹربیونل کے اختیارات کی واضح حد بندی کر دی ہے۔ یہ فیصلہ ان معاملات میں نہایت اہم ہے جہاں انتظامیہ یا DRC زبردستی بے دخلی یا قبضہ بحال کرنے کی کوشش کرتی ہے۔

کیس کا پس منظر

درخواست گزار کے خلاف فریقِ مخالف نے آرڈیننس 2025 کے تحت DRC سے رجوع کیا۔ دورانِ کارروائی ایڈیشنل ڈپٹی کمشنر (ریونیو) کی جانب سے جائیداد خالی کرنے اور بصورتِ دیگر زبردستی کارروائی کی زبانی ہدایت دی گئی، حالانکہ اسی جائیداد سے متعلق کرایہ داری کا مقدمہ عدالت میں زیرِ التوا تھا۔ درخواست گزار نے اس اقدام کو قانون اور due process کے خلاف چیلنج کیا۔

قانونی فریم ورک

عدالت نے آرڈیننس 2025 کی دفعات 7، 8، 9، 10، 16 اور 17 کا جائزہ لیا اور یہ واضح کیا کہ قانون نے DRC اور ٹربیونل کے کردار الگ الگ متعین کر رکھے ہیں۔

DRC کا کردار

DRC ایک pre-adjudicatory ادارہ ہے جس کا کام شکایات وصول کرنا، ریکارڈ کی جانچ، فریقین کو سننا، انکوائری کرنا اور مفاہمت کی کوشش کرنا ہے۔ DRC کے پاس نہ تو بے دخلی کا اختیار ہے اور نہ ہی قبضہ بحال کرنے یا زبردستی کارروائی کا۔

ٹربیونل کے اختیارات

عدالت کے مطابق قبضہ ریگولیٹ کرنے، عبوری یا حتمی بے دخلی، بحالیِ قبضہ، معاوضہ اور نفاذِ حکم کے تمام اختیارات صرف ٹربیونل کو حاصل ہیں۔ سیکشن 16 اور 17 اس حوالے سے واضح اور غیر مبہم ہیں۔

سیکشن 9 — احتیاطی اقدامات کی حدود

سیکشن 9 کے تحت DRC صرف احتیاطی (preventive) نوعیت کے اقدامات کر سکتی ہے، جیسے مناسب ضمانت لینا یا جائیداد سیل کرنا۔ یہ اختیارات:

  • عارضی ہوتے ہیں

  • تحریری اور وجہ دار حکم کے متقاضی ہیں

  • سماعت کے بعد استعمال کیے جاتے ہیں

  • کسی عدالتی status quo کے خلاف نہیں ہو سکتے

عدالت کے اہم مشاہدات

عدالت نے واضح کیا کہ:

  • زبانی یا غیر تحریری احکامات غیر قانونی ہیں

  • زیرِ التوا عدالتی مقدمات کو نظر انداز کر کے انتظامی کارروائی نہیں ہو سکتی

  • قبضہ سے متعلق ہر coercive اقدام صرف ٹربیونل کے حکم سے ہو گا

نتیجہ

لاہور ہائیکورٹ نے درخواست نمٹاتے ہوئے ہدایت دی کہ DRC اپنی قانونی حدود میں رہتے ہوئے غیر جبری طریقے سے کارروائی کرے، درخواست گزار کو مکمل سماعت دی جائے اور ٹربیونل کے حکم کے بغیر کسی قسم کی بے دخلی یا زبردستی قبضہ نہ کیا جائے۔

عملی اہمیت

یہ فیصلہ انتظامیہ، وکلا اور عوام کے لیے واضح رہنمائی فراہم کرتا ہے کہ آرڈیننس 2025 کے تحت DRC نفاذی ادارہ نہیں اور قبضہ سے متعلق تمام فیصلہ کن اختیارات ٹربیونل کے پاس ہیں۔

Must read judgement 

ORDER SHEET

IN THE LAHORE HIGH COURT

MULTAN BENCH, MULTAN.

(JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT)

Writ Petition No.15267 of 2025.

Ghulam Jilani Aftab.

Versus Government of the Punjab, etc.

S. No. of

order/

Proceeding

Date of order/

Proceeding

Order with signature of Judge, and that of

Parties or counsel, where necessary

18.12.2025

Sh. Jamshed Hayat, Advocate for the petitioner.

Kanwar Sajid Ali, Assistant Advocate General Punjab.

Rana Shakeel Ahmad, Advocate for respondent No.5.

(On Watching Brief).

Through this Constitutional Petition filed under

Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of

Pakistan, 1973 ('The Constitution'), the petitioner has

primarily laid a challenge to the provisions of Section 8(4)

& 8(5) of the Punjab Protection of Ownership of

Immoveable Property Ordinance, 2025 ('The Ordinance,

2025'), requesting to declare the same ultra vires to the

Article 175(3) of the Constitution and likewise the

provisions of Section 16 (1), being ultra vires to the Article

12(1) of the Constitution.

During the course of arguments, learned counsel for

the petitioner submits that respondent No.5 has filed an

application under Section 7 of the Ordinance, 2025, before

the Dispute Resolution Committee ('DRC') which has been

referred to the respondent No.3/Addl. Deputy

Commissioner (Revenue), Multan, who has straightaway

P. No.15267 of 2025.

2

asked the petitioner to vacate the property and deliver

possession to respondent No.5 failing which the petitioner

will be dispossessed by force. He submits that this conduct

of respondent No.3 is alien to the Ordinance, 2025, hence,

he would be satisfied if the respondents be directed to adopt

the due process and do not adopt any coercive measures

against the petitioner.

On the other hand, learned Law Officer submits that

respondent No.5 has filed an application under Section 07

of the Ordinance, 2025, claiming that the petitioner is

illegal occupant on her land. He maintained that as yet no

adverse action has been taken against the petitioner, hence,

this petition is not maintainable and misconceived.

Learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent

No.5 (on watching brief) submits that the petitioner is

illegal occupant over the rented premises who is not even

paying the rent, therefore, respondent No.5 moved

ejectment petition which has been allowed and final

eviction order has been passed against the petitioner.

Learned counsel for the petitioner, while availing right of

rebuttal, maintains that although ejectment petition filed by

respondent No.5 was allowed by the learned Special Judge

Rent by dismissing the petitioner’s application for leave to

contest but on the appeal filed by the petitioner said order

was set-aside and matter was remanded to the learned Trial

Court for decision of the ejectment petition after recording
W.P. No.15267 of 2025.

3

evidence. He adds that ejectment petition is still pending

adjudication but before its conclusion the respondent No.5

has moved the application before DRC.

Heard. Record perused.

Since the petitioner has stepped backed from the

challenge laid to the provisions of the Ordinance, 2025,

hence, the question that whether the Ordinance or its

provisions or ultra vires or otherwise is not under

adjudication in this petition.

The learned counsel for the petitioner contends that

the verbal direction of respondent No.3/Addl. Deputy

Commissioner (Revenue), Multan, requiring the petitioner

to vacate the property and hand over possession to

respondent No.5 with warning of forcible dispossession is

alien to the scheme of the Ordinance, 2025, particularly

when respondent No.5 has already filed an eviction petition

regarding the disputed property which is sub judice. He,

therefore, seeks a direction to the respondents to follow due

process of law and to refrain from adopting any coercive

measures against the petitioner.

As per statement of objections and reasons, primary

objective of the Ordinance is to protect the ownership rights

of lawful owners of Immovable properties; to curb the

menace of illegal possession of immoveable property; and,

to provide both civil and criminal remedies to property

owners. The Ordinance introduces a streamlined
W.P. No.15267 of 2025.

4

mechanism for removal of illegal possession and mandates

dispute resolution before litigation, to provide relief to the

public.

Section 7 of the Ordinance, 2025, provides that a

complaint, for an offence under the Ordinance, 2025, may

be filed by the owner or title holder of the immoveable

property with the Deputy Commissioner of the district in

which the property situates. Such compliant shall be

entrusted to the Dispute Resolution Committee (DRC).

Section 08 of the Ordinance, 2025, provides that

DRC shall consist of:

a) Deputy Commissioner (Convener);

b) District Police Officer;

c) Additional Deputy Commissioner (Revenue) of the

district;

d) Assistant Commissioner concerned;

e) Sub-Divisional Police Officer concerned; and

f) an officer of any agency of the Government, to be coopted by the committee.

  1. Whereas, Sub-Section (2) of the Section 8 of the

Ordinance, 2025, confers following powers upon the

Committee:-

(2) The Committee may:

(a)

scrutinize the relevant record and provide

hearing to all concerned;

(b)

summon any person and Inquire into the

matter;

(c)

take any administrative action as it may deem

appropriate to protect and safeguard the

ownership of Immovable property but such

action shall not be inconsistent with any

provision of any law for the time being in

force;
W.P. No.15267 of 2025.

5

(d)

report any instance of corruption, collusion or

misconduct by a public official or any other

stakeholder in the process of dispute resolution

or disposal of complaint and recommend

disciplinary or legal action to the competent

authority of such public official; and

(e)

encourage amicable resolution of disputes.

Section 09 of the Ordinance, 2025, mentions that in

case an owner or title holder of immovable property

apprehends commission of an offence under the Ordinance,

he may file application before the Deputy Commissioner

concerned for taking preventive measures. Exact wording of

Section 09 is as under:-

  1. Preventive measures.-(1) In case, an owner or title

holder of immoveable property apprehends

commission of an offence under the Ordinance, he may

file application before the Deputy Commissioner

concerned for taking preventive measures.

(2)

On receipt of the application, the Deputy

Commissioner shall refer the matter to the Committee

which may call all the relevant parties, in person, and

after examining the relevant record and hearing the

parties, pass such order as it may deem fit and

appropriate and such order may include taking

reasonable and adequate surety or guarantee from the

party concerned or sealing of the property.

Section 10 of the Ordinance, 2025, provides that in

case the dispute has been resolved, the Committee shall

reduce it into writing and send the same to the Tribunal for

its approval and for passing judgment and decree thereupon.

Sub-Section (2) describes that if dispute resolution fails or

stipulated time elapses without a resolution, the Committee

shall, within thirty days of expiry of the stipulated period,

W.P. No.15267 of 2025.

6

refer the matter, with its opinion to the Tribunal for its

decision.

Section 11 of the Ordinance, 2025, provides that the

Government may, by notification in the official Gazzette,

establish as many Tribunals as it considers necessary to

exercise jurisdiction under the Ordinance.

  1. A bare reading of Sections 7, 8, and 10 of the

Ordinance, 2025 makes it evident that the Dispute

Resolution Committee (DRC) is conceived as a preadjudicatory, fact-finding, and facilitative body rather than

an adjudicatory or enforcement authority. Under Section 7,

a complaint filed by the owner or title holder of an

immoveable property before the Deputy Commissioner is

entrusted to the DRC, which indicates that the Committee

serves as the first forum to examine allegations of illegal

possession. Section 8(2) empowers the DRC to scrutinize

the relevant record, provide hearing to all concerned,

summon persons, inquire into the matter, encourage

amicable settlement, and take administrative measures to

safeguard ownership rights, subject to consistency with the

law for the time being in force. These powers are

investigative and conciliatory in nature and do not include

the authority to order eviction, dispossession, or delivery of

possession. Section 10 further clarifies the role of the DRC

by providing that where a dispute is resolved, the

Committee shall reduce the settlement into writing and

W.P. No.15267 of 2025.

7

transmit the same to the Tribunal for approval and for

passing a judgment and decree thereupon, and where

resolution fails, the matter along with the Committee’s

opinion is to be referred to the Tribunal for final decision.

The scheme of the Ordinance, therefore, clearly

demonstrates that the Tribunal alone is vested with

adjudicatory jurisdiction, while the DRC functions as an

intermediary mechanism responsible for collecting material,

conducting inquiry, facilitating resolution, and transmitting

the record and its opinion to the Tribunal. Consequently, the

DRC cannot be treated as an executing or enforcement

agency, and any direction for eviction or forcible

dispossession at its behest would be alien to the scheme of

the Ordinance and contrary to due process of law.

  1. As far as Section 9 of the Ordinance, 2025, is

concerned, bare reading of said Section reflects that it

provides limited and non-adjudicatory role assigned to the

Dispute Resolution Committee. Section 9 is expressly

couched in preventive terms and is triggered only where an

owner or title holder merely apprehends the commission of

an offence under the Ordinance. Even in such

circumstances, the jurisdiction of the DRC remains

confined to examining the record, hearing the concerned

parties, and passing such preventive orders as it may deem

fit and appropriate. Significantly, the measures

contemplated under Section 9(2), such as obtaining

No.15267 of 2025.

8

reasonable and adequate surety or guarantee from the party

concerned or sealing of the property, are temporary,

precautionary, and regulatory in nature, aimed at preventing

further illegality.

Section 16 of the Ordinance, 2025, lays down

procedure to be followed by the Tribunal, which reads as

under:-

  1. Procedure of the Tribunal (1) The Tribunal shall,

upon referral of the matter by the concerned

Committee, take cognizance of it and try every case

arising out of any alleged offence with respect to the

ownership and title to, or possession of immoveable

property occupied illegally, whether before or after the

commencement of the Ordinance, and pass such orders

as it deems fit.

(2)

Notwithstanding anything contained in

the Ordinance or any law for the time being in

force, the Tribunal shall also have exclusive

jurisdiction to determine the question of title, if

any, of the immoveable property under reference

and for the purpose, may, for reasons to be

recorded in writing, follow such summary

procedure as it deems appropriate.

(3)

The Tribunal shall try the offences under

the Ordinance in accordance with the procedure

provided under Chapter XXIIA of the Code of

Criminal Procedure, 1898 (V of 1898).

(4)

Notwithstanding anything contained in

sub-section (3) or in any other law for the time

being in force, the Tribunal may, for reasons to be

recorded in writing, dispense with any provision of

the Code of Criminal Procedure. 1898 (V of 1898)

and follow such procedure as it may deem fit in the

circumstances of the case.

(5)

Every case shall be proceeded on dayto-day basis and shall be decided by the Tribunal

W.P. No.15267 of 2025.

9

within a period of ninety days from the date of its

receipt by the Tribunal.

(6)

The Tribunal may award monetary

compensation for wrongful and illegal possession

of immovable property which shall not be less than

the value of the immovable property so possessed,

as determined in accordance with the valuation

table notified under the Stamp Act 1899 (II of

1899), as on the date of the order and in addition

thereto, the Tribunal may order payment of any

profit or gain accrued from such property or any

superstructure constructed thereupon, by the

offender to the lawful owner, and may further

direct restoration of possession of the Immovable

property to its lawful owner.

(7)

The amount of compensation and profit,

so awarded and cost of restoration of possession, if

any, shall be recovered as arrears of land revenue.

(8)

The Tribunal may, at any stage of the

case, order the arrest of a person for an offence

under the Ordinance, through police or an agency

or authority of the Government.

(9)

Upon transfer of a case under subsection (6) of section 8, the Tribunal shall proceed

in the case as provided under this section and it

shall not be necessary for it to re-examine any

witness or record any evidence that has already

been recorded; however, the Tribunal may refer

such case to the Committee for resolution of the

matter or for its opinion and the Committee shall,

thereafter, proceed in accordance with section 8.

(10)

Upon conclusion of the trial, the

Tribunal, while deciding the title or ownership of

the Immovable property, shall pronounce a

judgment and pass a decree accordingly.

Section 17 of the Ordinance, 2025, provides

mechanism for eviction and mode of recovery as an interim

relief which reads as under:-

W.P. No.15267 of 2025.

10

  1. Eviction and mode of recovery as an interim

relief.- (1) The Tribunal may, at any stage of the case,

regulate the possession of immovable property and

issue such interim orders as it deems appropriate.

(2) For the purpose of securing compliance with an

order made under sub-section (1), the Tribunal may

authorize any officer, official, or authority of the

Government to take possession of the property, and the

officer, official or authority so authorized may use, or

cause to be used, such force as may be necessary for

giving effect to the order.

  1. In the light of the above statutory scheme, it is

manifest that the authority to regulate possession of

immoveable property, including restoration of possession as

an interim arrangement, vests exclusively in the Tribunal

and not in the Dispute Resolution Committee (DRC). The

powers conferred upon the DRC under Sections 7 and 8 of

the Ordinance, 2025, are confined to receiving complaints,

scrutinizing record, providing hearing to the parties,

conducting inquiry, encouraging amicable settlement, and

taking such administrative measures as are consistent with

the law for safeguarding ownership rights. These provisions

do not authorize the DRC to pass any coercive or executory

orders, nor do they empower it to direct eviction,

dispossession, or restoration of possession, whether on a

temporary or permanent basis.

  1. On the contrary, Sections 10, 11, 16, and 17 of the

Ordinance clearly demarcate the adjudicatory and

enforcement jurisdiction of the Tribunal. Section 10

W.P. No.15267 of 2025.

11

requires the DRC, whether upon successful resolution or

failure thereof, to transmit the matter along with its opinion

to the Tribunal for approval or final decision. Section 16

expressly vests the Tribunal with jurisdiction to try cases

arising out of alleged offences under the Ordinance,

determine questions of title, ownership, or possession, and

pass such orders as it deems fit, including directions for

restoration of possession and award of compensation. More

importantly, Section 17 specifically empowers the Tribunal,

at any stage of the proceedings, to regulate possession of

the immoveable property and to issue interim orders,

including authorization to any government officer or

authority to take possession of the property and to use such

force as may be necessary to give effect to its orders.

  1. The express conferment of interim powers upon the

Tribunal under Section 17, coupled with the absence of any

such provision in respect of the DRC, leaves no ambiguity

that restoration of possession, even as an interim measure,

falls strictly within the exclusive domain of the Tribunal.

The DRC’s role remains limited to a pre-adjudicatory

process of inquiry, facilitation, and recommendation,

whereas coercive measures affecting possession and

enforcement can only be undertaken pursuant to an order

passed by the Tribunal in accordance with due process of

law. Consequently, any attempt by the DRC or its members

to restore possession or direct dispossession as an interim

W.P. No.15267 of 2025.

12

arrangement would be without lawful authority, alien to the

scheme of the Ordinance, and contrary to the principles of

due process.

  1. In view of the foregoing discussion and the statutory

scheme of the Punjab Protection of Ownership of

Immoveable Property Ordinance, 2025, it is held that the

Dispute Resolution Committee (DRC) has no authority to

order eviction, dispossession, or restoration of possession,

whether as an interim or final measure, and is required to

act strictly within the parameters laid down in Sections 7, 8,

and 10 of the Ordinance. Any coercive or executory action

affecting possession can only be undertaken pursuant to an

order passed by the competent Tribunal in accordance with

Sections 16 and 17 of the Ordinance and after following due

process of law.

  1. Even the authority conferred upon the Dispute

Resolution Committee under Section 9 of the Ordinance,

2025, is strictly circumscribed and limited to the taking of

preventive measures. Such jurisdiction can be invoked only

upon a formal application by an aggrieved owner or title

holder who apprehends the commission of an offence under

the Ordinance. The exercise of this preventive jurisdiction

is neither automatic nor unfettered; rather, it must be

preceded by due consideration of the relevant record and

affording an opportunity of hearing to the concerned

parties. Moreover, the DRC is not empowered to act

W.P. No.15267 of 2025.

13

arbitrarily, informally, or through oral or verbal directions.

Any order passed under Section 9 must necessarily be a

speaking order in writing, clearly setting out the reasons and

justification for adopting preventive measures such as

obtaining reasonable and adequate surety or guarantee from

the concerned party or ordering the sealing of the property.

  1. Furthermore, the authority to take preventive

measures is not to be exercised liberally or mechanically in

every case merely because an application has been filed.

Rather, such power is to be exercised sparingly and only in

cases where the facts and circumstances genuinely warrant

preventive intervention to avert imminent illegality or

irreparable harm. The DRC is duty-bound to record detailed

reasons and to specifically identify and describe the factors

and circumstances, which necessitate the adoption of

preventive measures.

  1. The measures contemplated under Section 9 are, by

their very nature, temporary, precautionary, and regulatory,

intended solely to prevent further illegality or escalation of

the dispute during the pendency of proceedings. They do

not amount to a final determination of rights, adjudication

of title, or execution of possession. The ultimate authority

to finally adjudicate the dispute, determine legal rights, and

pass enforceable orders or decrees squarely vests with the

Tribunal alone. Any interpretation or practice that expands

the preventive jurisdiction of the DRC beyond these limits

W.P. No.15267 of 2025.

14

would not only be contrary to the express language of

Section 9 but would also undermine the statutory scheme of

the Ordinance and offend the principles of due process of

law.

  1. It is further imperative that while exercising

jurisdiction under Section 9, the DRC must take due notice

of, and strictly respect, any subsisting status-quo order

passed by a competent court of law. No preventive order

shall be passed in disregard of, or in conflict with, such

judicial directions, as doing so would amount to

encroachment upon judicial authority and a violation of the

doctrine of comity between courts and statutory forums.

Any preventive measure must, therefore, be consistent with

and subject to the orders of the competent court, ensuring

adherence to the rule of law and maintaining the sanctity of

judicial proceedings.

  1. As a corollary of above discussion, this constitutional

petition is disposed of with the direction that the Dispute

Resolution Committee, including respondent No.3, shall

remain within the sphere of authority conferred upon it

under the Ordinance, 2025, and shall deal with the

application filed by respondent No.5 strictly in accordance

with law while duly taking into account the observations

made hereinabove. The DRC shall afford proper

opportunity of hearing to the petitioner and all other

concerned parties, scrutinize the relevant record, and
W.P. No.15267 of 2025.

15

proceed in a fair, transparent, and non-coercive manner. It is

further directed that no coercive measures, including

eviction or forcible dispossession, shall be taken against the

petitioner except in pursuance of a lawful order passed by

the competent Tribunal.

(AHMAD NADEEM ARSHAD)

JUDGE

APPROVED FOR REPORTING.

JUDGE



For more information call us 0092-324-4010279 Whatsapp Dear readers if u like this post plz comments and follow us. Thanks for reading .as you know our goal is to aware people of their rights and how can get their rights. we will answer every question, so we need your help to achieve our goal. plz tell people about this blog and subscribe to our youtube channel and follow us at the end of this post.

12/20/2025

Financial Capacity of Lender and Evidentiary Value of ‘Probable’ Forensic Opinion in Recovery Suits under Order XXXVII CPC


Financial Capacity of Lender and Evidentiary Value of ‘Probable’ Forensic Opinion in Recovery Suits under Order XXXVII CPC.

Order 37 financial capacity 


آرڈر 37  کے تحت 2 کروڑ روپے کی ریکوری کا دعویٰ کیا تھا۔

مدعی کا مؤقف تھا کہ اس نے مدعا علیہ کو نقد رقم بطور قرض دی اور اس کے عوض ایک چیک بطور سکیورٹی حاصل کیا، جو بعد ازاں ڈس آنر ہو گیا


📌 کیس کا مختصر خلاصہ (Short Case Story)

یہ اپیل لاہور ہائیکورٹ، ملتان بینچ میں RFA No.08/2013 کے تحت دائر کی گئی، جس میں مدعی نے آرڈر 37 CPC کے تحت 2 کروڑ روپے کی ریکوری کا دعویٰ کیا تھا۔
مدعی کا مؤقف تھا کہ اس نے مدعا علیہ کو نقد رقم بطور قرض دی اور اس کے عوض ایک چیک بطور سکیورٹی حاصل کیا، جو بعد ازاں ڈس آنر ہو گیا۔
مدعا علیہ نے مؤقف اختیار کیا کہ:
اس نے 2 کروڑ روپے کا کوئی قرض نہیں لیا
چیک چوری ہو گیا تھا
صرف 1,35,000 روپے کا لین دین ہوا تھا
ٹرائل کورٹ نے مکمل شہادت کے بعد دعویٰ خارج کر دیا، جس کے خلاف یہ اپیل دائر کی گئی۔
⚖️ فیصلہ کے بنیادی قانونی نکات (Key Legal Findings)

1️⃣ فرانزک رپورٹ کی حیثیت

عدالت نے واضح کیا کہ:
اگر فرانزک رپورٹ میں دستخطوں کے بارے میں صرف "probably" جیسے الفاظ استعمال ہوں
تو ایسی رپورٹ حتمی اور فیصلہ کن شہادت نہیں بن سکتی
بالخصوص جب چیک میں کٹنگز / رد و بدل بھی موجود ہو
➡️ لہٰذا، صرف ایسی رپورٹ پر دعویٰ منظور نہیں کیا جا سکتا۔

2️⃣ سیکشن 118، نیگوشی ایبل انسٹرومنٹس ایکٹ

عدالت نے قرار دیا کہ:
Leave to Defend ملنے کے بعد
سیکشن 118 کے تحت موجود قانونی پریزمپشن ختم (neutralize) ہو جاتی ہے
اس کے بعد مدعی پر لازم ہے کہ وہ قرض کی حقیقت، طریقہ، وقت اور مالی استطاعت خود ثابت کرے

3️⃣ مالی استطاعت (Financial Capacity) کی اہمیت

عدالت نے نہایت اہم اصول وضع کیا کہ:
اگر قرض اور چیک کا اجرا تسلیم شدہ نہ ہو،
تو عدالت مدعی کی مالی حیثیت کا جائزہ لے سکتی ہے۔
اس کیس میں:
مدعی ٹیکس دہندہ نہیں تھا
2006 میں 2 کروڑ روپے نقد گھر میں رکھنا ناقابلِ یقین سمجھا گیا
قرض کی ادائیگی کا کوئی قابلِ اعتماد ثبوت پیش نہ کیا جا سکا

➡️ نتیجتاً، قرض کا دعویٰ غیر ثابت قرار پایا۔

🧠 منفرد قانونی نکتہ (Unique Legal Point)
🔹 Leave to Defend ملنے کے بعد، نیگوشی ایبل انسٹرومنٹ پر مبنی دعویٰ میں مدعی کو صرف چیک نہیں بلکہ اصل لین دین اور اپنی مالی حیثیت بھی ثابت کرنا لازم ہے۔
یہ فیصلہ آرڈر 37 CPC کے تحت ریکوری کے مقدمات میں ایک مضبوط نظیر ہے۔

📜 حتمی فیصلہ (Final Holding)

اپیل بے بنیاد قرار دے کر خارج کر دی گئی
ٹرائل کورٹ کا فیصلہ برقرار رکھا گیا
کوئی حکم برائے اخراجات نہیں دیا گیا


⚖️ اہم قانونی نکات

🔹 ہائی کورٹ نے قرار دیا کہ
اگر فرانزک رپورٹ میں دستخطوں کے بارے میں رائے صرف "probably" یا اسی نوعیت کے غیر یقینی الفاظ میں دی گئی ہو تو ایسی رپورٹ فیصلہ کن شہادت نہیں بن سکتی اور اس پر تنہا انحصار نہیں کیا جا سکتا۔
🔹 ہائی کورٹ نے قرار دیا کہ
جب چیک پر کٹنگز، رد و بدل یا مشکوک علامات موجود ہوں اور بینک کا گواہ بھی اس کی نشاندہی کرے تو فرانزک رپورٹ کی حیثیت مزید کمزور ہو جاتی ہے۔
🔹 ہائی کورٹ نے قرار دیا کہ
آرڈر 37 سی پی سی کے تحت دائر مقدمہ میں اگر مدعا علیہ کو Leave to Defend دے دی جائے تو سیکشن 118 نیگوشی ایبل انسٹرومنٹس ایکٹ کے تحت موجود قانونی پریزمپشن غیر مؤثر (neutralize) ہو جاتی ہے۔
🔹 ہائی کورٹ نے قرار دیا کہ
Leave to Defend کے بعد مدعی پر یہ ذمہ داری عائد ہوتی ہے کہ وہ قرض کی ادائیگی کو مثبت، واضح اور قابلِ اعتماد شہادت سے ثابت کرے۔
🔹 ہائی کورٹ نے قرار دیا کہ
صرف چیک کی موجودگی کافی نہیں بلکہ مدعی کو یہ بھی ثابت کرنا ہوتا ہے کہ قرض کب، کیسے، کس مقام پر اور کن گواہوں کی موجودگی میں دیا گیا۔
🔹 ہائی کورٹ نے قرار دیا کہ
اگر قرض اور چیک کا اجرا مدعا علیہ تسلیم نہ کرے تو عدالت کو یہ اختیار حاصل ہے کہ وہ مدعی کی مالی استطاعت (Financial Capacity) کا جائزہ لے۔
🔹 ہائی کورٹ نے قرار دیا کہ
یہ جانچنا جائز ہے کہ آیا ایک عام فہم شخص کے لیے یہ بات قابلِ یقین ہے کہ مدعی کے پاس متعلقہ وقت پر اتنی بڑی رقم نقد موجود تھی یا نہیں۔
🔹 ہائی کورٹ نے قرار دیا کہ
سال 2006 میں دو کروڑ روپے نقد گھر میں رکھنے کا دعویٰ بغیر کسی مستند مالی ریکارڈ کے ناقابلِ یقین ہے۔
🔹 ہائی کورٹ نے قرار دیا کہ
اگر مدعی متعلقہ وقت پر ٹیکس دہندہ نہ ہو اور اس کی آمدن یا مالی ذرائع ثابت نہ ہوں تو اس کی مالی حیثیت مشکوک سمجھی جائے گی۔
🔹 ہائی کورٹ نے قرار دیا کہ
قرض کے دعوے میں مدعی کا کیس اپنے پاؤں پر کھڑا ہونا چاہیے اور اسے صرف قانونی پریزمپشن کے سہارے قبول نہیں کیا جا سکتا۔
🔹 ہائی کورٹ نے قرار دیا کہ
قانون کسی فریق کو صرف چیک کی بنیاد پر ناجائز فائدہ (unjust enrichment) حاصل کرنے کی اجازت نہیں دیتا۔
🔹 ہائی کورٹ نے قرار دیا کہ
جب مدعی قرض کی بنیاد اور اپنی مالی استطاعت ثابت کرنے میں ناکام رہے تو ٹرائل کورٹ کی جانب سے دعویٰ خارج کرنا قانونی اور درست تھا۔
🔹 ہائی کورٹ نے قرار دیا کہ
اپیل میں مداخلت کا کوئی جواز موجود نہیں، اس لیے اپیل خارج کی جاتی ہے۔

Must read Judgement

Stereo. HCJDA 38.

JUDGMENT SHEET

LAHORE HIGH COURT

MULTAN BENCH MULTAN JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

RFA No.08/2013

Liaqat Ali Versus Liaqat Ali Shah

JUDGMENT

Date of Hearing:

Appellant by:

30.09.2025

Mr. Aurangzeb Alamgir Janjua, Advocate

Respondent by:

Proceeded against ex-parte, vide order dated 10.02.2022.

Anwaar Hussain, J. This appeal is directed against judgment and decree dated 21.12.2012 passed by the Trial Court whereby the suit of the appellant under Order XXXVII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 ("CPC") for recovery of Rs.20,000,000/- was dismissed.

2 Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the impugned judgment is result of misreading of evidence and non-appreciation of record. It is argued that despite failure of the respondent to prove that the cheque was stolen, and in spite of the opinion of the forensic laboratory that the signatures on the impugned cheque were "probably" those of the respondent, the appellant has been non-suited merely on the ground that it is not expected that a person would be keeping Rs.20,000,000/- in cash, at home, which reasoning is not persuasive to rebut the presumption of correctness attached to a negotiable instrument, under Section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 ("the Act").

  1. Conversely, the respondent was proceeded against ex-parte, vide order dated 10.02.2022.

  2. Arguments heard. Record perused.

  3. The appellant claimed that he had cordial relations with the family of the respondent, who was said to be residing in the U.K. and

RFA No.08/2013

2

requested a loan of Rs.20,000,000/-, on account of business losses. The amount was allegedly paid in cash, and the impugned cheque was issued by the respondent as security, which upon presentation was dishonoured. In defence, the respondent filed leave to contest, denying residence in the U.K. and contended that he had borrowed only Rs.135,000/- and had never issued any security cheque, which according to him had been stolen and misused. Leave was granted, issues were framed and evidence was recorded. The suit was dismissed. The pivotal issue framed by the Trial Court reads as under:

"Whether the defendant received Rs.20,000,000/- from the plaintiff on 02.07.2006 and issued cheque No.40647399 dated 03.08.2006 of his account? OPP"

  1. In the light of the ex-parte arguments advanced, the core questions requiring determination are as under:

(i) Whether the Trial Court was justified in discarding the forensic report regarding the signatures on the cheque, and in holding that the presumption of correctness under Section 118 of the Act stood rebutted?

(ii) Whether the Court can inquire into the existence/probability of the underlying transaction with reference to the financial capacity of the lender of amount for which a negotiable instrument is executed?

  1. The case of the respondent in his application for leave to defend was that the cheque in question was never issued in discharge of any liability but the same had been stolen, and therefore could not be made the basis of recovery proceedings. Leave to defend having been granted, the matter proceeded as a regular civil suit in which both parties led full evidence. The forensic report with regard to the signatures on the cheque opined only to the extent that they were "probably" of the respondent. At this juncture, it is imperative to note that whenever a forensic comparison is undertaken, whether it pertainsRFA No.08/2013

2

requested a loan of Rs.20,000,000/-, on account of business losses. The amount was allegedly paid in cash, and the impugned cheque was issued by the respondent as security, which upon presentation was dishonoured. In defence, the respondent filed leave to contest, denying residence in the U.K. and contended that he had borrowed only Rs.135,000/- and had never issued any security cheque, which according to him had been stolen and misused. Leave was granted, issues were framed and evidence was recorded. The suit was dismissed. The pivotal issue framed by the Trial Court reads as under:

"Whether the defendant received Rs.20,000,000/- from the plaintiff on 02.07.2006 and issued cheque No.40647399 dated 03.08.2006 of his account? OPP"

  1. In the light of the ex-parte arguments advanced, the core questions requiring determination are as under:

(i) Whether the Trial Court was justified in discarding the forensic report regarding the signatures on the cheque, and in holding that the presumption of correctness under Section 118 of the Act stood rebutted?

(ii) Whether the Court can inquire into the existence/probability of the underlying transaction with reference to the financial capacity of the lender of amount for which a negotiable instrument is executed?

  1. The case of the respondent in his application for leave to defend was that the cheque in question was never issued in discharge of any liability but the same had been stolen, and therefore could not be made the basis of recovery proceedings. Leave to defend having been granted, the matter proceeded as a regular civil suit in which both parties led full evidence. The forensic report with regard to the signatures on the cheque opined only to the extent that they were "probably" of the respondent. At this juncture, it is imperative to note that whenever a forensic comparison is undertaken, whether it pertains

RFA No.08/2013

3

to signatures or to thumb impressions, the evidentiary value of the expert's report essentially depends on the degree of certainty expressed therein. If the expert opines in terms of "probably," or in terms of expressions like "may be," "appears to be," the clarity of the impression is doubtful, such opinion cannot be treated as a conclusive finding can be drawn against a party. Therefore, in present case, expert report alone being inconclusive, could not by itself furnish a safe basis for holding the cheque to be duly executed, particularly, when alterations and cuttings on the said instrument were also noted by the bank official who appeared as PW-1.

proof. The element of probability diminishes its decisiveness, and in

such cases corroboration from other independent evidence and

surrounding circumstances becomes indispensable before any adverse

As regards the second legal question, formulated hereinabove,

  1. this Court is of the opinion that the presumption under Section 118 of the Act stood neutralized after grant of leave to defend. Therefore, it was incumbent upon the appellant/plaintiff to prove, affirmatively, the advancement of the alleged loan by showing when, how, and in whose presence the sum of Rs.20,000,000/- was paid in 2006. The appellant/plaintiff produced witnesses of the transaction, however, one of the witnesses PW-3 is his real son whereas PW-4 contradicted the stance of the appellant. The argument of learned counsel for the the financial capacity of the lender may not assume much significance. However, in cases where liability is denied and the lender has also failed to furnish details of the alleged transaction, it becomes essential to scrutinize and establish the lender's financial capacity in order to assess the plausibility of the claim. The appellant/plaintiff's case had to stand on its own legs, as he cannot be allowed to unjustly enrich himself, simply on account of the

appellant that financial capacity of a plaintiff in suit for recovery

under Order XXXVII, CPC, is irrelevant, is also misconceived. Where

the issuance of a cheque by a borrower or taking of a loan is admitted,

4

420 B/s

44

RFA No.08/2013

presumption of correctness albeit rebuttable attached to a negotiable instrument, which otherwise stood neutralized after grant of leave to defend. The non-existence of the consideration on account of lack of financial capacity was so probable in the present case that a person of ordinary prudence cannot believe that in the year 2006, the appellant could have a hefty amount of Rs.20,000,000/- lying in cash at his home. The appellant/plaintiff failed to establish his financial capacity. especially when it is admitted that he was not a taxpayer at the relevant time. In the absence of credible material to substantiate the lending of such a substantial amount, the assertion of loan remained unproven. The Trial Court, therefore, correctly dismissed the suit by holding that the plaintiff failed to establish the foundation of his claim. Therefore, no ground for interference is made out.

  1. In view of the above discussion, the present appeal is devoid of any merit and is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.

(ANWAAR HUSSAIN) JUDGE

Announced on the same day in open Court and dictated on 02.10.2025 and finalized/signed on 20.10.2025.

Approved for reporting

Judge


For more information call us 0092-324-4010279 Whatsapp Dear readers if u like this post plz comments and follow us. Thanks for reading .as you know our goal is to aware people of their rights and how can get their rights. we will answer every question, so we need your help to achieve our goal. plz tell people about this blog and subscribe to our youtube channel and follow us at the end of this post.

12/19/2025

Mere Allegation of Fraud Without Particulars Cannot Defeat a Valid Sale Mutation 2025 CLC 228


Mere Allegation of Fraud Without Particulars Cannot Defeat a Valid Sale Mutation 2025 CLC 228 .


وارثان نے دعویٰ کیا کہ انتقال دھوکہ دہی سے منظور ہوا، مگر وہ خود میوٹیشن کے وقت موجود نہیں تھے۔





📌 کیس کی بہت مختصر کہانی


مدعی نے سیل میوٹیشن کو جعلی اور دھوکہ دہی پر مبنی قرار دے کر اس کی تنسیخ اور اعلامیہ (Declaration) کی درخواست دائر کی، مگر عدالت نے قرار دیا کہ نہ تو دھوکہ دہی کی کوئی واضح تفصیل بیان کی گئی اور نہ ہی قابلِ اعتماد ثبوت پیش کیا گیا، اس لیے دعویٰ مسترد کر دیا گیا۔


---

⚖️ پس منظر


مدعی کے مورث نے اپنے بیان پر فروخت کی میوٹیشن منظور کروائی تھی، جس میں گواہان موجود تھے اور مکمل قیمت بھی ادا کی گئی۔ کئی سال بعد وارثان نے دعویٰ کیا کہ میوٹیشن دھوکہ دہی سے منظور ہوئی، مگر وہ خود میوٹیشن کے وقت موجود نہیں تھے۔


---

🔑 اہم قانونی نکات


ہر نکتہ عدالت کے قرار دینے سے شروع کیا گیا ہے:

✔ ہائیکورٹ نے قرار دیا:

دھوکہ دہی (Fraud) کا الزام مخصوص تفصیلات کے بغیر قابلِ سماعت نہیں۔

محض یہ کہنا کہ “دھوکہ ہوا” کافی نہیں، طریقہ، انداز اور حالات واضح کرنا لازم ہے۔

جس شخص نے خود میوٹیشن پر بیان دیا ہو، بعد میں اس کا انکار معتبر نہیں۔

سنی سنائی (Hearsay) گواہی کی کوئی قانونی حیثیت نہیں۔

دعویٰ میں وجۂ دعویٰ (Cause of Action) کے بارے میں تضاد مدعی کے مؤقف کو کمزور کرتا ہے۔

تحریری دستاویزات کو زبانی گواہی پر ترجیح حاصل ہے۔

ایک ثابت شدہ دستاویز اپنے مندرجات کے بارے میں خود بولتی ہے (Document speaks for itself)۔

جب میوٹیشن کے اجرا سے انکار نہ ہو تو گواہانِ تصدیق کا پیش نہ ہونا مہلک نہیں۔

کئی سال بعد دعویٰ کرنا بذاتِ خود مشکوک ہوتا ہے۔



---

⭐ منفرد قانونی نکتہ


عدالت نے واضح کیا کہ اگر تحریری دستاویز قانون کے مطابق ثابت ہو جائے تو اس کے مندرجات کے درست ہونے کا قرینہ (Presumption) قائم ہو جاتا ہے، اور ایسی دستاویز کو محض زبانی گواہی سے کالعدم نہیں کیا جا سکتا، ورنہ قانونی نظام میں بے یقینی پیدا ہو جائے گی۔


---

📚 اہم عدالتی نظائر


2023 SCMR 1155

2020 SCMR 197

2022 SCMR 842

2015 SCMR 1



---

❌ نتیجہ


سول ریویژن مسترد کر دی گئی، اور فروخت کی میوٹیشن کو درست اور مؤثر قرار دیا گیا۔


---




For more information call us 0092-324-4010279 Whatsapp Dear readers if u like this post plz comments and follow us. Thanks for reading .as you know our goal is to aware people of their rights and how can get their rights. we will answer every question, so we need your help to achieve our goal. plz tell people about this blog and subscribe to our youtube channel and follow us at the end of this post.

Civil Servant Promotion Deferred Despite Acquittal: Sindh High Court Ruling Explained (2025 PLC C.S. 293)


Civil Servant Promotion Deferred Despite Acquittal: Sindh High Court Ruling Explained (2025 PLC C.S. 293)



سول سرونٹ کی ترقی اس کا بنیادی حق نہیں بلکہ اتھارٹی کا صوابدیدی اختیار ھے۔

**فوجداری بریت کے باوجود سول سرونٹ کی ترقی کیوں مؤخر ہو سکتی ہے؟


سندھ ہائی کورٹ کا اہم فیصلہ (2025 PLC (C.S.) 293)**

تمہید


سول سروس میں ترقی کا عمل صرف سنیارٹی پر مبنی نہیں ہوتا بلکہ کردار، نظم و ضبط، سروس ریکارڈ اور انتظامی طرزِ عمل کو بھی بنیادی حیثیت حاصل ہے۔ سندھ ہائی کورٹ کے حالیہ فیصلے نے اس اصول کو مزید واضح کر دیا ہے کہ فوجداری مقدمے میں بریت کے باوجود بھی ترقی مؤخر کی جا سکتی ہے۔


---

کیس کا پس منظر


درخواست گزار ایک BPS-19 کا سول سرونٹ تھا جس نے اپنی BPS-20 میں ترقی مؤخر کیے جانے کو سندھ ہائی کورٹ میں چیلنج کیا۔
اس کا مؤقف تھا کہ وہ NAB ریفرنس میں بری ہو چکا ہے، لہٰذا ترقی روکنے کی وجوہات ختم ہو چکی ہیں اور اسے اپنے جونیئر افسران کی طرح ترقی دی جائے۔


---

درخواست گزار کے خلاف موجود عوامل


عدالتی ریکارڈ کے مطابق درخواست گزار کے خلاف درج ذیل اہم امور موجود تھے:

وہ NAB ریفرنس کا سامنا کر چکا تھا (اگرچہ بعد ازاں بری ہوا)

اس نے 2021 کی Performance Evaluation Report (PER) حاصل نہیں کی

تقریباً چار سال تک اثاثہ جات کا گوشوارہ جمع نہیں کروایا

اسٹیبلشمنٹ ڈویژن کے ریپٹری ایشن آرڈر کے باوجود سندھ حکومت میں ڈیپوٹیشن برقرار رکھی

مجاز اتھارٹی کی ہدایات کی نافرمانی، جو ڈسپلنری کارروائی کے زمرے میں آتی ہے



---

عدالت کا قانونی مؤقف


سندھ ہائی کورٹ نے واضح طور پر قرار دیا کہ:

اگر کوئی سول سرونٹ انکوائری، تفتیش یا ریفرنس کا سامنا کر رہا ہو تو اس کی ترقی قانوناً مؤخر کی جا سکتی ہے

ترقی کوئی بنیادی یا فطری حق نہیں بلکہ متعلقہ اتھارٹی کا صوابدیدی اختیار ہے

عدالت کا کام یہ نہیں کہ وہ CSB کو ترقی دینے کا حکم دے

سنگین بدانتظامی یا نظم و ضبط کی خلاف ورزی کی موجودگی میں عدالتی مداخلت اچھی حکمرانی کے اصولوں کے منافی ہے



---

Central Selection Board (CSB) کا کردار


عدالت نے CSB کے کردار کو تسلیم کرتے ہوئے کہا کہ:

CSB مجموعی طور پر کردار، سروس ریکارڈ، نظم و ضبط اور اہلیت کا جائزہ لیتی ہے

صرف فوجداری بریت، ترقی کے لیے خودکار حق پیدا نہیں کرتی

درخواست گزار کو کئی بار زیرِ غور لایا گیا مگر متعدد وجوہات کی بنا پر ترقی مؤخر کی گئی



---

عدالت کا حتمی فیصلہ


ہائی کورٹ نے قرار دیا کہ:

درخواست گزار کی ترقی مؤخر کرنے کا فیصلہ قانون کے مطابق اور درست ہے

اس فیصلے میں عدالتی مداخلت کی کوئی گنجائش نہیں

تاہم، آئندہ اگر وہ تمام وجوہات ختم ہو جائیں جن کی بنیاد پر ترقی روکی گئی، تو اس کا کیس دوبارہ زیر غور آ سکتا ہے



---

اس فیصلے کی قانونی اہمیت


یہ فیصلہ سول سروس قانون میں ایک اہم اصول واضح کرتا ہے:

> سروس ڈسپلن، انتظامی اطاعت اور شفافیت، ترقی کے لیے فوجداری بریت سے کہیں زیادہ اہم عوامل ہیں۔



یہ فیصلہ ان تمام سرکاری ملازمین کے لیے رہنمائی فراہم کرتا ہے جو یہ سمجھتے ہیں کہ صرف بریت کے بعد ترقی ان کا حق بن جاتی ہے۔


---

نتیجہ


سندھ ہائی کورٹ کا یہ فیصلہ اچھی حکمرانی، ادارہ جاتی نظم و ضبط اور میرٹ کے اصولوں کو مضبوط کرتا ہے اور واضح کرتا ہے کہ ترقی کا عمل محض عدالتی احکامات سے نہیں بلکہ کردار اور کارکردگی سے جڑا ہوتا ہے۔

Must read Judgement


2025 P L C (C.S.) 293

[Sindh High Court]

Before Muhammad Junaid Ghaffar and Adnan-ul-Karim Memon, JJ

ABDUL SHAKOOR ABRO

Versus

PRIME MINISTER OF PAKISTAN through Principal Secretary and 3 others

Constitution Petition No.D-2701 of 2022, decided on 16th April, 2024.

(a) Civil Servants Promotion (BPS-18 to BPS-21) Rules, 2019---

----Rr. 7(i) & 7(j)---Revised Promotion Policy, 2007, Para. 1(b)(iii)(iv)---Deferment of promotion---Scope---Criminal charges against civil servant---Effect---Petitioner (civil servant of BPS-19) by challenging his deferment of promotion sought direction to the official respondents to reconsider his case for promotion against the post of BS-20 with effect from the date when his juniors were promoted---Plea of the petitioner was that he had been acquitted from the criminal case against him, and his deferment on the continual various grounds was no more in the field---Validity---Petitioner, un-deniably, was facing a NAB reference and he was acquitted under S. 265-K, Cr.P.C, by the Accountability Court in the Reference filed against him---If any civil servant was facing an enquiry, investigation, NAB reference, his case could be deferred---Reasons assigned by the Central Selection Board (CSB) on the said analogy appeared to be reasonable and did not call for deliberation---In the meanwhile the petitioner had also failed to earn Performance Evaluation Reports (PERs) in the year 2021 and did not submit his assets declaration for the last about four years---Record revealed that the petitioner managed to retain his deputation with the Sindh Government despite the issuance of a repatriation letter issued by the Establishment Division as informed, but he remained adamant, as such prima facie he had defied the directives of the competent authority which action fells within the ambit of disciplinary proceedings under the law---Petitioner, admittedly, was considered for promotion in the CSB meetings but was deferred on account of many factors---Case of the petitioner for promotion was rightly deferred by the competent authority / CSB and such decision did not call for any interference by the High Court, however, his further deferment if any shall be subject to the ceasing of reasons based on which the deferment took place---Constitutional petition was disposed of accordingly.

(b) Constitution of Pakistan---

----Art. 199---Civil Servants Promotion (BPS-18 to BPS-21) Rules 2019, Rr. 7(i) and 7(j)---Revised Promotion Policy, 2007, Para 1(b)(iii) (iv)---Deferment of promotion of civil servant, matter of---Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court, invoking of---Scope---Petitioner (Civil Servant of BPS-19) by challenging his deferment of promotion sought direction to the official respondents to reconsider his case for promotion against the post of BPS-20 with effect from the date when his juniors were promoted---Plea of the petitioner was that he had been acquitted from the criminal case against him and his deferment on the continual various grounds was no more in the field---Validity---Petitioner, admittedly, was considered for promotion in the Central Selection Board (CSB) meetings but was deferred on account of many factors---High Court was not meant to compel the competent authority to promote a civil servant against whom prima facie involvement in serious charges of misconduct was available, for the reason that any such direction would be disharmonious to the principle of good governance and canons of service discipline, causing undue interference which would hamper the smooth functioning of the departmental authorities---Promotion cannot be claimed as a vested / fundamental right---Case of the petitioner for promotion was rightly deferred by the competent authority/CSB and such decision did not call for any interference by the High Court, however, his further deferment if any shall be subject to the ceasing of reasons based on which the deferment took place---Constitutional petition was disposed of accordingly.

Mst. Ifat Nazir v. Government of Punjab and others 2009 SCMR 703 ref.  

   Ali Asadullah Bullo for Petitioner.  

   Kashif Nazir, Assistant Attorney General for Respondents Nos.1 to 3.  

   Ali Safrdar Depar, A.A.G. for Respondent No.4.



For more information call us 0092-324-4010279 Whatsapp Dear readers if u like this post plz comments and follow us. Thanks for reading .as you know our goal is to aware people of their rights and how can get their rights. we will answer every question, so we need your help to achieve our goal. plz tell people about this blog and subscribe to our youtube channel and follow us at the end of this post.

12/18/2025

Compassionate Appointments under Rule 17-A: Terminal Date Clarified as 18 October 2024

Compassionate Appointments under Rule 17-A: Terminal Date Clarified as 18 October 2024



📌 مختصر مکمل کہانی (Case Story)


لاہور ہائیکورٹ ملتان بنچ کے سامنے پنجاب سول سرونٹس رولز کے Rule 17-A کے خاتمے کے بعد پیدا ہونے والے شدید انتظامی ابہام کے نتیجے میں بڑی تعداد میں آئینی درخواستیں دائر ہوئیں۔ اصل تنازع یہ تھا کہ کن تاریخ تک Rule 17-A کے تحت تقرریاں قانونی سمجھی جائیں گی۔ عدالت نے واضح کیا کہ حتمی (Terminal) تاریخ 18 اکتوبر 2024 ہے، نہ کہ 24 جولائی 2024، اور اسی بنیاد پر تمام زیرِ التواء درخواستوں کا فیصلہ کیا گیا۔


---

🧾 کیس کا پس منظر


Rule 17-A کو 24.07.2024 کو حذف کیا گیا

بعد ازاں Supreme Court کے فیصلے (General Post Office Case) کے باعث اس کے اثرات 18.10.2024 تک سمجھے گئے

انتظامیہ نے مختلف، متضاد احکامات جاری کیے

اسی ابہام کے خلاف متعدد آئینی درخواستیں دائر ہوئیں



---

⚖️ عدالت کے سامنے بنیادی قانونی سوال


> کیا Rule 17-A کے تحت تقرریوں کے لیے 24.07.2024 آخری تاریخ ہے یا 18.10.2024؟




---

🧩 عدالت نے درخواستوں کو دو زمروں میں تقسیم کیا


🔹 Category-A


وہ ملازمین

جنہیں 18.10.2024 سے پہلے تقرری کے باقاعدہ لیٹر جاری ہو چکے تھے


🔹 Category-B


وہ امیدوار

جنہیں تقرری لیٹر جاری نہیں ہوا

لیکن 18.10.2024 سے پہلے تمام حتمی و فیصلہ کن اقدامات مکمل ہو چکے تھے



---

🏛️ اہم قانونی نکات (ہر نکتہ "عدالت نے قرار دیا" سے شروع)


عدالت نے قرار دیا کہ Rule 17-A کے خاتمے کی حتمی مؤثر تاریخ 18.10.2024 ہے

عدالت نے قرار دیا کہ صرف 24.07.2024 کو بنیاد بنا کر تقرریاں غیرقانونی قرار دینا غلط ہے

عدالت نے قرار دیا کہ "Final and decisive step" کا تعین ہر کیس میں الگ الگ ہوگا

عدالت نے قرار دیا کہ جن کے تقرری لیٹر 18.10.2024 سے پہلے جاری ہو چکے، ان کی تقرریاں مکمل طور پر قانونی ہیں

عدالت نے قرار دیا کہ Category-A ملازمین کو تنخواہوں کی ادائیگی لازمی ہے

عدالت نے قرار دیا کہ Category-B کیسز کو متعلقہ حکام کے پاس دوبارہ فیصلے کے لیے واپس بھیجا جائے

عدالت نے قرار دیا کہ سابقہ متنازعہ و منفی احکامات کالعدم تصور ہوں گے



---

🧑‍⚖️ حتمی فیصلہ (Operative Part)


Category-A کی تمام درخواستیں منظور

تقرریاں درست قرار

تنخواہوں کی ادائیگی کا حکم

Category-B کی درخواستیں بھی منظور

لیکن معاملات متعلقہ محکموں کو ریمانڈ

تاکہ یہ دیکھا جا سکے کہ آیا 18.10.2024 سے پہلے حتمی اقدامات مکمل ہوئے تھے یا نہیں

چیف سیکرٹری پنجاب کو فیصلے پر عملدرآمد کی ہدایت



---

📝 قانونی اہمیت (Legal Significance)


یہ فیصلہ:

Rule 17-A کے تمام تنازعات کا واضح حل فراہم کرتا ہے

انتظامیہ کی غلط تشریحات کو ختم کرتا ہے

ہزاروں متاثرہ ملازمین کے حقوق کا تحفظ کرتا ہے

مستقبل میں غیرضروری آئینی درخواستوں کی روک تھام کا ذریعہ ہے

Must read Judgement

Form No: HCJD/C-121

ORDER SHEET

IN THE LAHORE HIGH COURT, MULTAN BENCH, MULTAN JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

W.P. No.11695/2024

Muhammad Tahir Bashir

Versus

Province of Punjab, etc.

S.No. of order/proceeding

Date of order/Proceeding

Order with signature of Judge, and that of parties of counsel, where necessary

16.12.2025

Mr. Muhammad Shah Jahan Rizvi, Advocate for the petitioner in this petition and in other connected petitions.

M/s Muhammad Ali Siddiqui, Syed Muhammad Kaml Haider Naqvi, Fatima Safeer and Nouman Aftab, Advocates in connected W.P. No.15228/2025.

Muhammad Ashraf Sago, Advocate for petitioner in connected W.P. No. 14414/2025.

M/s Ch. Muhammad Saeed and Farzan Hashmat Ch., Advocates for petitioner in connected W.P. No. 13245/2024.

Mr. Bilal Amin, Advocate for petitioner in connected W.P. No. 14345/2025.

Raja Naveed Azam, Advocate for petitioner in connected W.P. No. 14984/2025.

M/s Rai Rafaqat Hussain Bhatti, Babar Ahsan Bhatti and Abdul Samad Ali, Advocates for petition in connected W.P. No. 14700/2025.

Malik Masroor Haider Usman, Additional Advocate General along with Junaid Neem, AEO, Jawad Akbar, District Accounts Officer, Riaz Ahmad, Senior Law Officer LG&CD Department South Punjab, Abdul Razzaq Khan, Senior Auditor, District Accounts Office, Multan, Talha Sajid, AEO Rajanpur, Inspector Muhammad Atif, Khanewal and Amir Sohail, Municipal Officer (Finance) Municipal Committee, Kallar Kot.

Debates and controversies after the omission of

Rule 17-A of the Punjab Civil Servants (Appointment & Conditions of Service) Rules,

W.P. No. 11695/2024

1974 (Rule 17-A) reach this Court in one manifestation or the other.

  1. Primary reason for avalanche of constitutional petitions, instituted in routine, touching issue of enforceability of Rule 17-A vis-à-vis past and closed appointments and matters, where question of determination of final and decisive step requires clear and conclusive decisions, is gross confusion prevalent amongst the ranks of the Executive /Administrative branch of the Government, which, despite passing of judgments variously, still manifest disagreements and hand down inconsistent orders. This had compounded the confusion.

  2. Two categories of constitutional petitions are pending and are decided through this single decision which categories are identified as category-A and category-B [details of petitions in category-A are provided in Annex-A of the schedule and category-B are listed in Annex-B of the schedule, which schedule is part of this judgment.

  3. Category-A are cases where appointments under Rule 17-A were made before 18.10.2024. and category-B relates to cases where appointments letters were not issued, till 18.10.2024, but petitioners claimed that final and decisive steps were taken before 18.10.2024 and appointment letters were not issued in wake of confusion qua actual terminal date with respect to the applicability of order of omission of Rule 17-A.

  4. It is believed that determination of terminal date [when omission of Rule 17-A would be

W.P. No. 11695/2024

3

effective for all intent and purposes] would alleviate and address prevalent confusion. This determination was already carried out in terms of the decision dated 10.04.2025, in case of Province of Punjab, etc. v. Syed Muhammad Ali Raza Shah", passed while deciding ICA No.2407/2025 and connected matters. Relevant findings at paragraph 13 are reproduced hereunder:-

"13. The persons who have taken benefit of Rule 17-A of the Rules till its omission dated 24.07.2024, that process would deem to be a part and closed chapter. To further classify and clarify the situation, the persons who could not get the benefit of Rule 17-A of the Rules (omitted on 24.07.2024) and were in process. and no final and decisive step could had been taken effect till the pronouncement of venerated judgment passed in the case of General Post Office. Islamabad and others (supra) i.e. 18.10.2024, the judgment ibid would be applicable with retrospective effect".

  1. It is evident that learned Division Bench, while deciding the case(s) of those persons, who had not benefited from Rule 17-A, till its omission on 24.07.2024, which date was extended till 18.10.2024 by virtue of giving effect to the judgment in the case of General Post Office. Islamabad and others V. Muhammad Jalal Civil Petition No.3390/2021), clearly observed that such persons, whose cases were in process and no final and decisive step had been taken till the pronouncement of venerated judgment passed in the case of General Post Office, Islamabad and others (supra) i.e. 18.10.2024, would not claim benefit from Rule 17-A, since in their case judgment in the case of General Post Office, Islamabad and others would

W.P. No.11695/2024

4

apply retrospectively. Learned Division bench objectively had not drawn a clear divide between persons in whose favour appointment letters were issued before the terminal date and those who did not possess appointment letters and benchmark settled was that no final and decisive step had been taken effect till 18.10.2024.

  1. I reject the interpretation proposed by learned law officer that only those persons were protected whose appointment letters were issued before 24.07.2024. In fact and law, and by virtue of decision of 10.04.2024, terminal date was declared as 18.10.2024. Question that whether any final and decisive step had been taken is a fact-question, determination whereof differs in each case.

  2. In view of the above, persons appointed before 18.10.2024, in whose favour appointment letters were issued [category-A], their appointments were declared lawful and authorities concerned are directed to ensure payment of their salaries accordingly some petitioners raised grievance regarding non-payment of salaries despite performing of duties pursuant to appointment orders issued before the terminal date [18.10.2024].

All petitions listed in Annexure-A are allowed in terms of findings / declarations in this paragraph and any adverse order passed contrary to this declaration is set-aside.

  1. Now I take-up cases of category-B [listed at Annexure-B]. In certain petitions orders

Imran

1.4

A 18

W.P. No.11695/2024

5

variously passed by authorities were also assailed on the ground that despite taking of final and decisive steps, before 18.10.2024, appointments were declined by wrongfully applying terminal date as 24.07.2024. Without discussing individual facts/cases of each petitioner(s), it is appropriate to remand category-B matters to the respective authorities, which had passed orders respectively and hereby impugned, upon setting-aside said orders. Authorities concerned would determine that whether any final and decisive step had been taken till 18.10.2024 with respect to the claims of petitioners of Annex-B.

In view of aforesaid, petitions relating to category-B cases [Annex-BI are allowed in terms of findings / declarations in this paragraph.

  1. Hence, petitions are decided accordingly, terms of findings / declarations recorded at paragraphs 8 and 9, (supra) respectively. Office is directed to send copy of this order to Chief Secretary, Government of Punjab for compliance accordingly.

(ASIM HAFEEZ) JUDGE

Approved for reporting.

JUDGE




For more information call us 0092-324-4010279 Whatsapp Dear readers if u like this post plz comments and follow us. Thanks for reading .as you know our goal is to aware people of their rights and how can get their rights. we will answer every question, so we need your help to achieve our goal. plz tell people about this blog and subscribe to our youtube channel and follow us at the end of this post.

Featured Post

Court Marriage Process in Pakistan 2025 | Complete Urdu Guide

Court Marriage Process in Pakistan (2025 Latest Guide) کورٹ میرج پاکستان 2025 مکمل رہنمائی Last Updated: June 2025 Court marriage Pakis...